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When I was first introduced to the constitutional regulation of criminal
procedure in the mid-1950s, a single issue dominated the field: To what extent
did the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose upon states
the same constitutional restraints that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth
Amendments imposed upon the federal government? While those Bill of
Rights provisions, as even then construed, imposed a broad range of
constitutional restraints upon the federal criminal justice system,1 the federal
system was (and still is) minuscule as compared to the combined systems of
the fifty states.2 With the Bill of Rights provisions having long been held to
apply only to the federal government,3 the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause, because it did apply to the states, was the key to providing
federal constitutional regulation of the vast bulk of law enforcement activities
and criminal proceedings.4 The Supreme Court had repeatedly held that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause had a content that was
independent of the Bill of Rights.5 That clause demanded “fundamental
fairness,” which could overlap in part with the protections found in the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments, but was much narrower in scope.6
During the 1950s, as it had for the previous several decades, the Court pursued,
on a case-by-case basis, the task of answering the question of precisely how far
that overlap did extend.7
Then, in the 1960s, the Warren Court instituted a sea change in Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. It reformulated the fundamental fairness test to
facilitate the “selective incorporation” of individual Bill of Rights guarantees
within the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, thereby carrying over
to the states the same content that those guarantees had as applied to the
federal criminal justice system.8 Applying this “selective incorporation”
reformulation, the Supreme Court, over a period of less than a decade, applied
to the states almost all the criminal procedure guarantees found in the Bill of
Indeed, only one criminal procedural guarantee—the Fifth
Rights.9
Amendment’s requirement of prosecution of felony offenses by grand jury
1. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE §§ 2.4(c)-(d), 2.8(b) (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter TREATISE].
2. See 1 id. § 1.2(b), at 10-14.
3. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding Bill of Rights does not
apply to states); 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.2.
4. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 1.2(b), at 10-14.
5. See 1 id. § 2.4(c)-(d).
6. See 1 id. § 2.4(e).
7. See, e.g., Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 53 (1954); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
8. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 2.4(a), 2.6(a).
9. As discussed infra in the text accompanying note 465, the Court did not have occasion to
rule on the incorporation issue as to a few of those guarantees. See also 1 TREATISE, supra note
1, § 2.6(b).
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indictment or presentment—has been held by the Supreme Court not to apply
to the states.10
With almost all of the guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth
Amendments applied to the states, the focus of the constitutional regulation of
criminal procedure has shifted to the content of those guarantees. The bulk of
the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure rulings have focused on the scope of
those guarantees. The opinions in such cases have referred to the due process
clause, if at all, only to note in passing that it made the Bill of Rights guarantee
in question applicable to the states.11
At the same time, however, another group of Supreme Court rulings have
looked to the content of due process that stands apart from the incorporated
guarantees.12 Indeed, the post-incorporation years have seen a steady stream of
these Supreme Court rulings applying the independent content of due process
to the state and federal criminal justice processes. Although their contribution
to the constitutional regulation of criminal procedure is not as substantial as the
rulings applying the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendment guarantees,
these due process rulings nonetheless have made a significant contribution to
that regulation. For some stages of the process, what has come to be known as
“free-standing due process” provides the primary grounding for constitutional
regulation.13
While the rulings based on free-standing due process have received
considerable attention in the academic commentary, almost all of that coverage
has focused on the impact of individual rulings on particular stages of the
process. Thus, with only a handful of exceptions,14 the commentary on the
Supreme Court’s methodology—or lack of methodology—in determining the
independent content of due process tends to be found in brief discussions
within articles focusing on the potential regulation of particular procedures
through free-standing due process. My objective here is to provide a
springboard for further exploration of the appropriate role of free-standing due
10. See infra text accompanying note 466.
11. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.6(c), at 573 n.85.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 487-538.
13. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 527-33, describing the due process regulation of
sentencing procedures.
14. Donald Dripps and John Nowak, two of the distinguished group of commentators who
have been kind enough to respond to this article, are most prominently placed in that handful.
See Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635
(1999); Donald A. Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I
Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996); Donald A. Dripps, At the
Borders of the Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due Process Test Should Replace the Outrageous
Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 261; Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren
Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591 (1990); John E. Nowak, Due Process Methodology in
the Postincorporation World, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (1979).
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process in the constitutional regulation of the criminal justice process. I hope
to do that by providing a fairly complete doctrinal history of the Court’s
development and application of interpretative guidelines for determining the
content of free-standing due process. I apologize for presenting such a narrow
history, ignoring the personalities and the political and societal developments
that contributed to shaping those guidelines. However, limited space and
limited expertise15 lead me to concentrate on what I know best. Hopefully
others will fill in the rest of the picture.
The doctrinal grounding of free-standing due process, as applied to
criminal procedure, has been shaped in large part by how the Court viewed the
relationship between due process and the criminal procedure “specifics” of the
Bill of Rights. The original framing of the content of due process in criminal
procedure came out of a case dealing with that relationship. For many decades
thereafter, the development and modification of that initial position was shaped
by rulings dealing with that relationship. Following the dramatic restructuring
of the relationship in the 1960s, a primary concern of the Court was whether
the doctrinal base of free-standing due process should be narrowed in light of
that restructured relationship. Accordingly, I have divided my doctrinal
history into three periods, which are tied to that relationship: (1) Hurtado v.
California,16 which presented the Court’s initial pronouncements on the role of
due process in the regulation of criminal procedure; (2) the period between
Hurtado and the adoption of selective incorporation in the 1960s; and (3) the
period since the adoption of selective incorporation.
I. THE HURTADO CONCEPTION OF DUE PROCESS
(PARTICULARLY AS APPLIED TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)
Hurtado v. California17 provides the obvious starting point for tracing the
Supreme Court’s development of guidelines for determining the content of due
process as applied to criminal procedure. Although decided in 1884, over a
century after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Hurtado was the first major
Supreme Court ruling on what due process requires of the criminal process.
The Fifth Amendment includes a due process clause, but as of 1884, the Court
had never been called upon to apply that clause to the federal criminal process.
With the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and its due process
clause, a federal constitutional mandate of due process was extended to state
criminal justice systems. The state cases were more likely than the federal
cases to require federal due process rulings because (1) the constitutional

15. As for the limits of “lawyer” histories, see the discussion in 1 TREATISE, supra note 1,
§ 1.5(a) (introducing an “internal history” of the shaping of the basic structure of the American
justice process).
16. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
17. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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challenges in a state case could be based only on the due process clause and (2)
the numerous state systems presented greater potential for adopting some
significant departure from the common law tradition. Indeed, the Hurtado case
was a product of exactly those two distinguishing characteristics.
At issue in Hurtado was whether a state could provide for the initiation of
capital charges based upon a prosecutor’s information, supported by a finding
of probable cause by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, rather than by the
grand jury indictment or presentment that would have been required in a
federal felony prosecution by the Fifth Amendment.18 Bentham, in 1824, had
launched in England a prominent attack against the grand jury, which had been
carried over to this country. The critics characterized prosecution by
indictment as cumbersome, unwieldy, expensive and undemocratic (because of
its secrecy).19 In 1859, Michigan was persuaded by this criticism and adopted
a change in its constitution that allowed the legislature to authorize prosecution
by information for felonies.20 The Michigan legislature promptly accepted that
invitation, and provided that prosecutions for felonies could be either by
indictment or by information following a preliminary hearing bindover.
Several states, including California, followed suit.21 The adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment provided a potential federal constitutional grounding
for challenging that change. The same change, if presented in the federal
system, would not have arisen as a due process question because the Fifth
Amendment’s first clause dealt specifically with prosecution by indictment.
In Hurtado, the Supreme Court (with only Justice Harlan dissenting) held
that the California procedure for instituting capital charges, though it did not
require prosecution by indictment, nonetheless satisfied the due process
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Interestingly, that holding
continues to be the law even though the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
selective incorporation doctrine in the 1960s rendered irrelevant (and often
explicitly overruled) all of the other pre-1960s rulings on due process
challenges in state cases that would have been treated under specific Bill of
Rights guarantees in federal cases.22 However, what makes Hurtado

18. The first clause of the Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The “infamous crime” category includes all felonies. See 4
TREATISE, supra note 1, § 15.1(b), at 200-07.
19. See 3 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 8.2(b), at 14-15.
20. 1 SARAH SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.5 (2d ed. 1997);
RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 16341941, at 66-69 (1963).
21. YOUNGER, supra note 20, at 69-71; 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 1.5(d), at 261-62.
22. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.6(b), particularly at 564 n.33.
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significant in the development of the independent content of due process was
not its holding on initiating prosecutions without indictment, but its analysis of
the general character of due process in the context of criminal procedure. That
analysis provided both a general standard for determining the content of due
process that continues to be applied and several specific guidelines for
applying that general standard. Though those guidelines subsequently were
rejected in large part, the perspective they advanced arguably has been
resurrected, to some extent, in the post-incorporation development of
guidelines for applying free-standing due process.
Hurtado was decided long before the Supreme Court adopted the now
common practice of dividing its opinions into several parts, each designated by
a Roman numeral and treating a separate argument or issue.23 Although
stylistically quite different as written, Justice Matthews’ opinion for the Court
in Hurtado is readily restructured to fit that format. This would give it four
distinct parts. The first three would deal with responses to petitioner Hurtado’s
claim that prosecution by indictment was a prerequisite of due process as
established by (1) the historical understanding of due process, (2) the analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in the earlier due process ruling of Murray’s
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,24 and (3) the recognition of
prosecution by indictment in the Fifth Amendment. In the course of
responding to these contentions, the Hurtado opinion spoke primarily of what
the due process did not require of state procedure, but Part IV of a restructured
opinion would collect the Court’s extensive comments on what it is that due
process does require of a state criminal justice process. Each of these four
parts of a restructured Hurtado opinion is explored below, with an eye to what
they suggest as to guidelines for determining the content of due process.
Part I: The “law of the land”
As Justice Matthews noted at the outset, petitioner Hurtado’s initial
contention was that (1) “the phrase ‘due process of law’ is equivalent to ‘law
of the land’ as found in the 29th chapter of the Magna Charta,” and (2) “that by
memorial usage, [that clause] has acquired a fixed, definite, and technical
meaning” which includes prosecution by indictment. This contention was
supported by the 1857 ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Jones v. Robbins,25 which had relied heavily on the distinguished commentary
of Lord Coke in his Institutes of the Law of England.26

23. As to that practice, see Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455
(1995).
24. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
25. 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857).
26. See generally SIR EDWARD COKE, SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1671 ed.).
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The Hurtado Court accepted the first prong of this argument, that as Coke
had argued, the phrase “due process of law” was the equivalent of the “law of
the land” clause found in Chapter 29 of the Magna Charta.27 That provision
stated: “No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any
otherwise destroyed; nor will we [not] pass upon him, nor condemn him, but
by lawful Judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.”28 It was more than
a century later that the first prominent use of the phrase “due process”
appeared in the English law. A statute declared that “[n]o man of what estate
or condition that he be, shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken, nor
imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought to answer
by due process of the law.”29 It may well be that the standard reading of due
process in England limited that concept to use of a specified process to bring
the individual before the court.30 However, Coke equated due process with the
law of the land provision of the Magna Charta and thereby gave that phrase a
coverage that extended through the entire process by which a person could be
deprived of life, liberty or property. Coke noted that the “true sense and
exposition” of the words “but by law of the land” was expressed in a later
statute “where the words, by law of the land, are rendered without due process
27. This provision was in Chapter 39 of the original Magna Charta signed by King John in
1215 and is sometimes cited by reference to that Chapter number. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28
(1991).
28. 9 Hen. 3, ch. 29 (1225). This is the translation set forth by Justice Harlan in his dissent
in Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is based on the translation cited earlier in
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., which also used the phrasing “lawful
judgment of his peers or law of the land.” 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856) (emphasis added).
In 1905, W.S. McKechnie presented the contention that the “or” was an “and.” See W.S.
MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CHARTA 442 (Glasgow 1905), quoted in RODNEY MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF
LAW 3 (1926). Coke’s own translation placed the two phrases in the disjunctive and that is the
phrasing followed by the Supreme Court in its earliest interpretations of the due process clause, as
well as in its later opinions. See, e.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 415 (1897); Pac. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). The colonial and early state
provisions also used the disjunctive. See, e.g., the Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
and South Carolina provisions, quoted in NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS, §§ 10.1.3.3.c, 10.1.3.4, 10.1.3.8.b, 10.1.3.10.a
(1997). But consider the New York Declaration of Rights, quoted in COGAN, supra, § 10.1.3.6.a
(“but by the lawful Judgment of his Peers, and by the Laws of this Province”).
29. 28 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (1354).
30. See Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process
of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265 (1975) (historical evidence indicates that the statutory due
process command referred only to the required use of specific writs recognized in English law as
appropriate means of bringing the individual before the court and it thereby sought only to ensure
that the individual would have the opportunity to answer the complaint against him); RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 194 (1977).
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of law.”31 Thus due process, under Coke’s view, included not only the proper
procedure for bringing the individual before the court to answer the charges
against him (as required by the statute), but also such other procedures as fell
within the “law of the land.”
Coke’s interpretation of due process was widely known and accepted in the
colonies.32 Thus, while several of the original states employed the “law of the
land” language in their constitutions or statutes, New York was thought to have
imposed precisely the same guarantee through the use of due process language
in its statutory bill of liberties.33 That due process language was later included
in the New York Ratifying Convention’s list of proposed amendments to the
Constitution, although the proposed amendments of the states of Virginia, and
North Carolina used the traditional phrasing—that “life, liberty, or property”
not be deprived “but by law of the land.”34 When Madison drafted proposed
amendments based in part on those state recommendations, he used the due
process terminology.35 Madison’s proposal was then reshaped by a House
Committee of the Whole into a Bill of Rights to be placed at the end of the
Constitution, including what became the Fifth Amendment.36 As Justice Scalia
later noted, the First Congress, through the Fifth Amendment’s due process
clause, presumably was adopting “an affirmation of Magna Charta according
to Coke.”37
31. COKE, supra note 26, at 50. Coke interestingly did not cite to the statute cited supra note
29, but to a later statute. See Jurow, supra note 30, at 277 (noting that this reference was
“puzzling” because the later statute referred to no man being taken nor imprisoned nor put out of
his freehold but with “process of the law”). Coke earlier had stated that Chapter 29 prohibited
putting a person out of his freehold, livelihood or liberties “unless it be by lawful judgment, that
is verdict of his equals . . . or by the law of the land (that is, to speak it once for all) by the due
course and process of law.” COKE, supra note 26, at 46.
32. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“American colonists were intimately familiar with Coke . . . .”); Frank R. Easterbrook, Substance
and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 96 (“It is necessary to pay attention to Coke, not
because he was right in describing the law of England, but because the framers may have thought
Coke right and incorporated his error into our fundamental law.”). Coke’s view of due process
and the law of the land as equivalent principles was advanced in the most influential of the early
American commentaries. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 9-13 (1827);
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1783 (1833).
33. See Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 96-97; BERGER, supra note 30, at 196 (quoting the
comment of Alexander Hamilton on New York’s combination of a law of the land clause in the
New York Constitution and a due process clause in its statutory bill of rights).
34. See COGAN, supra note 28, §§ 10.1.2.1-10.1.2.4, at 348-49 (1997).
35. See HELEN VEIT ET AL., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD
FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 11 (1991) (Madison Resolution).
36. Id. at 8 (quoting motion by Sherman to add all amendments to the Constitution as a
supplement). Id. at 39 (including article VIII of the House Resolution, which became the Fifth
Amendment).
37. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 29 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). There is
no suggestion that the clause would have been viewed differently by those who ratified the
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In Murray’s Lessee,38 the Court’s first detailed analysis of the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause, the Court had accepted the equivalency of
due process and law of the land and offered the following explanation as to
why the First Congress chose the latter language over the former:
The words, “due process of law,” were undoubtedly intended to convey the
same meaning as the words, “by the law of the land,” in Magna Charta. Lord
Coke, in his commentary on those words, (2 Inst. 50,) says they mean due
process of law. The constitutions which had been adopted by the several
States before the formation of the federal constitution, following the language
of the great charter more closely, generally contained the words, “but by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.”
The constitution of the United States, as adopted, contained the provision,
that “the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.”
When the fifth article of amendment containing the words now in question was
made, the trial by jury in criminal cases had thus already been provided for.
By the sixth and seventh articles of amendment, further special provisions
were separately made for that mode of trial in civil and criminal cases. To
have followed, as in the state constitutions, and in the ordinance of 1787, the
words of Magna Charta, and declared that no person shall be deprived of his
life, liberty, or property but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land,
would have been in part superfluous and inappropriate. To have taken the
clause, “law of the land,” without its immediate context, might possibly have
given rise to doubts, which would be effectually dispelled by using those
words which the great commentator on Magna Charta had declared to be the
true meaning of the phrase, “law of the land,” in that instrument, and which
were undoubtedly then received as their true meaning.39

While Coke was clear in his characterization of due process as the precise
counterpart of the law of the land provision in the Magna Charta, he was not so
clear in conveying what he believed to be the content of that Magna Charta
provision. As generally understood by English courts and writers, Chapter 29
of the Magna Charta prohibited imposing sanctions upon the individual except
by jury verdict (i.e., a judgment of his peers) or in accord with alternative
procedures clearly established in the standing law (i.e., the law of the land). Its
purpose was to prevent the King from forfeiting life, liberty, or property
Amendment, so it generally is accepted that this was the view of the “Framers,” including both
those who proposed and those who ratified.
38. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
39. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855). See also
Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional Tradition, in
DUE PROCESS: XVIII NOMOS 3, at 11-12 (Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977)
(stating that a reasonable inference from the framers’ reasoning was “that, as the law of the land
[language] had already been employed with one meaning in the Supremacy Clause [of the
Constitution], it would be misleading to endow it with another meaning in the Fifth
Amendment”).
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without regard to the law or by simply declaring some new process of his own
choosing to be the law.40 Thus, David Currie has described the law of the land
principle as imposing basically a “separation of powers concept against
unlicensed executive action.”41 The monarchy was required to proceed
through established judicial procedures or such alternatives as were
specifically authorized by legislation. So too, the courts, as the agents of the
Crown, had to adhere to legal regularity, basing their decisions upon the
common law, custom, or statute, and not personal whim.42 This requirement of
adherence to the “standing law” did not prohibit modification of the law by the
legislature. The traditional English and colonial view was that the law of the
land clause allowed Parliament to institute new procedures.43 Legal regularity
arguably prohibited Parliament from itself passing judgment and imposing
punishment on an individual or group of persons,44 but Parliament could
authorize general modification of the common law process or a modification
fashioned for particular types of cases.45 Indeed, colonial enactments modeled
after the Magna Charta’s Chapter 29 sometimes spoke of prohibiting the

40. See Jurow, supra note 30, at 273-77; Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 95-96; Charles H.
McIlwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 27, 28 (1914).
41. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS 1789-1888, at 272 (1985).
42. Although the primary concern of the barons was exercise of authority by the crown
“without any process whatever,” rather than with “abuses of judicial process,” McIlwain, supra
note 40, at 43, judicial adherence to the standing law also came to be seen as part of the law of the
land requirement. See 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1103-04 (1953) (such adherence meant that the courts were
“not to indulge, in the cases covered, in any innovations of the ‘process’ which were not
authorized by acts of Parliament”).
43. See Raoul Berger, Law of the Land Reconsidered, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2-17 (1979); 2
CROSSKEY, supra note 42, at 1103; Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 369-70 (1971). But see MOTT, supra note 28, at 4344, 141-42.
44. See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, The Original Meaning of Due Process, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 213, 221 (Eugene W. Hickock,
Jr. ed., 1991) (noting Alexander Hamilton’s support of such a prohibition). In this respect, due
process would overlap with the prohibition of bills of attainder, but would have a broader reach.
See, e.g., Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 310, 324 (1804) (holding due process bars the
legislature from imposing a forfeiture of rights vested in the trustees of the state’s university
without a judicial determination that finds them “guilty of any such acts as will in law amount to
a forfeiture . . . or . . . a dissolution of the body”). But cf. Berger, supra note 43, at 13-14.
45. See WOLFE, supra note 44, at 222. See also sources cited supra note 43. The assumption
here is that limited modifications for types of cases are not aimed at cases involving specific
persons. See also Van Zant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 270 (1829) (finding that the law of
the land clause requires “a general public law equally binding upon every member of the
community . . . under similar circumstances”).
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imposition of sanctions except by a jury verdict or in accordance with a
“known law” adopted by the colonial legislative body.46
Coke at times spoke of the law of the land requirement in terms fully
consistent with a simple requirement of adherence to process prescribed by the
standing law, whatever the content of that process. Thus, he described Chapter
29 as providing that “no man be taken or imprisoned, but per legem terrae, that
is, by the common law, statute law, or custom of England.”47 The reference to
three sources of law, including statutory law, certainly suggested that the
required process could change with legislative modification. At times,
however, Coke also spoke of per legem terrae as including some mandated
procedures that the Parliament could not alter. He described per legem terrae
as necessarily including certain procedures known to the common law, and
noted that a law which was contrary to the Magna Charta would be “holden for
none.”48 Because this view was almost unique to Coke,49 and arguably
rendered due process far more open-ended than the other procedural
guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights,50 various commentators have argued

46. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 43, at 8 (citing the Massachusetts and Rhode Island
provisions). See also COGAN, supra note 28, § 10.1.3.1b (setting forth the Connecticut
Declaration of Rights of 1776, which stated, “[n]o Man’s Goods or Estate shall be taken away
from him . . . unless clearly warranted by the laws of this state”).
47. See COKE, supra note 26, at 45.
48. See SIR EDWARD COKE, Introduction to SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND A2-A7 (1671 ed.). But cf. BERGER, supra note 30, at 194 (suggesting Coke’s
reference was narrow—deeming invalid only a statute that, for example, “authorized the
imprisonment of a person without the judgment of his peers”).
49. See Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 96 (noting that Coke “was a solitary voice in English
law” in giving to per legem terrae “some component of natural law that Congress could not
evade,” but also acknowledging that “the framers may have thought Coke right”); 2 CROSSKEY,
supra note 42, at 1104 (agreeing that Coke misread the Magna Charta provision, but arguing that
the due process clause “pretty clearly” was designed to limit the legislature in its fashioning of
procedure). Crosskey notes that a standing law requirement would have been superfluous “in
view of the careful provisions in the Constitution for complete congressional supremacy and the
Presidential and judicial oaths of office.” Also, since “the language of clause is . . . completely
general as to the agencies of government it is intended to control,” the “reasonable view is that it
was, in all probability, read by most persons at the time it was adopted, as in some way limiting
government generally, including the legislature, as to the kind of ‘process’ to be followed in the
cases the clause covers.” Id.
50. Of course, how open-ended would depend upon whether Coke’s due process was read as
directing the courts to ensure that legislation was consistent with the specifics of the common law
or directing the courts to review legislation by reference to such general principles of justice as
the courts extrapolated from the common law. See discussion infra note 117. However, even if
adherence to the specifics were demanded, it would be left to the courts to determine which
specifics should be included. Thus, either reading would provide considerable flexibility, leading
to the conclusion that Coke’s due process as a limitation upon legislative modification of the
common law was unlikely to have been the objective of a provision that was described by
Alexander Hamilton as having a “precise technical import.” See BERGER, supra note 30, at 194.
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that the standing law concept of due process is that which the framers most
likely had in mind.51
If due process was read as requiring no more than adherence to the
standing law, that would have been a ready answer to petitioner Hurtado’s
claim; the California law clearly authorized proceeding without indictment.
But the Hurtado Court did not even stop to consider such a possibility.
Restricting due process to a standing law requirement apparently was
foreclosed by previous Supreme Court decisions applying the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in other contexts. While
there was occasional language in some of those decisions that could be read as
requiring no more than adherence to the standing law,52 that position had been
rejected in other rulings. Although those rulings found no due process
violation, they clearly indicated that due process not only required adherence
to the standing law, but also placed undefined limits on the procedures that the
legislature could authorize as part of the standing law.53
The Hurtado Court similarly noted that unlike the original Magna Charta
provision, which was aimed only at “guard[ing] against executive usurpation
and tyranny,” the Fifth Amendment due process clause placed limits upon
“legislative power.”54 Of course, a due process clause limiting the legislature
was not necessarily inconsistent with a due process clause based solely on the
standing law concept. For that concept does impose certain limits upon
legislative power; it precludes legislative adoption of procedures for individual
cases (such procedures would not be the general law of the land),55 the
legislature itself adjudicating the merits of a dispute,56 or the legislature
authorizing the executive or judiciary in their discretion to disregard

See also Charles Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 177
(Edmond Cahn ed., 1954) (explaining that when due process was added to the Fifth Amendment,
its “meaning was as fixed and definite as the common law could make a phrase,” as it referred
simply to “a procedural process, which could be easily ascertained from almost any law book”).
51. See, e.g., WOLFE, supra note 44; Berger, supra note 43; Corwin, supra note 43.
52. See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinent, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1875) (“Due process of law is process
due according to the law of the land. This process in the States is regulated by the law of the
State.”).
53. See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How) 272
(1856), discussed infra notes 101-04; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877) (“[C]an a
State make any thing due process of law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such?
To affirm this is to hold that the [Fourteenth Amendment] prohibition to the States is of no
avail . . . .”). See generally Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1875) (upholding
state procedure because it provided basic elements of an adversary proceeding, not simply
because it was authorized by state law).
54. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
55. See supra note 45.
56. See supra note 44.
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established procedures.57 Hurtado recognized such limits when it noted that
due process would be violated by “acts of attainder, bills of pains and
penalties, acts of confiscation, acts of reversing judgments, and acts directly
transferring one man’s estate to another.”58 The Hurtado Court also stated,
however, that due process went beyond such limitations. It also imposed limits
upon legislation prescribing procedures of general applicability. The Court
therefore had to respond to the defendant’s claim that one of those limits had
been violated by California because the law of the land clause historically had
insisted upon prosecution by indictment.
The Court characterized petitioner Hurtado’s claim as resting on the view
that the law of the land clause had a “fixed, definite and technical meaning”
that incorporated specific common law procedures,59 including the process of
charging by grand jury indictment or presentment. This stood in contrast to a
law of the land clause that insisted only that the process of the standing law be
consistent with the most general and basic principles of justice. Petitioner
Hurtado sought support for his position in two prior rulings: the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Jones v. Robbins60 and the Supreme
Court’s earlier reading of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause in
Murray’s Lessee.61 The Jones opinion rested largely on the reading of the law
of the land clause by Coke and others relying on Coke, and the Hurtado
Court’s rejection of Jones rested largely on its contrary understanding of the
English (and early American) reading of that clause, in contrast to the Court’s
rejection of Hurtado’s reliance upon Murray’s Lessee, which stressed the
character of due process as a constitutional limitation.62
Jones v. Robbins63 was a case deserving of attention because it directly
supported Hurtado’s position and had behind it the “authority of the great
name of Chief Justice Shaw” of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.64

57. See Jurow, supra note 30, at 267.
58. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 536. Such legislation, the Court noted, had not been viewed as
“inconsistent with the law of the land” in England, notwithstanding a contrary position attributed
to Coke. Id. at 531.
59. Id. at 521.
60. 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857).
61. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
62. See discussion of the Court’s analysis of Murray’s Lessee infra notes 98-132 and
accompanying text.
63. 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857).
64. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1884). For a discussion of Shaw’s
reputation, see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE
SHAW (1957); JOHN DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 263
(1895).
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Massachusetts, unlike several of the other original states,65 did not have a
constitutional provision specifically requiring prosecution by indictment. It
did, however, have a constitutional law of the land clause, and in Jones, the
Supreme Judicial Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw, had held that
clause to require prosecution by indictment for an offense punishable by
imprisonment in the state penitentiary. The Jones opinion relied heavily upon
Coke. It quoted Coke’s comment that “law of the land” as used in the Magna
Charta meant “without process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of
good and lawful men.”66 While that view was not “conclusive,” it was a
“construction adopted by a writer of high authority.”67 Coke’s explanation had
not only been influential in England (thus Blackstone had stated that
“informations of every kind are confined by the constitutional law to
misdemeanors”68), but also in this country. Relying upon Coke, Chancellor
Kent had stated in his commentaries, that “law of the land” was “understood to
mean due process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and
lawful men.”69 The “same view of this clause,” Chief Justice Shaw noted, was
“taken by Judge [later Justice] Story in his Commentaries.”70
Responding to Jones, Justice Matthews stated that the Massachusetts Court
had relied primarily on Coke, but it had “misunderstood” Coke’s position.71
The passage from Coke cited by the Jones Court72 “was not intended to assert
that an indictment or presentment of a grand jury was essential to due process
of law in the prosecution and punishment of crimes, but was only mentioned as
an example and illustration of due process of law as it actually existed in cases
in which it was customarily used.”73 This was shown, Justice Matthews noted,
by other passages from Coke. In particular, there was Coke’s description of

65. See 4 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 15.1(c), at 216 n.118 (noting that of the original states,
three had indictment clauses in their constitutions, most had due process or law of the land
clauses, and all utilized prosecution by indictment or presentment).
66. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 343 (1857) (quoting COKE, supra note 26, at
50).
67. Id. at 343.
68. Id. at 346 (describing the comments of Blackstone in 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 310 (11th ed. 1797)).
69. Id. at 343 (quoting 2 KENT, supra note 32, at 9-13). See also 2 CROSSKEY, supra note
42, at 1103 (quoting Alexander Hamilton’s explanation of due process as requiring “indictment or
presentment of good and lawful men and trial and conviction in consequence”).
70. Jones, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) at 343. The reference was to JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1783 (1833). Justice Story there noted that, in
light of Coke’s explanation of the law of the land clause, the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment “in effect affirms the right of trial according to the process and proceedings of the
common law.” Id.
71. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1884).
72. See supra text accompanying note 66.
73. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 523.
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due process in the first of what Coke categorized as the nine separate branches
of the Magna Charta’s guarantee—the prohibition that “no man be taken or
imprisoned but per legem terrae, that is by the common law, statute law, or
custom of England.”74 In explaining this prohibition, Coke had said the
following about due process, which he described as presenting “the true sense
and exposition” of the phrase “but by law of the land”:
[F]or there is said, though it be contained in the Great Charter, that no man be
taken, imprisoned, or put out of his free-hold without process of the law, that is
by indictment of good and lawful men, where such deeds be done in due
manner, or by writ originall of the common law. Without being brought in to
answere but by due process of the common law. No man be put to answer
without presentment before justices, or thing of record, or by due process, or
by writ originall, according to the old law of the land. Wherein it is to be
observed that this chapter is but declaratory of the old law of England.75

This passage was viewed as accepting alternatives (e.g., the writ originall) to
the initiation of prosecution by indictment or presentments. That such
alternatives were consistent with due process was also illustrated, in the
Court’s opinion, by the accepted practice when Coke wrote.
Coke had referred to the law of the land clause as applying “in all cases of
imprisonment for crime,”76 but that included misdemeanors (subject at the time
to much more severe penalties than today).77 Misdemeanors were prosecuted
without indictments, and in a major English decision, a challenge to that
procedure based upon Coke’s reading of the Magna Charta had been flatly
rejected. In support of that ruling,78 Justice Matthews noted, reference had
been made to Coke’s own practice on the King’s bench as well as the
statement elsewhere in Coke’s writings that the King could not put a person “to
answer, but his court must be apprized of the crime by indictment,
presentment, or other matter of record.”79 Justice Matthews also cited the law
which allowed, upon a coroner’s inquisition, a prosecution for murder or
manslaughter to be brought “without the intervention of the grand jury.”80 Still
another common law exception was found in Coke’s comments on the need for

74. Id. (quoting COKE, supra note 26, at 46).
75. Id. at 524 (quoting COKE, supra note 26, at 47).
76. Id. at 524.
77. While only felonies were punishable by forfeiture of the convicted person’s property,
misdemeanors were subject to severe sanctions. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13-14 &
n.11 (1985); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 68, at 5-19, 94-101; Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without A
Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 572-73 (1924).
78. That ruling came in Mr. Prynn’s Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 764 (K.B. 1690). The supporting
argument cited by the Court was that of Sir Bartholomew Shower, set forth in the report of The
King v. Berchet, 89 Eng. Rep. 480 (K.B. 1690). See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 524.
79. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 525 (quoting COKE, supra note 26, at 136) (emphasis added).
80. Id. (citing The Queen v. Ingham, 122 Eng. Rep. 827 (Q.B. 1864)).
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indictment and presentment being limited to “forfeitures of life and liberty at
the suit of king.”81 Even as to the crime of murder, which was Coke’s primary
concern, the common law allowed persons to be “tried, convicted, and
executed” on “appeals of murder,” i.e., prosecutions brought simply on the
initiative of the victim’s spouse or heir.82
The Hurtado Court also took account of leading American authorities. It
noted that Chancellor Kent (who had been cited in Jones), after quoting Coke,
had stated that the “better and larger definition of due process is that it means
law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice.”83 That
broad description hardly prohibited a practice as well established as
prosecution by information. Also cited were similar, very general descriptions
of due process advanced by distinguished federal and state judges, none of
which referred to grand jury charging.84 Finally, the state of Connecticut had
shown its understanding that the Magna Charta provision did not demand a
grand jury indictment or presentment as to all criminal offenses. The
Connecticut Constitution, adopted in 1818, included a prohibition against
depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property “but by due course of law,”
yet its provision on grand jury charging required prosecution by indictment or
presentment only for crimes carrying a punishment of death or imprisonment
for life (i.e., not for felonies generally).85
The first Justice Harlan,86 in his Hurtado dissent,87 argued that if the
Magna Charta required trial by jury, it similarly required in a capital case

81. Id. at 526.
82. Id. The Court noted that this practice had survived in England through the early part of
the nineteenth century. In this country, the English statutes allowing an appeal of murder were in
force in the colonies of both Pennsylvania and Maryland. The Court did not comment on the
infrequency of prosecutions by appeal in England, although noting that the process had never
been used in Pennsylvania and only once used in Maryland. Id.
Blackstone stated that the appeal was available to victims for prosecuting felonies, and
as to murder, by certain relatives of the victim. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 68, at 308-12. But
Blackstone added that the appeal process was “very little in use, on account of the great nicety
required in conducting it.” Id. at 308.
83. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 527 (quoting 2 KENT, supra note 32, at 13).
84. Id. at 526-27. The Court cited Justice Merrick’s dissent in Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8
Gray) 329 (1857), Justice Denio’s opinion in Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854), and
Supreme Court Justice Johnson’s opinion in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235
(1819). All used general descriptions of due process similar to those the Court offered. See
discussion infra notes 180-87.
85. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 537. The Court also noted that this provision had been “in force
when the Fourteenth Amendment took effect . . . .” Id. See also infra text accompanying note
173.
86. John Marshall Harlan, who served on the Court from 1877 to 1911, was the grandfather
of John Marshall Harlan, who served on the Court from 1955-1971, and who decidedly did not
share his grandfather’s views on the content of due process in criminal procedure. See, e.g.,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
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prosecution by indictment. He cited in this regard Hawkins, Blackstone,
Erskine, and others. He suggested that the Court was being disingenuous in
looking at the practice in anything other than capital cases. Various
commentators have sided with Harlan, strongly suggesting that the Court was
simply wrong in its reading of Coke and others.88 That conclusion, however, is
not nearly so certain.
Of course, prosecution of a felony offense by information, rather than
indictment or presentment, clearly was contrary to the English common law
and therefore would have been prohibited by the “law of the land” clause
insofar as it required adherence to the standing law. It is not so clear, however,
that Coke and others saw grand jury screening as one of those elements of
process as to which legislative change was forbidden. Coke at times appeared
to speak of an authorized alternative as also being appropriate, as in the
quotation cited in Hurtado,89 although the reference there may have been to
cases that were not felonies, or at least, not capital cases. Perhaps even more
troublesome is the language of the Magna Charta clause, which refers to a right
to “lawful judgment of his peers or by law of the land.”90 The provision
appears to be directed to requiring a jury trial or some alternative adjudicatory
process consistent with the law of the land. That reference point would not
suggest including prosecution by indictment as part of the law of the land
alternative, as the indictment process is not a trial-by-jury alternative, but a
pre-adjudication procedure.91

400, 408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, the second Justice Harlan was a strong
supporter of the view of due process, as set forth by Justice Frankfurter in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter described the senior
Justice Harlan’s position as that of a judge “who may respectfully be called an eccentric
exception.” Id. at 62.
87. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
88. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L. J.
1193, 1248-50 (1992); Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 96-97; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 42, at
1103-10.
89. See supra text accompanying note 75, where reference is made to the alternative of “writ
originall.”
90. See 9 Hen. 3, ch. 29 (1225) (emphasis added). See also supra note 28.
91. Of course, the original use of the term due process, which referred only to the process for
bringing the individual before the court to answer charges, also was not a jury trial alternative.
See supra text accompanying note 29 (quoting 28 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (1354)). One difficulty posed by
Coke’s commentary on the specific contents of due process was the limited range of procedures
that he cited—trial by jury, indictment and process for bringing the individual before the court.
See also Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 97 (“Coke’s natural law was a rather tame creature,
satisfied with the inalienable rights to indictment and jury trial.”). Justice Harlan, in dissent, saw
due process as encompassing a much broader range of elements involved in adjudication,
including the various elements described in the Sixth Amendment, as he believed to be suggested
by Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
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In any event, whether the Hurtado Court misread Coke becomes much less
significant in light of the next two parts of the Hurtado opinion. There, the
Court concluded that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment was not
intended to prohibit legislative modification of even the most basic procedures
of common law, and, in particular, it was not intended to mandate what was
already guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s indictment clause. Those
conclusions suggest that the Court would have held prosecution by a grand
jury charge not to be demanded by due process even if the Court had read
Coke (and the American commentators relying on Coke) as stating that such a
charging process was demanded by the law of the land clause as one of those
parts of the standing law that could not be altered by the legislature.92 Yet the
Court’s response to Jones was not that Coke’s views were offset by other
considerations that shaped the content of due process, but that Jones had
misread Coke. Perhaps, it would have held the specific understanding of Coke
to be controlling on the ground that the framers incorporated that
understanding even though its general conception of due process did not
logically demand that understanding.93 Even if that were the case, however,
reliance on that specific understanding would not have provided much
assistance in determining the overall content of due process, as Coke offered
only a few examples of the procedures that were essential to the law of the
land.94
In light of what is said in Parts II and III of the Hurtado opinion, Part I of
the opinion is significant primarily for its reaffirmance of points made in
earlier rulings. Initially, the Court reaffirmed that, though due process was
based upon the law of the land concept, that concept here required more than
regular adherence to the standing law, as it imposed restraints on what
legislatures and courts could include in the standing law. Secondly, in looking
to the historical practice in criminal cases, the first portion of Hurtado arguably
also reaffirmed another point made in earlier cases—that what process was due
was different for cases where liberty was at stake as opposed to cases where
only property was at stake. The Court focused its examination of English
practice only on criminal cases; indictment obviously was not required in
proceedings that could result only in a deprivation of property, but that was not
considered relevant. Of course, Coke’s analysis had treated criminal cases as a
separate category, and the Court was responding to the reading of Coke
92. Thus, the Hurtado Court’s analysis, in what is described here as Parts II and IV of its
opinion, presumably allows legislative elimination of trial by jury. See discussion infra text
accompanying notes 151-52. A due process clause that allows the legislature to eliminate jury
trial also would allow elimination of grand jury review. Coke also described jury trial as an
element of the “law of the land.” See Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 97.
93. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, at 641-43 (discussing the different levels of generality
employed by courts and commentators in defining “original intent”).
94. See supra note 91.
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advanced in Jones, but the Court did not in any way challenge the separate
treatment of criminal cases (although it apparently rejected the contention that
capital cases presented a special due process sub-category).95 To do so would
have been inconsistent with Murray’s Lessee,96 where the Court had looked to
the traditions of the particular type of civil proceeding involved in determining
what procedural safeguards were required by due process.97
Part II: Murray’s Lessee and the significance of common law acceptance
The second prong of petitioner Hurtado’s argument relied on Murray’s
Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.98 Hurtado argued that, in its
description of the content of due process, the Court in Murray’s Lessee had
established standards that would clearly encompass prosecution by indictment
or presentment. Although decided in 1856, over a half century after the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, Murray’s Lessee had provided the first major
Supreme Court discussion of the procedural content of due process. Of course,
Murray’s Lessee was decided prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the assumption of Hurtado and the Supreme Court was that
precedent interpreting the Fifth Amendment due process clause was equally
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the premise running
95. The Court’s historical analysis of English law, cited to show that Coke had not viewed
grand jury charging as an essential of the law of the land, considered the treatment of all criminal
cases, including misdemeanors. This may have been a product of Coke’s relevant commentary
being a part of a discussion that spoke of all criminal cases, but it may also have reflected the
view that what was acceptable for one type of criminal case was also acceptable for another.
Thus, although Justice Harlan’s dissent stressed that the case before the Court was a capital case,
the Court deemed relevant in establishing that due process did not require prosecution by
indictment the Connecticut constitutional provision which did not require indictment for all
felonies, though it did require an indictment in capital cases. See supra text accompanying note
85.
Fifteen years later, Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899), flatly rejected the
contention that due process was violated by extending to capital cases a struck jury procedure that
arguably had been used at common law only for non-capital felonies. The Court reasoned:
A struck jury was not unknown to the common law, though, as urged by counsel for
plaintiff in error, it may never have been resorted to in trials for murder. But if
appropriate for and used in criminal trials for certain offenses, it could hardly be deemed
essentially bad when applied to other offenses. It gives the defendant a reasonable
opportunity to ascertain the qualifications of proposed jurors, and to protect himself
against any supposed prejudices in the mind of any particular individual called as a juror.
Whether better or no [sic] than any other method, it is certainly a fair and reasonable way
of securing an impartial jury, was provided for by the laws of the state, and that is all that
due process in this respect requires.
Id. at 176.
96. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
97. See infra text accompanying note 117. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97
(1877), quoted in note 193 infra.
98. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

322

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:303

throughout the Court’s opinion (and Hurtado’s argument) is that the identical
language must have the identical content as used in both provisions.99
At issue in Murray’s Lessee was the constitutionality of the Treasury
Department’s use of an administrative procedure, a distress warrant, to seize
the property of a collector of customs based upon an internal audit that found
the collector to be owing more than one million dollars that he had collected
from importers. The distress warrant process, which was authorized by an
1820 Act of Congress, allowed the Treasury to proceed on its own
determination of debt in a form of self-help. The seizure was executed without
any opportunity for a hearing, with the warrant giving the collector notice of
the purpose of the seizure. The transferees of the collector challenged this
procedure, claiming that it violated due process in allowing the Treasury to
impose a distraint, without the exercise of the judicial power of the United
States.100
Justice Curtis’ opinion for the unanimous Murray’s Lessee Court initially
noted that, as explained by Coke, the “words ‘due process of law’ were
undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words ‘by the law of
the land’ in Magna Charta.”101 The opinion then went on to characterize the
warrant in question as clearly being “legal process,” since “it was issued in

99. In what I have characterized as Part III of the restructured Hurtado opinion, the Court
notes: “We are to construe this phrase [due process] in the Fourteenth Amendment by the usus
loquendi [i.e., the customary language] of the Constitution itself,” for the “same words are
contained in the Fifth Amendment.” Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534. Justice Harlan took the same
position in his dissent. He noted that this “language [of the Fifth Amendment] is similar to that of
the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now under examination. That similarity . . . evinces a
purpose to impose upon the States the same restrictions, in respect of proceedings involving life,
liberty and property, which had been imposed upon the general government.” Id. at 541 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Petitioner Hurtado, in his argument based upon Coke’s explanation of due
process, similarly assumed that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses had the
same content. That argument assumed that Coke’s position shaped the understanding of the Fifth
Amendment clause when it was adopted and the Fourteenth Amendment clause was viewed at the
time of its adoption as identical to the Fifth Amendment. Of course, it does not follow that the
common understanding of the content of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause was identical
at the time of the adoption of the Fifth Amendment and at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it is likely that the character of the due process requirement was
viewed somewhat differently at those two points in time. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 181-214 (1998); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39 n.29 (3d ed. 2000); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall,
Adjudicatory Independence and Values of Procedural Due Process, 96 YALE L. J. 455, 463-65
(1986). The apparent assumption of Hurtado was that any such difference in perspective at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment should not control, and due process should be
read in accord with its history and the viewpoint that led to its placement in the Fifth Amendment.
See also discussion infra in text accompanying note 136.
100. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276.
101. Id.
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conformity with an Act of Congress.”102 At this point, the due process inquiry
would have ended had the Court viewed due process as requiring only
adherence to the standing law. However, without explicitly referring to the
standing law interpretation, Justice Curtis clearly indicated that due process
had a broader reach. “It is manifest,” he noted, that, under the due process
clause, “it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which
might be devised.”103 That was so because the Fifth Amendment “is a restraint
on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the
government, and cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to make any
process ‘due process of law.’”104
Having found that due process imposed limits on the standing law, even
where authorized by Congress, Justice Curtis proceeded to briefly describe the
Court’s approach in determining the content of those limits. His statement in
this regard was relied upon heavily by petitioner Hurtado and therefore was
quoted in Justice Matthews’ Hurtado opinion. Justice Curtis had stated:
To what principles then, are we to resort to ascertain whether this process,
enacted by Congress, is due process? To this the answer must be twofold. We
must examine the Constitution itself, to see whether this process be in conflict
with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to
have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted
on by them after the settlement of this country.105

Two elements of this statement potentially benefited petitioner Hurtado.
The Murray’s Lessee Court had noted initially that it looked to the Constitution
itself to determine where a procedure was consistent with due process.
Pursuing this inquiry, it had examined two provisions in the Federal
Constitution. First, it considered whether the administrative determination of
the debt of a receiver of public moneys could be contrary to the Article III
vesting of certain jurisdiction in the judiciary. It concluded in this regard that
while such a determination could be viewed as “a ‘judicial act’” in an
“enlarged sense,”106 it did not come within the Article III reference to
“controversies to which the United States shall be a party.”107 Second, the
Court asked whether the distress warrant was contrary to the Fourth
Amendment because the warrant “was issued without the support of an oath or
affirmation,” but that was held not to be the case because the Fourth
102.
103.
104.
105.
(1884).
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276-77, quoted in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528
Id. at 280.
Id. at 275.
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Amendment had “no reference to civil proceedings for the recovery of debts,
of which a search warrant is not made part.”108
The Court’s consideration of the Fourth Amendment in Murray’s Lessee
arguably suggested that due process, as applied in the criminal context,
required compliance with all the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment
provisions dealing with criminal procedure. That would follow from what
Murray’s Lessee had described as the first step in the due process inquiry—
”examine the constitution itself, to see whether the process be in conflict with
any of its provisions.”109 Since one of the constitutional requirements
incorporated under this analysis would be the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury
clause, due process would render unconstitutional a statute that allowed
prosecution by information.
Several commentators, most notably William Crosskey and Akhil Amar,110
have advanced exactly such a view of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, relying in part on Murray’s Lessee. As far as one can tell from
Justice Matthews’ opinion, the petitioner Hurtado did not rely on that position.
The Court describes Hurtado’s argument simply as relying on the second point
of reference cited in Murray’s Lessee—common law procedures “sanctioned
by usage” in this country. Justice Harlan’s Hurtado dissent relied on the same
reference point in the Murray’s Lessee opinion. Although he also argued that
the recognition of prosecution by indictment in the Fifth Amendment was
strong evidence of it being one of those foundation principles that the majority
acknowledged to be required by due process, he did not directly argue that,
under Murray’s Lessee, due process incorporated that and all other procedural
guarantees of the Constitution.111
108. Id. at 285.
109. Id. at 277. See also supra quotation in text accompanying note 105.
110. See Amar, supra note 88, at 1224-26; AMAR, supra note 99, at 172-73; 2 CROSSKEY,
supra note 42, at 1108. Amar and Crosskey are the most significant constitutional “originalists”
of their respective generations. Each has offered fresh interpretations of the Constitution that are
contrary not only to judicial precedent (which is fairly common among academics) but also to
basic premises accepted both in that precedent and in conventional academic commentary. On
this particular clause, unlike others, their readings were similar. Much the same position also has
been taken by others. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 90, 130 (1986). This reading of due
process, it should be noted, stands apart from the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to incorporate all of the Bill of Rights, which typically is hinged to the privileges
and immunities clause. A noted originalist of the generation standing between Crosskey and
Amar, Raoul Berger, takes a quite different view of the original understanding of due process. See
Berger, supra note 43.
111. Justice Harlan did note at one point that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to “impose upon the States the same restrictions, in respect of proceedings involving life, liberty
and property, which had been imposed upon the general [i.e., federal] government.” Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 541 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But the point of reference here
simply was to the equivalency of the two due process clauses. He also turned to the constitutional
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Why was it that neither the Court majority, Justice Harlan’s dissent, nor
petitioner Hurtado deemed worthy of examination a possible reading of
Murray’s Lessee as having incorporated within due process the procedural
limitations found elsewhere in the Federal Constitution? One answer is that
such a reading of due process was contrary to the 1875 ruling of Walker v.
Sauvinent.112 The Court there held that due process did not preclude the state
from providing for a verdict by judge, rather than jury, in a civil case seeking
damages in excess of twenty dollars. The Walker Court stated that the Seventh
Amendment applied to federal trials, but had absolutely no bearing on a state
proceeding. Citing Murray’s Lessee, it noted that the mandate of the
Fourteenth Amendment was met “if the trial is had according to the settled
mode of judicial proceedings,” and that was the case here because the trial
judge acted in accordance with the process established by the law of the state.
In stressing that the “law of the land” in state proceedings is the process
“regulated by the law of the state,”113 the Walker Court indicated its likely
reading of the first inquiry prescribed in Murray’s Lessee (that as to
consistency with the Constitution) though it did not mention that portion of
Justice Curtis’ opinion in Murray’s Lessee. Adherence to the standing law in
the federal system included compliance with the limits imposed by the Federal
Constitution. Even if the distress warrant procedure met the second prong of a
Murray’s Lessee inquiry, finding support in the common law, it would not be
consistent with the standing law and therefore would violate due process if it
violated some other portion of the Constitution. Thus, the Murray’s Lessee
Court looked not only to the Fourth Amendment,114 but also to Article III,
amendments as indicators of the “settled usages” of the common law carried over to this country,
but the focus here was on what was within the common law, not what was within the
Constitution. Id. at 542.
In responding to the majority’s contention that other amendment provisions should not
be rendered superfluous by reading due process as encompassing the procedural rights specified
in those provisions, see infra quotation accompanying note 140, Justice Harlan argued that the
procedural rights specified in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were among the most essential
elements of due process. See infra text accompanying note 147. This position, however, did not
contend that those rights were made part of due process because that clause incorporated all of the
procedural limitations of the Federal Constitution, but because of their general character. Justice
Harlan argued that their inclusion in the Bill of Rights should not thereby be taken to indicate that
they are not also a part of due process, but rather it indicated that they were viewed as among the
most important of the various common law rights protected by due process.
112. 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 90 (1875).
113. Id. at 93.
114. The discussion of the Fourth Amendment issue, although apparently considered as part
of the due process claim, had elements suggesting it was viewed as a separate claim. The case
was before the Court on a single certified question, asking whether the distress warrant
proceedings were “sufficient, under the Constitution of the United States and the law of the land,
to pass and transfer the title . . . to the premises in question . . . .” Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at
274. The listing of the plaintiffs’ claim by the court reporter referred to their Fourth Amendment
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which dealt not with specific procedures, but with the division of authority
between the judiciary and the legislature. In a state proceeding, of course,
federal constitutional provisions apart from the Fourteenth Amendment (and
the Article I prohibitions against Bills of Attainder and ex post facto laws)
would not be part of the standing law. Thus, compliance with Bill of Rights
provisions was a part of the standing law for the federal system, but not for the
state system.115 As noted in Walker, the Federal Constitution’s requirement of
adherence to the law of the land in state proceedings did not include adherence
to the Seventh Amendment, as the Bill of Rights had long been held to apply
only to the federal government.
Both petitioner Hurtado and Justice Harlan’s dissent looked to the second
prong of the inquiry specified in Murray’s Lessee—looking “to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to
have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted
on by them after the settlement of this country.”116 The Court in Murray’s
Lessee had found that the summary procedure at issue there, though lacking in
some basic prerequisites ordinarily demanded by the common law to deprive a
person of property (“regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and trial
according to some settled course of judicial proceedings”), satisfied due
process in light of the historical acceptance in England and this country of
summary seizures against public employees charged with collecting the
government’s moneys.117 The opinion indicated that if not for historical
contention as separate from the due process claim, and the Court referred to it as presenting the
last “remaining objection.” Id. at 285.
115. That this was the reasoning of the Hurtado Court is suggested by the distinction it draws
in describing the meaning of due process as applied to the federal and state governments. See
infra quotation accompanying note 138. Due process in the federal system is described as
referring to “that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred
upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein
prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles of the common law.” Hurtado, 110 U.S. at
535 (emphasis added). As applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, “by parity of
reason, it refers to that law of the land in each State, which derives its authority from the inherent
and reserved powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added). Since the standing law requires that the law meet the requirements of validity for the
jurisdiction, federal law must be consistent with the Federal Constitution, but the state law’s
validity under its own constitution is for the state to decide. Here the only limit imposed by due
process is adherence to the fundamental principles that the Court views as limiting legislation
even though it may be in accord with the limits imposed by the state.
116. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528, 542.
117. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 280. The Court first examined the history in England of the
use of “summary method for recovery of debts due to the Crown.” Id. at 277. Although the
Magna Charta had imposed certain limits on summary seizures, a distinction had been drawn
between “public defaulters and ordinary debtors.” Id. at 278. As to balances due from “receivers
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acceptance, the summary process at issue there could have violated due
process.
Petitioner Hurtado contended that Murray’s Lessee established a due
process prerequisite of historical acceptance of the particular procedure in the
type of proceeding in which it was now being used. That prerequisite clearly
was not present for prosecution by information in a capital case, as the
common law in this country and England confined the use of information
charging to misdemeanors. The Court majority responded that Hurtado and
Justice Harlan were misreading Murray’s Lessee. Admittedly, historical
acceptance, as found in Murray’s Lessee, automatically sustained a practice
against a due process challenge. This was true “however exceptional [as the
procedure] may be, as tested by definitions and principles of ordinary
procedure.”118 If some procedure “has been immemorially the actual law of
the land . . . [it], therefore, is due process of law.”119 However, historical
sanction was not “a characteristic . . . essential to due process of law.”120 A
departure from the historical forms of the common law could be entirely
consistent with due process. The due process standard was not historical on
both sides because that would lock in the common law forms.121 Such a result,
the Court reasoned, would be contrary to the role that the Magna Charta played
in inspiring the due process clause, contrary to the character of the common
law, and contrary to the flexibility required of a constitutional limitation.
As for the Magna Charta, its law of the land guarantee had served in
England solely as a safeguard against “executive usurpation and tyranny.”122
Through legislative action, change was possible. The extension of the
American guarantees of due process to also limit the legislature carried with it
of revenue,” the English “law of the land” authorized a summary process “bearing a very close
resemblance to what is termed a warrant of distress in the act of 1820,” which was at issue here.
Id. Moreover, that summary process had been carried over to this country, as illustrated not only
by the federal statute, but also by various state laws. This history led to the following conclusion:
Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of our
ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of this
amendment, the proceedings authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to be due
process of law, when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances due to the
government from a collector of customs, unless there exists in the constitution some other
provision which restrains congress from authorizing such proceedings.
Id. at 280.
118. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 529.
121. In holding that Murray’s Lessee did no more than make history a one way street, the
Hurtado Court ignored another due process ruling that arguably suggested that history was the
critical determinant of what processes were both acceptable and unacceptable under due process.
See CURRIE, supra note 41, at 365-66 (discussing the 1878 ruling in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878)).
122. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 532.
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a need to focus upon the “very substance of individual rights” rather than
“particular forms of procedure.”123 “Restraints that could be fastened upon
executive authority with precision and detail, might prove obstructive and
injurious when imposed on the just and necessary discretion of legislative
power.”124
As for the common law, the “flexibility and capacity for growth and
adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law.”125 It
would be inconsistent with those characteristics to adopt a view of due process
that would “deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable
of progress or improvement.”126 To mandate a process that eternally adhered
to the common law as it stood at the adoption of the Fifth Amendment was
contrary to the lessons taught by the common law, indeed, even as to the grand
jury. The grand jury’s accusation originally was the practical equivalent of a
conviction, with the accused subjected to ordeal and banished even if he
managed to survive that. Moreover, “the primitive grand jury heard no
witnesses in support of the truth of the charges to be preferred, but presented
upon their own knowledge, or indicted upon common fame and general
suspicion.”127 However, the growth of the common law had given the grand
jury a different role and a different procedure. The lesson learned, the Court
noted, is that “it is better not to go too far back into antiquity for the best
security for our ‘ancient liberties,’” but to allow for “progressive growth and
wise adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the forms and processes
found fit to give, from time to time, new expression and greater effect to
modern ideas of self-government.”128
The Court also stressed that the very nature of the Constitution warned
against reading due process as mandating the particular forms of the common
law.129 In a passage that earned Hurtado’s place (for many years) in
constitutional law casebooks, Justice Matthews noted:
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 529.
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530.
Id.
The Court did not, however, offer the following argument:
[T]he Constitution expressly incorporates the common law in one instance [the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in suits at common law]. Thus, we can apply a
popular mode of statutory interpretation: Given that the Congress that voted on the Bill of
Rights ‘knew how’ to constitutionalize the common law, we should not be so quick to
assume that other constitutional provisions that lack similar language were also meant to
incorporate the common law.
Samuel C. Kaplan, “Grab Bag of Principles” or Principled Grab Bag?: The
Constitutionalization of Common Law, 49 S.C. L. REV. 463, 467-68 (1998). Its failure to do so is
somewhat surprising in light of the Court’s focus in Part III on the relationship of the due process
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The Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, by
descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of the English law and
history; but it was made for an undefined and expanding future, and for a
people gathered and to be gathered from many nations and of many tongues.
And while we take just pride in the principles and institutions of the common
law, we are not to forget that in lands where other systems of jurisprudence
prevail, the ideas and processes of civil justice are also not unknown. Due
process of law, in spite of the absolutism of continental governments, is not
alien to that code which survived the Roman Empire as the foundation of
modern civilization in Europe, and which has given us that fundamental
maxim of distributive justice—suum cuique tribuere. There is nothing in
Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and law,
which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every age; and as it
was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from
every fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply
have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the new and
various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and shape it
into new and not less useful forms.130

The Hurtado Court appeared in this segment of its opinion to not only
reject the contention that Murray’s Lessee had imposed a strict historical test,
but also to suggest that departures from the common law process would not
necessarily be tested by the basic principles of that process. However, the
significance of the references to “other systems” and to a Roman law maxim
(albeit one finding common law counterparts131) was unclear. The Court also
spoke of looking to the “spirit of personal liberty and individual rights” that
were “embodied in” and “preserved and developed by” the “progressive
growth” of the common law. On the one hand, Hurtado could be read as
indicating that due process would accept a procedural system that departed
completely from the basic structural features of the common law system—a
procedural system, for example, that was not adversary, not accusatorial, and
did not require lay participation. On the other hand, the Court arguably was
saying only that due process would not bar innovations that borrowed from
clause to other Bill of Rights provisions, but it may have been concerned that this type of
argument would also challenge that part of Murray’s Lessee that the Court accepted as a proper
reading of due process. See supra text accompanying note 119.
130. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530-31 (emphasis added).
131. Suum cuique tribuere (“to render to each his due”) was probably viewed by the Court as
requiring something akin to the standing law, that each person be accorded the rights due to him
in the particular type of proceeding. This maxim had a much broader content. See Phillipe
Nonet, Judgment, 48 VAND. L. REV. 987, 993-94 (1995); Peter Stein, Justinian’s Compilation:
Classical Legacy and Legal Source, 8 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. FOR. 1 (1993). However, in Hurtado,
it presumably had the same point of reference for the Court as its use of the phrase “distributive
justice.” See infra note 192. See also Wilfried Bottke, “Rule of Law” or “Due Process” as a
Common Feature of Criminal Process in Western Democratic Societies, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 419,
426 (1990).
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other systems, but retained the basic goals, though not necessarily the forms of
the common law process.132 Under this view, the core of the common law
process would still be the touchstone of due process.
As discussed below, in what I designate as Part IV of a restructured
Hurtado opinion, the Court offered general definitions of the mandate of due
process that arguably supported both of the above positions.133 In explaining
why California’s charging procedure did not violate due process, the Court
cited only the common law roots of magistrate review of the charging decision,
and did not mention possible civil system analogies,134 but that may simply
have reflected the actual derivation of the California procedure. The Hurtado
opinion certainly left open the possibility, as suggested by the Court eight
years later, that due process would not preclude a state from going so far as to
adopt in toto a civil system of adjudication.135
Part III: The structural context of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
The Hurtado majority (and the Hurtado dissent) started from the premise
that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause had the same content as the
Fifth Amendment due process clause.136 This led Justice Matthews’ majority
opinion to offer still another reason for rejecting petitioner Hurtado’s
contention that due process required prosecution by indictment. If due process
required prosecution by indictment, how did one explain the inclusion of the
indictment clause in the Fifth Amendment? Justice Matthews reasoned:
That article [the Fifth Amendment] makes specific and express provision
for perpetuating the institution of the grand jury, so far as relates to
prosecutions for the more aggravated crimes under the laws of the United
States. It declares that “no person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when
in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” It
132. See WOLFE, supra note 44, at 223. Hurtado suggested that “the common law legal
procedure’s principles were constitutionally protected” while the “forms” were subject to
legislature modification “as long as the principles or purposes of the older forms were adequately
preserved by the new forms.” Id.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 193-98.
134. See infra text accompanying note 218.
135. Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 321 (1892). The Court stated:
If the State of New York, for example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and its
method of procedure for New York City and the surrounding counties, and the common
law and its method of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so.
Id.
136. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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then immediately adds: “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.” According to a recognized canon of interpretation,
especially applicable to formal and solemn instruments of constitutional law,
we are forbidden to assume, without clear reason to the contrary, that any part
of this most important amendment is superfluous. The natural and obvious
inference is that, in the sense of the constitution, “due process of law” was not
meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a
grand jury in any case. The conclusion is equally irresistible, that when the
same phrase was employed in the Fourteenth Amendment to restrain the action
of the States, it was used in the same sense and with no greater extent; and that
if in the adoption of that amendment it had been part of its purpose to
perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in all the States, it would have
embodied, as did the Fifth Amendment, express declarations to that effect.[137]
Due process of law in the latter refers to that law of the land which derives its
authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein
prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. In
the Fourteenth Amendment, by parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land
in each State, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved
powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right of the
people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure.[138]
“The Fourteenth Amendment” [as was said by Mr. Justice Bradley in
Missouri v. Lewis,][139] “does not profess to secure to all persons in the United
States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in
these respects may exist in two states separated only by an imaginary line. On
one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side
no such right. Each State prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding.”140

Although this argument is framed in terms of the relationship of the due
process clause to the other clauses in the Fifth Amendment, it is equally
applicable to all the other procedural rights specified in the Bill of Rights. The
Court’s reasoning would apply whether the indictment clause had been placed
in the Fifth Amendment or in some other amendment; if due process included
prosecution by indictment, that clause, whether located in the Fifth, Sixth, or
some other amendment, would still be superfluous. Indeed, in the original
drafting of the Bill of Rights, the indictment clause was not located in the same
article as the due process clause, but in a separate article dealing with both jury

137. See infra text accompanying note 168.
138. See discussion supra note 115, as to the significance of Court’s reference to the
Constitution in the preceding sentence and not in this sentence.
139. 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
140. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534-35.
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trial and grand jury indictment.141 The Senate subsequently shortened the total
number of articles. In doing so, it eliminated the separate article on petit and
grand juries, placing the jury clause in what became the Sixth Amendment
(listing the various rights of the “accused”) and the indictment clause in the
Fifth Amendment.142
In his dissent, Justice Harlan recognized the reach of the Court’s argument.
The Court’s “line of argument,” he noted, “would lead to results which are
inconsistent with the vital principles of republican government.”143 “If the
presence in the Fifth Amendment of a specific provision for grand juries in
capital cases, alongside the provision for due process of law” is accordingly
“held to prove that ‘due process of law’ did not, in the judgment of the framers
of the Constitution, necessarily require a grand jury in capital cases, inexorable
logic would require it to be, likewise, held” that the various rights mentioned in
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ “express provisions” on criminal procedure
“were not protected” by due process of law.144 Justice Harlan listed each of
these rights and asked “whether it [will] be claimed that none of these rights
were secured by the ‘law of the land’ or ‘due process of law’ as declared and
141. Madison started with a series of amendments to be made in the body of the Constitution.
He proposed an amendment of Article I, section 9, which included a single sentence containing
prohibitions against (1) more than one trial or punishment for the same offense (double jeopardy);
(2) a person being “compelled to be a witness against himself”; (3) deprivation of life, liberty and
property without due process; and (4) being obliged to relinquish property, except where “it may
be necessary for public use,” and with “just compensation.” The first two prohibitions were
separated by a comma, the second from the third by a colon, and the third from the fourth by a
semi-colon. The Madison proposal also included an amendment of the Article III provision on
jury trial that would have mandated, inter alia, prosecution by indictment or presentment for all
crimes punishable “with loss of life or member.” See VEIT ET AL., supra note 35, at 12-13.
When the House Committee of the Whole voted to place the amendments at the end of
the Constitution, creating a Bill of Rights, see supra note 36, the House Resolution included in
the eighth article what had been Madison’s combination of a double jeopardy clause, selfincrimination clause, due process clause, and requirement of just compensation. Its version
separated the first clause from the second and the second from the third by commas and placed a
semi-colon after the due process clause to separate it from the just compensation clause. See
VEIT ET AL., supra note 35, at 38-39.
142. VEIT ET AL., supra note 35, at 47-49. At this point, the punctuation was again changed
to separate the first four clauses by semi-colons, and the fifth (just compensation) by a colon.
The Fifth Amendment might be viewed as collecting in its initial clauses prohibitions
that restrict the initiation of criminal prosecutions. The double jeopardy clause restricts the
initiation of second prosecutions; the self-incrimination clause stands as a barrier “against the
revival of the ex officio oath (or similar procedure) to force the individual, in effect, to bring
charges against himself,” and the indictment clause limits initiation to cases approved by the
grand jury. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, at 514. Due process would fit alongside this grouping
because one of its aspects historically had been to insist upon an appropriate initiation of
prosecution. See supra text accompanying note 30.
143. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
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established at the foundation of our government.”145 He added that since the
Sixth Amendment imposed an “explicit jury trial command”:
[I]t results from the doctrines of the [majority] opinion . . . that the clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding the deprivation of life or liberty without
due process of law, would not be violated by a State regulation, dispensing
with petit juries in criminal cases, and permitting a person charged with a
crime involving life to be tried before a single judge, or even a justice of the
peace, upon a rule to show cause why he should be hanged.146

For Justice Harlan, his jury trial illustration not only showed the obvious
error in the majority’s reasoning, but also suggested why it was that “the
framers of the Constitution made express provision for the security of those
rights which at common law were protected by the requirement of due process
of law, and, in addition, declared, generally, that no person shall ‘be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.’”147 Certain rights “were
of a character so essential to the safety of the people that it was deemed wise to
avoid the possibility that Congress, in regulating the processes of law, would
impair or destroy them.”148 Accordingly, the framers insisted upon their
“specific enumeration” while also including the “general requirement of due
process of law,” which included not only those rights but all others recognized
in “the settled usages and modes of proceedings . . . at the time our government
was founded.”149
The Hurtado majority obviously found Justice Harlan’s response
insufficient. Indeed, it did not find it necessary to comment upon either his
explanation of why the framers included the combination of “express
provisions” and the due process clause or his parade of horribles. Perhaps,
they viewed the response to each to be obvious. As for Justice Harlan’s
explanation of the framers’ drafting objectives, if the rights described in the
“express provisions” were so obviously fundamental and therefore within due
process, why the need to enumerate them for fear that Congress and the courts
would not recognize that they were a part of due process? Also, if due process
was to serve as a “catchall clause,”150 why wasn’t it placed in a separate

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 550.
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id.
See LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 66 (1972).
[T]he history of due process shows that it did mean trial by jury and many of the
other traditional rights of accused persons that were specified separately in the Bill of
Rights. Its framers were in many respects careless, even haphazard, draftsmen. They
enumerated particular rights associated with due process and then added the due process
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provision following the listing of the enumerated rights, rather than in the Fifth
Amendment (placed alongside some of those procedural rights, with others to
follow in the Sixth Amendment)?
As for Justice Harlan’s parade of horribles, the jury trial hypothetical had
in a sense been answered in prior cases. The Court had already indicated that
due process did not require a jury trial in a civil case, as evidenced by the
quote from Missouri v. Lewis (as well as the ruling in Walker v. Sauvinent),151
notwithstanding the inclusion of a civil jury trial guarantee in the Seventh
Amendment. Presumably the same position could be taken as to jury trials in
state criminal cases.152 The Magna Charta, after all, spoke of life, liberty, and
property being taken “by lawful judgment of his peers or by law of the
land.”153 Perhaps, more telling was Justice Harlan’s reference to the Sixth
Amendment requirement that the accused be informed of the “nature and cause
of the accusation.” In cases rejecting due process challenges to state civil
proceedings depriving persons of property, the Court had strongly suggested
that due process required “bringing the party against whom the proceeding is
had before the court and notifying him of the case he is required to meet.”154
However, due process could require some form of notice without making
either that clause or the Sixth Amendment notice-of-charges clause
superfluous.
The Hurtado argument against adopting an interpretation that would render
the specific procedural guarantees “superfluous” did not preclude a content of
due process that partially overlapped with the specific guarantees. If due
process imposed a notice requirement of a general character, but the Sixth
Amendment required more complete notification in a particular form (e.g.,
clause itself, probably as a rhetorical flourish, a reinforced guarantee, and a genuflection
toward traditional usage going back to medieval reenactments of Magna Carta.
Id.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 139 and 112.
152. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). Although that ruling dealt only with the size
of the state jury, the Court strongly suggested that the right to a jury trial in a criminal case simply
was not a “requisite of due process.” Id. at 603. Later, Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167,
176 (1912), citing both Hurtado and Maxwell for support, noted that “due process does not
deprive a State of the power to dispense with jury trial altogether.”
153. 9 Hen. 3, ch. 29 (1225) (emphasis added). See supra note 28.
154. Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1875), quoted in Hurtado, 110 U.S.
at 533. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 97 (1877).
[W]henever by the laws of a State, or by State authority, a tax, assessment, servitude,
or other burden is imposed upon property for the public use . . . and those laws provide for
a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed, in the ordinary courts of
justice, with such notice to the person, or such proceeding in regard to the property as is
appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment in such proceedings cannot be said to
deprive the owner of his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may
be to other objections.
Id. at 104-05 (emphasis added).
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through the indictment) and at a particular time in criminal cases, neither
provision would be superfluous. The Sixth Amendment provision would not
be superfluous because it required more than the notice guarantee contained
within due process. The due process notice requirement would be superfluous
as to criminal cases, where the Sixth Amendment’s provision would apply, but
not as to other proceedings depriving persons of property or liberty, for the
Constitution has no Sixth Amendment counterpart for those proceedings.
Similarly, due process could require a jury trial for all capital cases, as Justice
Harlan urged, and not render superfluous a Sixth Amendment provision that
applies to “all criminal prosecutions” and carries with it certain commands as
to the size and selecting of the jury.155 Petitioner Hurtado’s grand jury claim,
on the other hand, appeared to require a due process interpretation that
completely overlapped with an “express provision,” as the Fifth Amendment’s
grand jury clause expressly includes “capital” cases.156
Justice Harlan, in raising the hypothetical of a state eliminating trial by
jury in capital cases, argued that “[a] State law which authorized the trial of a
capital case before a single judge . . . would . . . meet all the requirements of
due process of law, as indicated in the opinion of the court; for such a law
would not prescribe a special rule for particular persons; it would be a general
law which heard before it condemned, which proceeded upon inquiry, and
under which judgment would be rendered only after trial . . . .”157 As discussed
below, that listing reflects a fair reading of the procedural content of due
process as stated in what I have characterized as Part IV of a restructured
Hurtado opinion.158 Justice Harlan might well have asked, if that is all due
process requires, doesn’t it render the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause
itself superfluous as to criminal cases? Would not any criminal prosecution
that complied with the “express provisions” of the Bill of Rights thereby
invariably meet the requirements of due process? It seems likely that the
answer of the Hurtado majority would be that, except for the requirements
155. In Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), the Court relied heavily on the analysis of
Hurtado in holding that due process did not preclude a state from using a jury trial of less than
twelve in a non-capital case, but did not cite Hurtado’s argument regarding provision superfluity.
That argument, if read as applying only to a complete overlap, would not be applicable. On the
other hand, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), did refer to (and basically discard) that
superfluity argument in a case involving a claimed due process right to counsel that would be
much narrower than the Sixth Amendment, as it would apply to capital cases in which the
defendants obviously were unable to represent themselves. Arguably, Powell thought it advisable
to refer to the Hurtado argument in order to acknowledge earlier rulings having disregarded that
argument, but it may also suggest a reading of that argument that substantially weakens its logic
by having it preclude even a partial overlap with an express provision. See discussion of Powell
infra notes 290-94 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 18.
157. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158. See infra text accompanying note 212.
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flowing from the “standing law” mandate of due process (a general law,
previously established, etc.), the Fifth Amendment requirements for due
process, as applied to criminal cases, would, indeed, largely be subsumed
within the more extensive reach of the express provisions applicable to
criminal cases. The due process clause might add some basic requirements of
fairness in adjudication not specified in an “express provision” (e.g., the
neutrality of the judge),159 but those would be few and arguably could also be
required under an expansive reading of either the standing law requirement or
a particular specific guarantee.160
Because of the standing law requirement and, perhaps, a few additional
prerequisites of adjudicatory fairness, the Hurtado majority’s reading of the
content of Fifth Amendment due process would not render that clause
superfluous in its application to deprivations of “life” (which would encompass
only criminal cases). It would, however, give that clause quite limited
significance in the constitutional regulation of federal criminal cases. But that
also would have been true of the Fifth Amendment clause if the concept of due
process had incorporated the content suggested in the writings of Coke, Kent
and Story, who focused on jury trial and prosecution by indictment.161 Unless
the due process clause mandated the full range of common law procedures (a
position clearly rejected by the Court), it was going to have little significance
for federal criminal cases (apart from precluding enforcement deviations from
the “standing law”). It was a provision that was applicable to both criminal
and civil cases,162 but really would demand significant procedural content,

159. See discussion of Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), infra notes 400-05 and
accompanying text.
160. Consider, in this regard, the interpretations offered by Justice Black, discussed infra
notes 445-47 and accompanying text.
161. See discussion supra notes 62-70, 91. Crosskey had the following to say about the views
of early American legal commentators Kent, Rawle and Story on the subject of “due process of
law”:
[A]pparently all assumed, without a close examination of the Constitutional text and
context, that the “due process” guaranty in the Fifth Amendment was merely one relating
to procedure in criminal cases; and because the subject of criminal “process” was so
nearly completely covered by the particular “process” guaranties that the Constitution
contains, they tended to regard to general “due process” guaranty of the Fifth Amendment
as not of much importance.
2 CROSSKEY, supra note 42, at 1110-11.
162. See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 42, at 1111-12, stating:
That the “due process” guaranty cannot, however, be limited to criminal cases seems
clear. In the first place, the processes of imprisonment and sequestration of chattels were
used, when the guaranty was drawn, and still are used, as coercive “processes” in equity.
At that date, too, imprisonment for debt was widely practiced; and exemplary, or punitive,
damages, are, and always have been, plain deprivations of the property of him who has to
pay them. It seems evident, too, that even compensatory damages are of this same
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beyond the “express provisions,” only as to civil cases.163 That conception of
its role would be consistent with its location in the Fifth Amendment,164 an
amendment which mixed civil and criminal guarantees,165 although the
positioning of the various Bill of Rights guarantees hardly suggests some
comprehensive scheme offering a clear directive on content.166

character; for the execution of a judgment for such damages involves, necessarily, a
deprivation of property for the judgment debtor.
163. It had great significance for civil cases even if the procedural content of due process was
limited to the basics of notice, and opportunity to be heard, as suggested in Part IV of the
restructured Hurtado opinion. See infra text accompanying notes 205-12. See, e.g., Hovey v.
Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897) (holding due process prohibited court action that struck a civil
defendant’s answer as a response to what the Court considered to be contempt; and noting that
due process clearly “signifies a right to be heard in one’s defense”). There were no other federal
constitutional provisions imposing such requirements upon the civil process in either the federal
or state systems.
164. Although the Virginia, New York and North Carolina recommendations placed their
respective law of the land or due process guarantee in a separate provision, see discussion supra
note 34, Madison’s proposed amendments to Article I, Section 9 set forth in a separate paragraph
a combination of the double jeopardy prohibition, the due process prohibition, and the just
compensation requirement. See VEIT ET AL., supra note 35, at 12. These guarantees remained
together through the House and the grand jury clause was added in the Senate. See supra text
accompanying note 142.
165. The indictment clause is limited to capital or otherwise infamous crimes, and the “life or
limb” language in the double jeopardy clause would also be limited to criminal cases. See Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169-70 (1873) (applying to all crimes, not just capital and
corporal punishment). The prohibition against compelling a person in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself did not refer to “criminal case[s]” as originally proposed, but the House
later added that language. VEIT ET AL., supra note 35, at 31. However, because defendants could
not testify in their criminal trials, it was aimed at compulsion at other proceedings, which could
include early stages in the criminal case or civil cases. See 3 TREATISE, supra note 1, at 287
(stating that the privilege had become available to witnesses in civil cases prior to adoption of the
Constitution). The due process clause applied to both civil and criminal cases, and the “just
compensation” clause applied to civil takings—although it does not deal with procedure. As to
its location, see Harry N. Scheiber, The Takings Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent
and Significance in American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING
AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 234 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991); AMAR, supra note 99,
at 78.
166. See Miller, supra note 39, at 42.
[I]t is quite probable that the order of clauses in the Bill of Rights was not as
carefully conceived as later legalistic minds tend to expect, or as was the original
constitutional text, which benefited from a Committee on Style. Within the Bill of Rights
as a whole, the provisions relating to criminal law are not gathered together. Within the
Fifth Amendment, the clauses seem almost randomly collected, although one could argue
that they deliberately begin with guarantees for criminal trials alone, go through a
guarantee which is applicable in both criminal and civil situations (the due process clause)
and conclude with a noncriminal provision (just compensation).
Id. Compare WOLFE, supra note 44, at 211 (explaining that “the Bill of Rights has at
least some rough order—it is not a mere grab bag of rights,” as the first three amendments deal
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Because the Court majority and Justice Harlan started from the premise
that the Fourth Amendment due process clause should have the same content
as the Fifth Amendment clause,167 the understanding of due process at the time
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was not controlling. If the
Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment and the state legislatures
that ratified it had views of due process that were in error, measured by the
Court’s reading of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, those views
become irrelevant. Nonetheless, the majority, after noting the implications of
the Fifth Amendment due process clause being placed alongside a grand jury
clause, called attention to the likely reading of due process by the Congress
that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment. If that Congress wanted to require
prosecution by indictment it asked, would it not have included within the
Fourteenth Amendment the Fifth’s grand jury clause as well as its due process
clause.168 Of course, Justice Harlan argued that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment would have viewed that as unnecessary, since they accepted
Coke’s view that due process included prosecution by indictments. However,
Justice Harlan also noted that the original framers were not satisfied with
relying on the implications of due process and insisted upon “express
provisions.”169 Why hadn’t the framers of the Fourteenth adopted the same
position if they truly had meant to mandate prosecution by indictment and
other procedural requirements in the Bill of Rights. There were no intervening
Supreme Court opinions stating that due process required indictment and a
state case like Jones hardly made the matter so clear as to ignore the precaution
of including the indictment provision.170 Commentators who believe that
Congress intended to incorporate all the amendments in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause would say that was
unnecessary,171 but that contention in turn raises the troublesome question of
why the due process clause would have been added to the Fourteenth
Amendment if it already had been incorporated under the privileges and
immunities clause.172

with substantive rights, the Fourth and Fifth largely with pretrial procedures, the Sixth and
Seventh with trial rights, and the Eighth with other procedural rights).
167. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
168. See supra quotation from Hurtado in text accompanying note 137.
169. See supra text accompanying note 147.
170. But see AMAR, supra note 99, at 201.
171. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.3(a), at 491-92 (citing the commentary on this issue).
172. See BERGER, supra note 30, at 91-92; CURRIE, supra note 41, 346 n.129; Stanley
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140,
159 (1949); AMAR, supra note 99, at 172 (noting that there was no redundancy because the
procedural guarantees incorporated under the privileges and immunities clause would apply only
to citizens and the separate due process clause would apply to all persons).
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The Hurtado majority also called attention to the fact that the Connecticut
constitutional provision limiting mandatory grand jury review to the highest
level of felonies, rather than all infamous crimes, was “in force when the
Fourteenth Amendment took effect.”173 The suggestion here was that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment certainly would have been aware that
Connecticut did not view due process as incorporating the broader common
law grand jury requirement since Connecticut also had a due process clause.
Surprisingly, there was no mention in this regard of Michigan having abolished
the requirement of mandatory prosecution by indictment or presentment in
1859, even though it also retained a due process clause,174 and three other
states having constitutional provisions that allowed the legislature to eliminate
the requirement of prosecution by indictment.175
A similar omission is found in Justice Harlan’s dissent. He stressed that
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, “twenty-seven States expressly
forbade criminal prosecutions, by information, for capital cases . . . .”176
Seventeen did so through constitutional provisions similar to the Fifth
Amendment’s grand jury clause (although also including in their constitutions
due process clauses), and “in the remaining ten States [such prosecutions] were
impliedly forbidden” under law of the land or due process clauses.177 Justice
Harlan failed to note, however, that provisions in four of the latter states
allowed the prosecution to do away with prosecution by indictment (and that
Michigan had done exactly that).178 Commentators have debated at length the
question of what implications can be drawn from the “silence” during the
ratification process of those four states (and others considering similar action),
with some arguing that it shows clearly that the Fourteenth Amendment was
not viewed as applying a grand jury requirement to the states and others
contending that it shows only a focus on other matters.179 The Hurtado

173. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 537.
174. See sources cited supra note 20.
175. 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 20, § 1.5 (noting that those states were Indiana, Kansas and
Oregon). See also Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 87-125 (1949).
176. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 557.
177. Id.
178. See id.; see also supra notes 174-75.
179. This debate extends beyond the grand jury issue. Application of the Bill of Rights to the
states also would have raised difficulties for some states as to the Seventh Amendment (civil jury
trial), the First Amendment prohibition against establishment of religion and the double jeopardy
clause. See Fairman, supra note 175, at 82-97. The commentators are divided as to whether
these state deviations from the Bill of Rights’ provisions were sufficiently significant so that one
would have expected legislative debate in the ratification process and legislative action thereafter
if the legislators had viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as making the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states. Cf. Fairman, supra note 175; BERGER, supra note 30, at 77-78; WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
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opinions, apart from the majority’s single comment on the Connecticut
provision, simply did not address that silence.
Part IV: “The contents of due process”
Part IV of a restructured Hurtado opinion would consist of the opinion’s
various descriptions of what due process does require of the criminal justice
process. Initially, the Court offered several general descriptions of the
restraints that due process would apply to that process, in addition to requiring
adherence to the standing law. Thus, it noted that due process prohibits “the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private right and distributive justice’”;180 that due process allows
legislative change in procedure, “but only with due regard to the landmarks
established for the protection of the citizen”;181 that due process accepts the
common law tradition which permits changes “in form and process, to
accommodate new circumstances” and to give “new expression and greater
effect to modern ideas of self-government,” where those changes are
“consonant to the true philosophy of our historical institutions” by preserving
the “spirit of personal liberty and individual right, which they embodied”;182
that due process “guarant[ees], not particular forms of procedure, but the very
substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property”;183 that due process
requires adherence to those “general principles of public liberty and private
right, which lie at the foundation of all free government[s]”;184 that due process
refers to “that law of the land in each state which derives its authority from the
inherent and reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits of those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the
right of the people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure”;185
4, 118 (1988); CURTIS, supra note 110; Michael P. Zuckert, The Politics of Judicial
Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-1867, 8 CONST.
COMMENT. 149, 160-61 (1981) (book review); AMAR, supra note 99, at 197-206. One argument
advanced by those giving little or no weight to the silence is that the silence also works against
the “fundamental fairness” interpretation of the due process clause because that standard hardly
shuts the door on mandating prosecution by indictment as indicated by Jones. Id.
180. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 527 (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235,
244 (1819)).
181. Id. at 528 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 356 (1868)).
182. Id. at 530 (discussing the changes that had occurred in the role of the grand jury).
183. Id. at 532. The Court similarly noted that legislation “may alter the mode and
application, but have no power over the substance of original justice.” Id. at 532 (quoting TRACT
ON PROPERTY LAWS, 6 BURKE’S WORKS 323 (Little & Brown ed.)).
184. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 521.
185. Id. at 535. See also supra text accompanying note 135.
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that due process “refers to certain fundamental rights which that system of
jurisprudence, of which ours is a derivative, has always recognized”;186 “and
that there are rights in every free government beyond the control of the state,”
with due process accepting “any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority . . . in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice . . . .”187
Three characteristics of these general descriptions of due process are
noteworthy. First, the descriptions not only make clear that due process
imposes limitations on legislation, but they also convey the message that those
limitations are not so restrictive as to interfere with legislative efforts to serve
the public good. The limitations are confined to only the most basic principles
(the true “landmarks”), and allow even these basics to be “adopted to new
circumstances.” Indeed, these are principles of liberty and justice, “the
greatest security for which resides in the right of the people to make their own
laws, and alter them at their pleasure.”188 Moreover, they will be applied
sparingly to reach only core violations. For while
laws that violated express and specific injunctions and prohibitions might
without embarrassment be judicially declared to be void, yet any general
principle or maxim founded on the essential nature of law, as a just and
reasonable expression of the public will, and of government as instituted by
popular consent and for the general good, can only be applied to cases coming
clearly within the scope of its spirit and purpose, and not to legislative
provisions merely establishing forms and modes of attainment.189

Second, the phrasing of these descriptions point to limitations that restrict
the substantive objectives of the state law as well as the procedures employed
in achieving those objectives. General concepts of “personal liberty and
individual right”190 can serve to restrict the grounding for depriving a person of
life, liberty and property, as well as restrict the procedures applied in
establishing that grounding. Prior to Hurtado, the Court had hinted at the
possible adoption of what later came to be known as substantive due
process,191 and Hurtado continued to hold open that possibility. The Hurtado

186. Id. at 536 (quoting Brown v. Levee Commissioners, 50 Miss. 468 (1874)).
187. Id. at 536-37 (quoting in part from Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662
(1874)).
188. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535.
189. Id. at 532. The Court also noted that, while there were certain principles of liberty and
justice “beyond the control of the State, . . . any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power
in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty
and justice, must be held to be due process of law.” Id. at 536-37.
190. See supra text accompanying note 182.
191. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois; 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 235 (1819). See also discussion of these cases infra note 192. Much stronger support for
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opinion, though dealing with procedure, cited language in cases and
commentary that obviously was concerned with more than procedure.192
Third, Hurtado’s varied descriptions of the basic limitations imposed by
due process are both abstract and opaque. Not only are those limitations
described in general terms,193 but the point of reference for determining their
content is unclear. The Court speaks of principles established as fundamental
in looking to the substance and structure (but not the form) of the common
law,194 to rights deemed fundamental in the “system of jurisprudence of which
ours is derived”195 and to the foundational principles of “our” institutions.196
Such statements point to examining the Anglo-American tradition. However, a
broader perspective—consistent with the possibility of the legislature looking

the concept was to be found in state cases. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered:
Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 326-42
(1999).
192. The Court cited to Cooley, who clearly accepted the concept of substantive due process.
See COOLEY, supra note 181. See also Ely, supra note 191, at 342-45. The Court relied on Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), a case involving a challenge to rate regulation. Although Munn
upheld the regulation of what were, in effect, public utilities, the case could be read as suggesting
that rate regulation would raise a significant due process issue as to businesses that were not
“affected by the public interest.” See CURRIE, supra note 41, at 373. See also Corwin, supra
note 43. The Court quoted the definition of due process set forth in Bank of Columbia v. Okely,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819), which spoke of rejecting the exercise of governmental power
where it was not in accord with “established principles of . . . distributive justice.” The phrase
“distributive justice” might have referred here simply to the even handed application of the law,
as mandated by the standing law principle, but it generally has been viewed as referring to
substantive due process. See WOLFE, supra note 44, at 226. See also Easterbrook, supra note 32,
at 103 (“About to embark on an orgy of substantive due process, it [the Hurtado Court] baldly
stated that arbitrary acts are not ‘law’ and so cannot satisfy due process”); Stephen Gardbaum,
New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 541
(1997) (“The fundamental rights approach that the Court adopted when it considered the general
issue of the relationship of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights for the first time in
the 1884 case of Hurtado v. California, was simply a particular application of substantive due
process under which all fundamental rights, including the right to contract, were deemed part of
the ‘liberty’ protected against the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
193. Indeed the general principles are described so broadly that they are not tied in those
descriptions to the particular type of deprivation being imposed. In rejecting petitioner Hurtado’s
reading of due process, the Court had looked to the common law practice in criminal cases. See
supra text accompanying note 95. Earlier cases, such as Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97,
105 (1877), quoted in Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 533-34, similarly referred to “a fair trial in a court of
justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a case.” However, when the
Hurtado Court spoke of due process prohibiting legislative violation of what it described as the
“substance of individual right” and “foundational principles of public liberty and private right,” it
did not speak of those limitations varying with whether life, liberty or property was being taken.
194. See supra text accompanying note 182.
195. See supra text accompanying note 182.
196. See supra text accompanying note 185.
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to the “best ideas of all systems”197—is suggested when the Court speaks of
principles recognized as foundational by “all free government[s].”198 These
differences apparently did not trouble the Court, perhaps because it recognized
that such general descriptions had a limited role in determining the content of
due process. The Court repeated the Davidson v. New Orleans199 warning that
providing a comprehensive definition of due process is “difficul[t], if not
impossibl[e],”200 and that, therefore, it is best to ascertain the content of “such
an important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall
require.”201
Somewhat surprisingly in light of the above, the Hurtado opinion, at
several points, did identify specific prohibitions that would be imposed by due
process. It noted, for example, that the legislature could not adopt “a special
rule for a particular person or a particular case.”202 There was
thus exclud[ed], as not due process of law, acts of attainder, bills of pains and
penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly
transferring one man’s estate to another, legislative judgments and decrees, and
other similar special, partial, and arbitrary exertions of power under the forms
of legislation.203

These illustrations would appear to follow from the due process command that
the deprivation of life, liberty and property be in accord with the standing
law.204 But a further element of due process arguably also is suggested in
some of the above illustrations—that due process requires an opportunity for a
factual adjudication before a court or a similar tribunal. Thus, the legislature
itself could not adjudicate, even though applying general principles, whether
particular property belonged to one person or another.
In the course of discussing previous rulings that had found no violation of
due process in the procedures there provided, the Hurtado Court also offered
illustrations of procedural requirements that clearly went beyond adherence to
the standing law. In Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan,205 it noted, the
Court had upheld “a mode of trying the title to an office, in which was no
provision for a jury.”206 In concluding that “ample provision has been made

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra text accompanying note 130.
See supra text accompanying note 184.
96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877).
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 533.
Id. at 534 (quoting Davidson, 96 U.S. at 104, discussed supra note 193).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 535-36.
See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
92 U.S. 480 (1875).
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 533.
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for the trial of the contestation before a court of competent jurisdiction,”207 the
Kennard Court had noted that this included process
for bringing the party against whom the proceeding is had before the court, and
notifying him of the case he is required to meet; for giving him an opportunity
to be heard in his defence; for the deliberation and judgment of the court; for
an appeal from this judgment to the highest court of the State, and for hearing
and judgment there.208

While this statement had not rendered all of the cited elements prerequisites of
due process, it had indicated that the combination was sufficient, and due
process did not require more.
In quoting Daniel Webster’s “familiar definition” of due process,209 the
Hurtado Court turned to a listing of those procedural components identified as
essential to providing due process. Webster, it noted, had described due
process as prohibiting a “special rule for a particular case or person” and
requiring a “general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.”210 In light of
this reference, Justice Harlan in dissent argued that the majority would even
accept as consistent with due process a “State law which authorized the trial of
a capital case before a single judge, perhaps a justice of the peace . . . .”211
After all, he noted, such a law would
meet all the requirements of due process of law, as indicated in the opinion of
the court; for such a law would not prescribe a special rule for particular
persons; it would be a general law which heard before it condemned, which
proceeded upon inquiry, and under which judgment would be rendered only
after trial; it would be embraced by the rule laid down by the court when it
declares that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and
preserves those principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process
of law.212

That due process was limited to certain basic elements of a trial-type
adjudication was also suggested by the final few paragraphs of Justice
Matthews’ opinion in Hurtado. Here, the Court applied the general principles
that it had previously discussed regarding the content of due process to the
California process. “Tried by these principles,” it noted, “we are unable to say
that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the
207. Kennard, 92 U.S. at 483.
208. Id., quoted in Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 533.
209. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535.
210. Id. (quoting Webster’s argument in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819), although not citing that source).
211. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 549.
212. Id. at 549-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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proceeding by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to
the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for
the prosecution, is not due process of law.”213
Three factors were cited in support of this conclusion. First, prosecution
by information was “an ancient proceeding at common law, which might
include every case of an offense of less grade than a felony, except misprision
of treason . . . .”214 The significance of this common law acceptance was not
fully explained. Presumably the point was that a procedure so well accepted at
common law, even though not for the type of case at hand, was hardly arbitrary
or contrary to the most fundamental principles of that “system of jurisprudence
of which ours is a derivative . . . .”215 Interestingly, although the Hurtado
Court previously spoke of rights fundamental to “all free governments”216 and
stated that due process should not be a barrier to the adoption of innovations
absorbing “the best ideas of all systems,” including civil systems,217 it cited
only the common law roots of magistrate review of charging decisions with no
mention of possible civil law analogies.218
The second factor noted by the Court was the function and operation of the
California preliminary hearing. The Court noted that “in every circumstance
of its administration, as authorized by the statute of California, it carefully
considers and guards the substantial interest of the prisoner.”219 A prosecution
by information was allowed only “after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on
his part to the aid of counsel, and to cross-examination of the witnesses
produced for the prosecution”220—safeguards not present in the indictment
process. In adopting this procedure, the legislature had obviously taken
account of the interest of the individual in not being put through the burden of
a trial where the state lacked a legitimate grounding for prosecution. It simply
had used an alternative to grand jury review to protect that interest.
The third factor mentioned, however, implicitly questioned whether a
legislative effort to safeguard that interest had been needed to satisfy due
213. Id. at 538.
214. Id.
215. See supra text accompanying note 195. See also Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172,
176 (1899), quoted in supra note 95.
216. See supra text accompanying note 184.
217. See supra text accompanying note 130.
218. As to the magistrate’s role in the classic civil law system particularly in conducting the
“preliminary examination,” see A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
500-10 (J. Simpson trans., 1913). See also Stewart Field et. al., Prosecutors, Examining Judges,
and Control of Police Investigations, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE A COMPARATIVE STUDY
227 (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995).
219. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
220. Id.
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process. For the Court here noted that the challenged California procedure was
“merely a preliminary proceeding,” and it could “result in no final judgment,
except as a consequence of a regular judicial trial, conducted precisely as in
cases of indictments.”221 This statement suggested that due process was only
concerned with fairness in the adjudication itself. That limitation also found
support in a previously quoted statement from Davidson v. New Orleans,222
that “[i]t is not possible to hold that a party has, without due process of law,
been deprived of his property when, as regards to the issues affecting it, he has
by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes
of proceeding applicable to such a case.”223
Hurtado and fundamental fairness
Hurtado often is described as the launching pad for the flexible, evolving
conception of due process that later came to dominate the application of due
process in both its procedural and substantive context.224 Indeed, it even has
been described as the Supreme Court case that “made judges [through the due
process clause] censors over what was ‘fundamental’ in a judicial
procedure.”225 Such characterizations of Hurtado find support in the broad
language used by the Court in describing due process. Two statements in
particular stand out: The description of due process as proscribing “arbitrary
exertions of power under the forms of legislation,”226 and the comment that
due process should not override state law which “derives its authority from the
inherent and reserved powers of the State” provided that those powers are
“exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”227 Those

221. Id.
222. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
223. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534 (quoting Davidson, 96 U.S. 97 at 105). See also supra note
193.
224. See, e.g., Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 14, at 647; Joseph D. Grano, Free
Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 785, 891 n.151 (1979); Douglas Laycock, Due
Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clause Nonjusticiable,
60 TEX. L. REV. 875, 894 (1982) (though citing as a still earlier source Bank of Columbia v.
Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)); Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the
States: A Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REV. 551, 574 (1998); see also CURRIE,
supra note 41, at 368 (in the procedural domain the Court managed both to construe due process
in a manner highly deferential to state legislative judgments and at the same time to establish
itself as the protector and definer of “fundamental procedural rights”).
225. CURRIE, supra note 41, at 368.
226. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 536; see also supra text accompanying note 180. The Court added
that “[a]rbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the persons and property of its
subjects, is not law, whether manifested as the decree of a personal monarch or of an impersonal
multitude.” Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 536.
227. See supra text accompanying note 185.
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statements and others arguably provided the foundation for a highly subjective,
expansive and evolving conception of substantive due process that took hold
not very long after Hurtado.228 However, the concept of procedural due
process set forth in Hurtado, at least as applied to criminal cases, was narrow,
largely fixed and provided a sharply confined judicial review.
The Hurtado Court imposed three significant limitations upon the content
of procedural due process as applied to criminal cases. First, it accepted and
reaffirmed the conclusion of Murray’s Lessee that “a process of law, which is
not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show
the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country.”229 Since the
“otherwise forbidden” language referred to additional constitutional restraints
not applicable to the states,230 this meant that a federal constitutional limitation
(i.e., due process) could only strike down a state process when it departed from
the common law. Some commentators have argued that any such limitation on
due process is inconsistent with other language in Justice Matthews’ opinion,
which they read as supporting an evolving “progressive growth” in due process
that could result in the rejection of common law procedures as not sufficiently
fair.231 However, the passages in question noted the need for a constitutional
228. As to the subsequent development and application of substantive due process, see DAVID
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, at
40-55 (1990); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L.
REV. 493 (1997); 8 OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 155-221 (1993).
It is uncertain whether the Hurtado Court intended to lay the foundation for such a broad
substantive due process doctrine. The Supreme Court’s one pre-Hurtado use of substantive due
process, in the notorious opinion of Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857), was not mentioned in Hurtado. Also, in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873), an opinion by Justice Miller (also a member of the
Hurtado Court) dismissed in a single sentence a claim that an economic regulation violated due
process. However, only a few years after Hurtado, the Court, in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887), though it did sustain the economic regulation at issue, appeared to openly recognize the
concept. In addition, substantive due process was applied to strike down an economic regulation
in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.2 (3d ed. 1999). See
also CURRIE, supra note 41, at 375; 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-99, at 705-09 (1971). See also
supra note 192.
229. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 109-15.
231. See Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 103-04 (noting that this passage has been “taken as an
assertion that the demands of due process grow with time,” although concluding that was not its
purpose); Laycock, supra note 224, at 894 (“Easterbrook implausibly claims that Hurtado meant
only that constitutional rights could contract, not that our understanding of them could expand.
One sentence [relating to Murray’s Lessee] lends some support to such a view, but that is not the
fair tenor of the whole opinion.”); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary
Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1998) (“[I]n Hurtado v. California, the Justices turned
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flexibility that would allow the legislature to adjust procedures to take account
of new circumstances and refined concepts of justice (possibly borrowed from
other systems). There was no suggestion that this was a task for the Court
itself in reviewing the procedures of the states. The Court would insist that
new procedures were consistent with the foundational principles embodied in
“our historical legal institutions,”232 but, if the legislature decided not to
change those institutions, that would remain, a fortiori, consistent with the
principles that shaped them.233
Second, where the state legislature (or state court) did depart from the
common law, the Hurtado opinion hardly gave to the Court a blank check in
determining whether those changes violated “those fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.”234 Here, a second limiting principle applied. Hurtado indicated
that, in the procedural arena, those foundational principles were limited to the
basics of a trial-type adjudication—notice of the charges, an opportunity to
challenge the other side’s case and present your own, a competent tribunal
rendering decision on consideration of the evidence and the application of the
general standing law. Subsequent rulings extending through the first third of
the twentieth century consistently cited Hurtado as adopting a view of
procedural due process that demanded no more.235 It was this conception of
their back on originalism to ensure the ‘progress [and] improvement’ of the Constitution ‘in this
quick and active age.’”).
232. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530.
233. The Court did note that the common law had reshaped the grand jury to make its role
more consistent with those principles, and cited this as an illustration that it is better not to go too
far back into antiquity for the best securities for our “ancient liberties.” Id. at 530. But it hardly
suggested that this task of bringing the common law up to date, and rendering it “more consonant
to the true philosophy of our historical legal institutions” was assigned to the Court rather than the
state courts and legislatures. Hurtado has been aptly described as an “opinion characterized by
seeming sensitivity to historical change, by sweepingly humanistic views on jurisprudence and
society, and by confidence in the destiny of the United States . . . .” Miller, supra note 39, at 18.
But the Court did not suggest that it had been assigned a major role in either instigating or
monitoring the legislative and judicial innovations that were a part of its vision of progressive
growth in the law and its institutions.
234. See supra text accompanying note 135.
235. See, e.g., the following cases, which also relied on Hurtado: Jordan v. Massachusetts,
225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912) (“When the essential elements of a court having jurisdiction in which
an opportunity for a hearing is afforded are present, the power of a State over its methods of
procedure is substantially unrestricted by the due process clause of the Constitution.”); Frank v.
Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915) (“As to the ‘due process of law’ that is required by the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is perfectly well settled that a criminal prosecution in the courts of a
State, based upon a law not in itself repugnant to the Federal Constitution, and conducted
according to the settled course of judicial proceedings as established by the law of the State, so
long as it includes notice, and a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard, before a court of
competent jurisdiction, according to established modes of procedure, is ‘due process’ in the
constitutional sense.”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (due process did permit
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due process that arguably would go so far as to allow a state legislature to
adopt a civil system of adjudication236 and would give to due process a
minimal role in the constitutional regulation of the federal criminal process,
which was subject to the more rigorous adjudication requirements of the
express provisions of the Bill of Rights.237
Due process, though limited to the basics of adjudication, had a greater
potential in the constitutional regulation of state criminal procedure systems,
because only the due process clause applied to those systems. But here,
Hurtado’s third limiting principle restricted the potential for constitutional
regulation. The avoidance of provision superfluity required that due process
not overlap in content with the express provisions of the Bill of Rights.238
Thus, the requirements that it imposed as to notice and an opportunity to be
heard in defense had to be less than what the Sixth Amendment demanded as
to these elements of adjudication. Finally, Hurtado had stressed the need to be
highly deferential to state legislative judgments in assessing whether the few
protected basics had been respected.239
Shortly before Hurtado, the Supreme Court in Davidson240 had expressed
dismay as to the frequency with which state petitioners were pressing due
process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, notwithstanding that the
Fifth Amendment’s due process clause had “rarely” been invoked during the
many decades in which it stood as the Constitution’s only due process
clause.241 Hurtado recognized that, as to criminal procedure, the due process

various departures from the common law, but “[w]hat may not be taken away is notice of the
charge and an adequate opportunity to be heard in defense of it”).
236. See supra text accompanying note 130. See also supra note 135.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 158-63.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 136-55.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 187-89.
240. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1877).
241. Justice Miller there noted:
It is not a little remarkable, that while this provision has been in the Constitution of
the United States, as a restraint upon the authority of the Federal government, for nearly a
century, and while, during all that time, the manner in which the powers of that
government have been exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the
most rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely
been invoked in the judicial forum or the more enlarged theatre of public discussion. But
while it has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the power of the States,
only a very few years, the docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are
asked to hold that State courts and State legislatures have deprived their own citizens of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. There is here abundant evidence that
there exists some strange misconception of the scope of this provision as found in the
fourteenth amendment. In fact, it would seem, from the character of many of the cases
before us, and the arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is looked
upon as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions
of every unsuccessful litigant in a State court of the justice of the decision against him,
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clause had played such a limited role in the federal system because it stood
apart from the express provisions of the Bill of Rights and added little
additional content. Arguably, the original purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s
due process had been only to impose the standing law requirement of per
legem terrae,242 but such a narrow interpretation had been foreclosed by earlier
rulings.243 However, Hurtado’s three limiting principles, although giving due
process a somewhat broader content, ensured that the due process clause would
continue to have only a limited role in the constitutional regulation of the
federal criminal justice system. Of greater importance, those principles
precluded placing the Court in the position of being the ultimate arbiter of state
criminal procedure (and thereby increasing the flow of petitions from state
courts).
In subsequent years, the Court became more and more willing to assume
the position of ultimate arbiter and gradually chipped away at the limiting
principles of Hurtado. Somewhat surprisingly, as discussed infra,244 once
selective incorporation placed the Court squarely in the position of ultimate
arbiter, there developed within the Court a movement to return to the
philosophy of Hurtado, if not its specific limiting principles, in determining the
independent content of due process.
II. THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE PRE-INCORPORATION DECADES
Over the eight decades between Hurtado and the adoption of the selective
incorporation doctrine in the mid-1960s, there were a variety of developments
in the Supreme Court’s application of the due process guarantee to the criminal
justice process. The vast majority of the Court’s rulings came in cases in
which state defendants presented challenges which would have been treated
under the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights had they been presented in
federal prosecutions. Much of the doctrine adopted in those cases, however,
had a bearing that extended beyond determining the degree of overlap between
due process and the specific provisions. That doctrine also shaped a scattered
group of rulings that did not have a parallel in the specific guarantees and it
established a conception of due process that became the starting point for the
expansion of free-standing due process in the post-incorporation era. From the
and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded. If,
therefore, it were possible to define what it is for a State to deprive a person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, in terms which would cover every
exercise of power thus forbidden to the State, and exclude those which are not, no more
useful construction could be furnished by this or any other court to any part of the
fundamental law.
Id. at 103-04.
242. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.4(b).
243. See supra text accompanying note 53.
244. See infra discussion at notes 480-86, 557-82, and 596-618.
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perspective of these consequences, the primary features of the due process
rulings in criminal procedure over the pre-incorporation decades were: (1) their
continued adherence to Hurtado’s general description of the “fundamental
rights” protected by due process; (2) their rejection of the Hurtado limitations
that gave the fundamental rights concept a very narrow content as applied to
the criminal justice process; (3) their characterization of due process as an
“evolving concept”; (4) their development of a more flexible methodology for
determining the content of due process; (5) their application of that
methodology in a series of rulings which gave due process a content that stood
apart from the content of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights; and (6)
the presentation of a minority viewpoint that challenged the majority’s
fundamental fairness analysis as intolerably subjective.
A.

The description of fundamental fairness

Hurtado had offered several different descriptions of the fundamental
rights protected by due process. They included: those “general principles of
public liberty and private right, which lie at the foundation of all free
government”;245; “those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions”;246 and “certain
fundamental rights which that system of jurisprudence, of which ours is a
derivative, has always recognized.”247 Over the pre-incorporation decades, the
Supreme Court similarly saw no need to settle upon a single description. In its
criminal procedure rulings alone, the Court offered the following descriptions
of the rights protected by due process: those “fundamental principle[s] of
liberty and justice which inher[e] in the very idea of a free government and . . .
the inalienable right[s] of a citizen of such a government”;248 rights “so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental”;249
“immutable principles of justice, acknowledged semper ubique et ab omnibus
whenever the good life is a subject of concern”;250 rights of the “very essence
of a scheme of ordered liberty,” without which “a fair and enlightened system

245. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884).
246. Id. at 535.
247. Id. at 536 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Levee Comm’rs, 50 Miss. 468, 479 (1874)).
248. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908). The Court also referred to rights
grounded in “fundamental principles, . . . which have relation to process of law, and protect the
citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of government,” and to
“immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no
member of the Union may disregard.” Id. at 101-02 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389
(1898)).
249. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
250. Id. at 122 (emphasis added). The Court also referred to rights “inherent in every concept
of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men.” Id.
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of justice would be impossible”;251 rights necessary to provide a defendant
with that “fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice”;252
rights so fundamental that their violation in a particular case would be
“shocking to the universal sense of justice”;253 and rights reflecting “those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of Englishspeaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous
offenses.”254
Like the Hurtado descriptions, the pre-incorporation descriptions appeared
to vary in their point of reference. Some suggested that fundamental character
was to be determined by reference to the Anglo-American common law
system,255 others that the proper reference was universal elements of justice,
recognized in all civilized systems.256 Some seemed to focus on historical
traditions,257 while others appeared to also take account of differing
contemporary notions of justice.258 The Court, however, did not view such
differences in wording as significant. It simply had expressed the same general
principle “many times . . . in differing words.”259 As noted in Hurtado, no
single definition could be treated as “comprehensive” and the “full meaning”
of due process would have to be “gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of decisions of cases as they arise.”260
The Court also continued to point out, as it had in Hurtado, that respect for a
state’s authority to shape its own criminal justice process directed that the
judiciary proceed with caution in determining whether a fundamental right has
been violated.261
As in Hurtado, the descriptions of fundamental rights offered over preincorporation decades were sometimes formulated with specific reference to

251. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
252. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
253. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
254. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
255. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 249 and 254.
256. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 248, 250-51 and 253.
257. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
258. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
259. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (“This idea has been many times
expressed in differing words by this court . . . .”).
260. Id. at 100. See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 127 (1959).
261. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106-07 (1908) (“Under the guise of
interpreting the Constitution we must take care that we do not import into the discussion our own
personal views of what would be wise, just, and fitting.”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934) (similar); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“When the standards for judicial judgment are not narrower than
‘immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of a free government,’ . . . [and]
‘immunities . . . implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ . . . great tolerance toward a State’s
conduct is demanded of this Court.”) (citations omitted).
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procedure262 and sometimes expressed in terms that would encompass both
substantive and procedural due process.263 Here again, the Court apparently
did not view the distinction as significant. In Rochin v. California,264 the Court
announced a somewhat distinct standard265 in dealing with what later came to
be described as a substantive due process issue: When did police actions so
invade the individual liberty of a suspect that the government should not be
allowed to utilize the evidentiary fruits of those actions?266 The Court there
spoke of due process imposing such a prohibition where the police action
constitutes “conduct that shocks the conscience”267 and thereby violates “the
general requirement that [s]tates in their prosecutions respect certain decencies
of civilized conduct.”268 However, the Rochin opinion also cited more
traditional formulations of the fundamental rights standard269 and Rochin
neither described its ruling as resting on substantive due process (a description
that emerged in later cases270), nor suggested that it was formulating a separate
standard for due process claims involving the acquisition of evidence.271

262. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 252 and 254; infra text accompanying note
279.
263. Thus, in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court did not shift its
description of fundamental rights in explaining why First Amendment rights were protected by
due process while various other procedural rights were not.
264. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
265. See Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due
Process Test Should Replace the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
261, 265-69.
266. For a description of Rochin, see infra note 433.
267. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
268. Id. at 173. The Court also noted that, “[d]ue process of law, as a historic and generative
principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely
than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend ‘a sense of justice.”
Id. (quoting Chief Justice Hughes “speaking for a unanimous Court” in Brown v. Mississippi, 274
U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936)).
269. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168. The Court also quoted the standards set forth in Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
See also supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998), discussed infra at
notes 572-75; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 746 (1987).
271. Arguably, the Court was simply seeking to explain why the police conduct controverted
the fundamental fairness standard without reference to those Fourth Amendment interests which
had been held to be protected by due process but not to require evidentiary exclusion when
violated. See infra notes 297-98. Rochin drew an analogy to the Court’s coerced confession
cases, but did not suggest that “conscience-shocking” was a due process standard to be applied in
determining the admissibility of confessions. Nonetheless, a conscious-shocking standard has
persisted where the Court is considering police conduct that does not violate a specific guarantee
of the Bill of Rights. See infra note 488; Dripps, supra note 265 (arguing that the Rochin
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In one respect, the descriptions of the pre-incorporation decades did offer a
new insight. Various decisions noted that the fundamental character of a right
claimed by a defendant would often depend upon the circumstances of the
case. As to some rights, the Court was willing to say that they simply were not
protected by due process; that was the case, for example, of prosecution by
indictment, the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to jury trial.272
As to several others, due process required their recognition without regard to
the particular circumstances of the defendant or suspect.273 For many,
however, the Court concluded that the particular right might be demanded by
due process under some circumstances, but not others. Indeed, the Court
noted, “[w]hat is fair in one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in
others.”274 The primary example of due process rulings stressing the
circumstances of the particular case were those involving claims based upon
the failure to provide counsel to assist indigent defendants,275 but essentially
the same circumstance-focused approach also was applied to other claims (e.g.,
that multiple trials could produce burdens violating due process,276 that the
pressures leading to a defendant’s confession could be so overbearing that due
process should preclude prosecution use of that confession in evidence,277 and
that the character of a seizure of evidence could be so offensive that due
process should require the exclusion of that evidence278). In these areas, the
Court often asked whether, upon an “appraisal of the totality of facts in [the]
given case,” the result of failing to provide the defendant with the claimed

standard is an anachronism). The Rochin standard has not been applied in other substantive due
process contexts. See, e.g., the cases cited infra note 577.
272. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (prosecution by indictment);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (privilege against self-incrimination); Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1908) (jury trial). As discussed in 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.4(d), most
of these rulings came prior to the 1930s, but the same position was taken on occasion in the later
decades. See, for example, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949), where the Court
ruled that due process did not give to the defendant the right to insist that the sentencing judge
consider only evidence presented in court in evaluating defendant’s past behavior and character.
The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that this general authority would violate due process in
exceptional circumstances—here a capital case in which the judge imposed capital punishment
notwithstanding the contrary recommendation of the jury and relied on information contained in a
probation report that was not “subject to examination by the defendant.” Id. at 251.
273. See, e.g., Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) (right to retained counsel); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge without financial interest in conviction).
274. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 117 (1934).
275. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942);
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
276. See, e.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 467 (1958).
277. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949);
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
278. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954).
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protection was a “denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice.”279 This led to the common description of due process rulings
in criminal procedure cases as applying a “fundamental fairness” standard.280
This focus on the circumstances of the case was quite different than Hurtado,
which had indicated that a grand jury’s initiation of charges would not be a
fundamental right under any circumstances.281 However, as noted, the focus
on circumstances was not universal and Hurtado had not suggested that a flat
standard of inclusion or rejection was the only way due process could deal with
a particular procedural right.
B.

Rejecting the Hurtado limitations

Though retaining formulations of due process protection consistent with
Hurtado, over the pre-incorporation decades, the Court overrode each of those
Hurtado limitations that had sharply restricted the role of due process in the
constitutional regulation of criminal procedure. Initially, it rejected the
Hurtado rule of construction, which worked against a due process “overlap”
with the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. That rejection opened the
door to substantially expanding the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause, the only source of constitutional regulation of state procedure.
It allowed, in particular, for a due process content that went beyond the basic
elements of trial-type adjudication that Hurtado had identified as the only
likely content of procedural due process. The Court also rejected the Hurtado
position that the approval of the common law shielded a procedure from a due
process challenge. The fundamental fairness analysis was no longer reserved
for departures from the common law, but applied even to procedures that had
the “sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country.”282
It was in a substantive due process case, rather than a criminal procedure
case, that the Court pushed aside the Hurtado rule of construction that due
process should not be read to encompass (and therefore render superfluous) the
coverage of a specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights. The Chicago Railroad

279. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). See also Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596,
605 (1944); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 666 (1948); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 46768 (1958).
280. See, e.g., 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.4 and the articles cited therein.
281. Had the Court looked at the particular circumstances, the defendant’s case for charging
review by a grand jury might have gained strength. Hurtado presented a fact situation (a killing
in response to an alleged adultery), see People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288 (1883), where the
defendant might have benefited from the grand jury’s power to take account of the community’s
sense of justice and to “charge . . . a lesser offense” than the evidence might support. See
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (recognizing that authority). I am indebted to
Donald Dripps for calling the facts of Hurtado to my attention.
282. See supra text accompanying note 229.
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Case,283 decided in 1897, held that due process included a prohibition also
found in another provision of the Fifth Amendment—the prohibition against
the government taking property without providing just compensation. The
Court did not refer to the Hurtado rule of construction, but it also did not
suggest that the due process prohibition against takings without just
compensation was any narrower than the Fifth Amendment prohibition (which
would have met Hurtado’s concern as to rendering the specific guarantee
“superfluous”).284 Not long thereafter, in Twining v. New Jersey,285 the Court
spoke to whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was
a fundamental right guaranteed by due process.286 The Court rejected that
contention based on the history of the privilege in English law (which
recognized various exceptions to the privilege), the limited recognition of the
privilege in the constitutions of the original states and the uniform rejection of
the privilege in civilized countries “outside the domain of the common law.” It
did not start from the premise that the privilege was not within due process
because that would render superfluous the Fifth Amendment guarantee. No
mention was made of Hurtado’s rule of construction. Rather, citing the
Chicago Railroad Case, the Court noted:
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight
Amendments against national action may also be safeguarded against state
action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process. . . . If this is
so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight
Amendment[s], but because they are of such a nature that they are included in
the conception of due process of law.287

In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama,288 the Court faced up to the Hurtado
standard. By this time, the Court had already held that due process
encompassed certain First Amendment rights as well as the Fifth

283. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
284. Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Chicago Railroad Court mentioned neither Hurtado nor
the Fifth Amendment provision. Harlan, of course, had dissented in Hurtado. The Court had no
need to determine whether due process was as extensive as the Fifth Amendment in its definition
of a taking, as the critical issue in this case was whether the compensation received by the
railroad fell short of being “just.” Id. at 241.
285. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
286. The precise issue before the Court was whether due process was violated by a charge to
the jury noting that it could draw an inference adverse to the defendant based on his failure to
take the stand and refute a direct accusation made against him. The Court did not limit its
analysis to this aspect of the privilege, but asked whether the core prohibition against compelling
a person to be a witness against himself was a fundamental right protected by due process.
Twining, 211 U.S. at 82-83.
287. Id. at 99.
288. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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Amendment’s just compensation provision.289 At issue in Powell was whether
due process encompassed aspects of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
the assistance of counsel. The Court took note of Hurtado’s canon of
interpretation, noting that if it “stood alone,” it would “be difficult to justify the
conclusion that the right to counsel, being thus specifically granted by the
Sixth Amendment, was also within the intendment of due process.”290
However, Hurtado did “not stand alone,”291 as the Chicago Railway case and
the First Amendment cases had “establish[ed] that notwithstanding the
sweeping character of the language in the Hurtado case, the rule laid down
[there] is not without exceptions.”292 The rule of Hurtado, the Court noted,
was simply an “aid to construction,” which must “yield to more compelling
considerations whenever such considerations exist.”293 One such compelling
consideration was the very fact that the character of the right rendered it one of
those “fundamental principles” that met the general standard of due process
formulated in Hurtado. Though the Powell Court also stated that the Hurtado
rule of construction “in some instances may be conclusive,”294 that was
meaningless if those instances did not extend to any rights in the specific
guarantees that otherwise would be deemed “fundamental” and therefore
within due process. Powell thus politely buried the Hurtado rule of
construction and it was never again heard from in a due process ruling.
Hurtado also had suggested that procedural due process was limited to the
basic elements of a trial-type adjudication,295 but if the door was now open to
inclusion of the full range of guarantees found in the Bill of Rights, due
process could readily go beyond rights aimed at providing a “fair hearing.”296
The Court went down that path in holding that due process encompassed the

289. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 285 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (freedom of speech); Pierce
v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931)
(freedom of press). See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937) (listing these rights
as absorbed into due process).
290. Arguably, that would not have been true for the limited right to counsel recognized in
Powell, which was narrower than the right recognized under the Sixth Amendment. See supra
text accompanying note 155.
291. Powell, 287 U.S. at 66.
292. Id. at 67.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 209 and 234-37.
296. Rulings into the 1920s offered a vision of procedural due process much like that in
Hurtado. See, e.g., West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1904); Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912). The shift occurred
in the 1930s. It was one element of a general movement toward more expansive readings of
constitutional provisions regulating the criminal process. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, at 617,
622-24.
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basic privacy interest safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment297 (although not
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule remedy, absent a violation that
“shocks the conscience”298), prohibited some forms of cruel and unusual
punishments299 and prohibited the use of confessions obtained through
pressures deemed offensive because they overrode the suspect’s free will
(though there was no reason to doubt the reliability of the confession).300 Such
rulings might have been characterized as imposing substantive due process
limitations, as they reflected prohibitions against governmental invasion of
certain aspects of human dignity as well as restrictions upon the administration
But the Court generally viewed
of the criminal justice process.301
constitutional limitations that regulated the process of criminal investigation,
trial and punishment (as compared to constitutional regulation that limited the
behavior that could be punished) as involving procedural aspects of due
In any event, the same general standard for identifying
process.302
297. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
298. Id.; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
299. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462-66 (1947) (plurality,
concurring and dissenting opinions all recognize this content, but state action here did not meet
that characterization).
300. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (ploy on friendship); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) (interrogation by psychiatrist was misuse of his position);
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 203 (1960) (reliable confessions may nonetheless be
excluded). See 2 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 6.2(b).
301. See Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS,
XVIII NOMOS 182, 183 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
Procedural fairness has both a loose and a strict sense. In its loose sense, the term
includes certain rules and principles applicable to dispute-setting procedures that are
designed to protect substantive rather than procedural values. I have in mind examples
such as these: the criminal defendant’s privilege not to testify; the rule excluding from
evidence a priest’s testimony about a penitent’s confession; the rules prohibiting the use
of evidence extracted by physical or psychological abuse; and rules prohibiting or
restraining the use of evidence obtained by invasion of privacy or trespasses. These are
not rules and principles of procedural fairness in the strict sense in which I shall use the
term in this paper. They are procedural standards only in that their primary (or sole)
application is to dispute-settling procedures. Unlike rules and principles of procedural
fairness in the strict sense, they are not aimed at producing more accurate or fair decisions
of those disputes. They are rather designed to protect various substantive rights and
interests from the invasions to which they would be subject if the strictly procedural aims
of correct fact-finding and rule-applying were pursued single-mindedly (or subject only to
prudential constraints of costs).
Id. See also Dripps, Beyond The Warren Court, supra note 14, at 618 (“[T]here is no
separating Lochner v. New York from Gitlow v. New York, Roe v. Wade and Mapp or Miranda.
All are substantive due process cases . . . .”).
302. One notable exception was the Rochin ruling prohibiting admission of evidence gained
through police practices that “shocked the conscience.” See supra text accompanying note 267.
But it was not until the post-incorporation era that the Court began describing Rochin as a
substantive due process rule. See supra note 270. In the pre-incorporation period, the Court did
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fundamental rights applied whether the issue was an overlap with the
“substantive limits” of the First Amendment or the “procedural” limits of the
Fourth Amendment.303
Powell v. Alabama304 also marked the demise of the Hurtado rule that a
process sanctioned by “settled usage” at common law “must be taken to be due
process of law.”305 Powell involved two claims—that due process required
that a defendant be given an adequate opportunity to retain counsel and that
due process required that an indigent defendant be provided with court
appointed counsel. In sustaining the defendant’s right to the assistance of
retained counsel (and to an adequate opportunity to obtain such counsel), the
Powell opinion relied heavily on the historical developments that led to the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment and similarly worded state constitutional
provisions, noting that those developments reflected the fundamental character
of the right to be represented at trial by retained counsel. When the Powell
opinion turned to an indigent defendant’s right to appointed counsel, it did not
look to the lessons of history, but instead stressed the logical implications of
the due process right to a fair hearing.306 As the Court later noted in Betts v.
Brady,307 at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the appointment of
counsel was a limited practice, typically confined to capital cases (if
recognized at all) and not grounded in constitutional provisions.308 Thus, the

not describe as substantive its ruling in Rochin or its rulings on due process prohibiting the
admission of coerced confessions, unreasonable searches, or certain types of punishments that
were cruel and unusual. See cases cited supra notes 297 and 299-300.
303. See, for example, cases cited supra notes 289, 297, 299-300, and the Court’s analysis in
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), discussed supra note 263. See also Dripps,
Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 14, at 651 (criticizing the Court’s use of the “fundamental
fairness” standard, a “substantive due process concept, to articulate the proper inquiry into
procedural fairness”).
304. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
305. See supra note 229. Others disagree as to the timing of this demise. See Redish &
Marshall, supra note 99, at 470 (suggesting that by the time of Twining (1908), the Court had
adopted an analysis that made “the historical absence or presence of a procedure . . . simply
another evidentiary factor, with history providing neither a floor nor a ceiling” to due process);
Kaplan, supra note 129, at 470 (the Court modified the Hurtado principle in Twining); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 31 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that a shift
in approach had occurred “by the time the Court decided Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934)” but
unbroken historical usage was not rejected as being dispositive until the mid-20th century with
rulings like Gideon v. Wainwright). See also infra note 312.
306. See infra text accompanying note 376. Powell did back up this analysis by reference to
current practice, noting that every state required appointment of counsel at least in capital cases,
but there was no suggestion that this had been a long standing tradition or one viewed as
grounded on a fundamental right. Powell, 287 U.S. at 73.
307. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
308. Betts, 316 U.S. at 465-67. See also 3 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 11.1(a).
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“settled usage” (at least for non-capital cases)309 was to leave defendants to
fend for themselves when they could not afford counsel.
The Powell opinion noted that “[o]ne test which has been applied to
determine whether due process of law has been accorded in given instances is
to ascertain what were the settled usages and modes of proceeding under the
common and statute law of England before the Declaration of Independence,
subject, however, to the qualification that they be shown not to have been
unsuited to the civil and political conditions of our ancestors by having been
followed in this country after it became a nation.”310 That test, it noted, “has
not been met in the present case.”311 The denial of the opportunity to retain
counsel was consistent with the settled usage in England, but not the settled
usage in this country, where recognition of a fundamental right to the
assistance of retained counsel of choice was widespread at the time of its
founding. Powell did not consider separately the possible sanction of history
for placing an indigent defendant in a position where he had to represent
himself (i.e., not providing him with appointed counsel). Perhaps it concluded
that this practice also did not have the sanction of settled usage under the
Hurtado standard because, although it was in fact the practice in both England
and this country, only the American law formally took a position on not
providing indigents with the assistance of counsel; the English common law
had no reason to treat that issue as it did not allow representation even by
retained counsel. Logically, however, the rationale of Hurtado’s “settled
usage” rule should still have applied. If those who adopted the Fifth
Amendment’s due process assumed that English practice carried over to this
country was consistent with due process, they also would have similarly
viewed a uniquely American practice that had been well established in the
colonies. The Powell Court, however, saw no need to even discuss the
possibility that Hurtado’s settled usage “shield,” which had been reaffirmed in
several subsequent due process rulings,312 could be based solely on the settled
309. Powell itself involved a capital case, and the Court mentioned that factor in summarizing
its holding as to appointed counsel. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. However, the Powell Court did not
rely on the special consideration of capital cases in the appointment of counsel in early American
practice. In Betts v. Brady, see discussion supra text accompanying note 307, the Court extended
Powell to require appointed counsel in non-capital cases under special circumstances, though
noting that American common law had not required appointment in such cases.
310. Powell, 287 U.S. at 65.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (quoting Hurtado); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (finding no settled usage supporting the practice challenged
there, looking to both English practice and the “strict common-law rule” carried over to this
country, and disparaging the acceptance of the practice in a few states); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256
U.S. 94, 109-12 (1921) (finding settled usage required acceptance of practice even though it
departed from the general rule requiring a right to be heard unencumbered by a bond posting
requirement).
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usage in this country. Arguably it viewed such a shield, like Hurtado’s rule of
construction on avoiding superfluous readings, as simply a factor to be
considered, but not conclusive.
A handful of other pre-incorporation due process cases also held
unconstitutional practices that appeared to be sanctioned by “settled usage,” at
least in the common law of this country. A series of confession cases extended
due process to bar confessions even though they would have been accepted
under the common law rule that looked to whether the methods used were
likely to produce an untrustworthy statement.313 These rulings, in turn, led the
Court in Jackson v. Denno314 to hold that due process required that the
voluntariness of a confession first be determined by the judge, although the
contrary practice of submitting the voluntariness issue directly to the jury had
“more than a century of history behind it.”315 In Griffin v. Illinois,316 the Court
relied on due process, in part, to hold unconstitutional a state’s failure to
provide an indigent convicted defendant with the transcript needed to raise an
evidentiary sufficiency challenge on appeal, notwithstanding that the common
law did not require appellate review and took no special account of the
indigent.317
C. Due process as an “evolving concept”
While most of the rulings rejecting practices sanctioned by settled usage
took account of the common law tradition that had accepted the practice, they
treated that tradition as no more than one factor to be considered in
determining whether the defendant had been denied fundamental fairness.
Their failure to refer to Hurtado’s description of settled usage as a shield was
not surprising, because the Court had developed a characterization of due
process that implicitly rejected such a shield. In the years following Powell,
the Court had set forth a conception of due process that could readily justify

313. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 300. As to the common law rule and the departure from
that rule, see 2 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 6.2(a)-(b); Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda:
The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59,
92-101 (1989); YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1-25 (1980). The
Court’s position in these confession cases could also be seen as extending the privilege against
self-incrimination to out-of-court pressures that produced a confession, which would also
constitute a departure from the common law. See id. at 27-77; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
500-26 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
314. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Although decided in the mid-1960s, Jackson came shortly before
the Court held the self-incrimination privilege to be fundamental and applicable to the states.
315. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 403 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 172 (1953).
316. 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). See discussion infra notes 416-23.
317. See infra text accompanying note 420.
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striking down a procedural practice with strong common law roots.318 Due
process, it had noted, was an “evolving concept,” distinguishable from
guarantees, such as the double jeopardy prohibition, that were “rooted in
history.”319 The term “due process” was said to “formulate[] a concept less
rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular
provisions of the Bill of Rights.”320 Indeed, due process was described as “the
least frozen concept of our law—the least confined to history and the most
absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society.”321 It was not
“a stagnant formulation of what had been achieved in the past but a standard
for judgment in the progressive evolution of the institutions of a free
society.”322 Since basic rights do not become petrified as of any one time and
“[i]t is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is
deemed reasonable and right,” due process would be viewed as a “living
principle, not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given
time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.”323
This conception of a flexible, evolving due process meant that history did
not invariably establish either a “floor []or a ceiling” for due process.324 The
Court could determine that a procedural prohibition or requirement viewed as
essential when the Bill of Rights was adopted, considered in the context of
modern criminal procedure and modern society, was less an “enduring
reflection[] of experience with human nature” than an expression of “the
restricted views of Eighteenth-Century England regarding the best methods for
the ascertainment of facts.”325 That was consistent with Hurtado’s recognition
of the potential for departure from historical practice to reflect “a progressive
growth and wise adaption to new circumstances and situations” in giving “new
expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government.”326 But a
flexible and evolving conception of due process could also lead the Court to

318. This conception was advanced not only in criminal cases, as illustrated by opinions cited
infra notes 319-23, but also in cases dealing with federal and state, civil and administrative
procedures. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161-65
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (collecting cases); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315-20 (1950) (invalidating notice by publication as inconsistent with due
process when plaintiff could reasonably ascertain the defendant’s address, although service by
publication was a longstanding practice in civil procedure); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 50 (1950) (finding due process hearing requires a tribunal “which meets at least currently
prevailing standards of impartiality”).
319. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392 (1958).
320. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
321. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
322. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
323. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
324. Redish & Marshall, supra note 99, at 470.
325. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
326. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530. See also supra text accompanying notes 128 and 130.
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hold fundamentally unfair a practice sanctioned by the common law. That
position might be based on a changed context that altered the impact of the
practice327 or on “refinement[s] in our sense of justice.”328 Such a ruling,
however, would be contrary to Hurtado’s acceptance of “settled usage” as a
shield against a due process challenge, particularly where based more on a shift
in societal values than a shift in factual context.
While the Hurtado Court explained at length why it was rejecting the
suggestion in Murray’s Lessee that would have had due process incorporate the
settled usage of the common law,329 the post-Hurtado decisions never offered
an extensive explanation as to why they were rejecting the Hurtado (and
Murray’s Lessee) position that settled usage provided a shield against a due
process challenge. Arguably, the Court viewed such a shield as inconsistent
with Hurtado’s recognition of the need for change to properly reflect the
progressive evolution of free society.330 If that evolution could justify holding
as non-fundamental (and therefore subject to legislative change) “methods of
procedure, which at the time the Constitution was adopted were deemed
essential to the protection and safety of the people,”331 then could that
evolution also not work in the opposite direction—to establish that practices
formerly deemed acceptable were contrary to modern notions of basic
fairness?332 If the recognition that the common law had relied on erroneous
assumptions regarding such matters as “the best methods for the ascertainment
of facts”333 could lead to sustaining a state’s rejection of a prohibition deemed

327. See Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 343 (1957) (noting that this conception of due process
allowed consideration of “the unique character in which each generation’s problems are
presented,” and recognized “[s]olutions of the problems of another day are useful but certainly
not determinative of today’s problems”).
328. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6
(1956). The author of this article, Justice Walter Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court, was a
strong supporter of a flexible due process theory and urged the Supreme Court to utilize that
conception of due process to “identify the fundamental constitutional values, resolve current
conflicts in these social policies, and accommodate future changes in society.” Nowak, supra
note 14, at 399.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 120-30.
330. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 467 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (citing to the “classic language” of Hurtado in support of the proposition that due
process safeguards “run back to [the] Magna Carta but contemplate no less advances in the
conceptions of justice and freedom by a progressive society”).
331. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 385-86 (1898). Holden reviewed various departures
from the common law that had been upheld under such an analysis and cited other departures that
had not been challenged. See discussion infra note 339.
332. See discussion supra note 330. See also Redish & Marshall, supra note 99, at 469-70
(“By the time of its decision in Twining v. New Jersey, the Court seemed to recognize the
deficiencies in the one-directional progress approach adopted in Hurtado.”).
333. See supra text accompanying note 325.
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essential at the common law, could not that same recognition lead to a court
prohibiting as fundamentally unfair practices formerly accepted at the common
law?334
The criminal procedure cases characterizing due process as an “evolving
concept” came after the Court had completed its notorious and ultimately
unsuccessful Lochner era practice of rigorous substantive due process review
of state economic regulations.335 That review clearly had recognized a content
in substantive due process that went beyond the specific provisions of the Bill
of Rights—a content presumably based upon a natural law foundation.336
Though the Court subsequently had rejected the Lochner era rulings, that
rejection was based only on the failure of those rulings to give ample deference
“to the opinion of other branches of government regarding the legitimate ends
of legislation or the proper means for achieving those ends.”337 Thus, the
Court had not rejected other substantive due process rulings of the Lochner era,
dealing with non-economic liberties, that also went beyond the specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights.338 As to criminal procedure, Hurtado and

334. See Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 14, at 653-54 & n.55:
Suppose a criminal defendant shows a complete common-law consensus to the effect
that a perfectly reliable type of evidence should be excluded. For example, a child abuse
defendant moves to bar the victim, now six years old, from testifying. At common law,
this would have been the usual result, on the ground that a child of tender years cannot
understand the oath and its potentially eternal consequences. Would any court do
anything but laugh at the defendant’s due process argument, despite its impeccable
historical pedigree?
On the other hand, suppose the state excludes reliable defense evidence that would
not have been admissible at common law. For example, suppose a state procedural rule
has the effect of preventing the defendant herself from testifying. At common law, the
defendant could not be sworn as a witness (again on the theory that this made damnation
too likely). Could the state justify its rule on the basis of common-law history? Suppose
a state barred coconspirators from testifying on one another’s behalf. Or prohibited a
defendant from cross-examining a witness who gave testimony favorable to the state after
being called by the defense? All of these cases actually reached the Supreme Court, and
in each the Court struck down the state rules, history notwithstanding.
See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (striking down bar on co-conspirator
testimony under the Sixth Amendment compulsory process clause); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973) (striking down voucher rule on due process
grounds); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (striking down on compulsory process
grounds ban on testimony by accused who had been subjected to hypnosis prior to trial).
335. As to that practice, see 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 228, § 15.3.
336. See generally J.A.C. Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L.
REV. 56 (1931). See also CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW
CONCEPTS 143-95 (1930); Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American
Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928).
337. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 228, § 15.4.
338. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding infringement on liberty to
make educational decisions); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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other cases had already set a proper tone of deference to legislative change.339
Accordingly, recognizing that due process was also an “evolving concept” as
applied to procedure, capable of overriding settled usage as well as allowing
legislative change from settled usage, may have been seen as a logical and
appropriate extension of what the Court had already recognized in its
application of substantive due process.340
One point that was not discussed in the pre-incorporation rulings was how
this view of due process as a flexible and evolving concept squared with the
original understanding of the Fifth Amendment clause.341 Arguably, the Court
saw no need to relate its view of due process to the original understanding of
the “law of the land” concept because of the extensive discussion of that
understanding in Hurtado itself and its continued adherence to the fundamental
rights formulation which Hurtado had announced. Hurtado’s vision of the
339. As to the other cases setting that tone, see Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) and the
cases cited therein. See also discussion supra note 331. Holden was especially forceful in
identifying the need for deference in considering departures from the common law in both
procedural and substantive regulation. The Supreme Court noted:
[I]n passing upon the validity of state legislation under th[e] [Fourteenth]
[A]mendment, this court has not failed to recognize the fact that the law is, to a certain
extent, a progressive science; that in some of the States methods of procedure, which at
the time the Constitution was adopted were deemed essential to the protection and safety
of the people, or to the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no longer necessary;
that restrictions which had formerly been laid upon the conduct of individuals, or of
classes of individuals, had proved detrimental to their interests; while, upon the other
hand, certain other classes of persons, particularly those engaged in dangerous or
unhealthful employments, have been found to be in need of additional protection. Even
before the adoption of the Constitution, much had been done towards mitigating the
severity of the common law, particularly in the administration of its criminal branch. . . .
The present century has originated legal reforms of no less importance [citing the
elimination of “special pleading” and “ancient tenures of real estate,” the emancipation of
married women, the abolishment of imprisonment for debt, witnesses no longer being
considered incompetent to testify because parties to the litigation, the simplification of
indictments, and the abolition of grand juries in several states]. . . . This case does not call
for an expression of opinion as to the wisdom of these changes, or their validity under the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . . They are mentioned only for the purpose of calling attention
to the probability that other changes of no less importance may be made in the future, and
that while the cardinal principles of justice are immutable, the methods by which justice is
administered are subject to constant fluctuation, and that the Constitution of the United
States, which is necessarily and to a large extent inflexible and exceedingly difficult of
amendment, should not be so construed as to deprive the States of the power to so amend
their laws as to make them conform to the wishes of the citizens as they may deem best
for the public welfare without bringing them into conflict with the supreme law of the
land.
Id. at 385-87.
340. Kadish, supra note 327, at 325.
341. As to why the focus would have been on the original understanding of the Fifth
Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, see discussion supra note 99.
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original understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause was not
limited, however, to the clause’s protection of fundamental rights. In
accepting practices sanctioned by “settled usage,” Hurtado had suggested that
the due process clause’s protection of fundamental rights was designed
basically to mark the limits on departures from the common law, not to give
the federal courts the authority to compel such departures through their
application of the clause. As Hurtado and Murray’s Lessee viewed the clause,
it deemed adherence to the common law as entirely acceptable, and sought
only to ensure that any subsequent departures did not contradict those cardinal
principles of justice that had helped to shape the common law. In advancing
an “evolving” due process, the pre-incorporation cases, if they considered the
original understanding to be significant, must have had a quite different vision
of that understanding. Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall, in their article
on the “values of due process,” have offered a reading of the original
understanding that supports the evolving concept of due process advanced in
the later decades of the pre-incorporation period. They note:
There is clear evidence that the framers of the Bill of Rights were aware of
their inability to envision each and every scenario that might arise. Indeed,
many objected to the amendments for the very reason that they might be
understood as embodying the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius. It
is therefore not at all unreasonable to suggest that, notwithstanding the Bill of
Rights’ enumeration of specific procedures, the framers fashioned an openended clause to cover both those procedures that they might have accidentally
omitted and those that might prove necessary in future times.342

Such a reading would not have been unique, as the Court had earlier offered a
similar explanation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,343

342. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 99, at 464. See also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (equal protection and due
process clauses “are broad, inexplicit clauses of the Constitution, unlike specific provisions of the
first eight amendments formulated by the Founders to guard against recurrence of well-defined
historic grievances”); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1247 (1995)
(“provisions that appear designed more directly to ends as such in their proclamations of about
how governments are to treat persons, and that represent not the system’s architecture, but its
aspirations, ought perhaps to be read through lenses refined by each succeeding generation’s
vision of how these ends are best understood and realized”).
343. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). The Supreme Court stated:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore
a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments,
designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
“designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.” The
future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no
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although the concern there was more in extending a previously established
value to new settings than in the possible recognition of new fundamental
values.
Other commentators have argued that the character of the Bill of Rights as
a whole make such an original understanding of due process most unlikely.344
They note that neither the background of the adoption of the Bill of Rights nor
the contemporary statements of commentators and courts suggest that the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause would have been designed to allow judges to
add to the extensive list of constitutionally required procedures placed in the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments. Rather, they argue, those
sources indicate that the Bill of Rights was offered as a response to those who
feared that the new central government would “snatch back the freedoms so
recently won in the Revolutionary War.”345 It thus was “a promise that the
known rights would not be lost,” designed to preserve procedural rights such as
jury trial and indictment, and not to give to courts a new authority to “find and
enforce whatever procedures judges thought important when the government
threatened the people with loss.”346
D. Methodology
The adoption of a flexible open-ended conception of procedural due
process lead to some modifications in the factors considered in determining
whether a particular procedural claim reflected a fundamental right.347 In
1957, Sanford Kadish, in a perceptive analysis of “methodology and criteria in
due process adjudication,”348 identified four sources as most frequently cited

prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be.
Id.
344. See Easterbrook, supra note 32; CROSSKEY, supra note 42; Berger, supra note 43;
Wolfe, supra note 44. Although these commentators offer different views of the original
meaning of the clause, none suggest a design for the open-ended function advanced by Redish
and Marshall. But see MOTT, supra note 28 (offering some support for that view).
345. Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 94-95.
346. Id.
347. This arguably was only one strand in the Court’s adoption of a more activist stance in
applying constitutional limitations to the criminal justice process. Commentators tend to view the
post-Powell decisions of the pre-incorporation era as much more receptive to finding a denial of
fundamental fairness than the pre-Powell decisions. See, e.g., 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.4(c)(d); Nowak, supra note 14, at 398. As to the factors that may have contributed to this shift, see
Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DEPAUL L. REV. 213 (1958); Henry P. Weihofen, Supreme Court Review of State Criminal
Procedure, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189 (1966); 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 2.8(c)-2.11, at 622723.
348. Kadish, supra note 327, at 319.
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by the Court in determining whether a particular right or prohibition was
fundamental. Those were:
(1) the opinions of the progenitors and architects of American institutions; (2)
the implicit opinions of the policy-making organs of state governments; (3) the
explicit opinions of other American courts that have evaluated the
fundamentality of a given mode of procedure; or, (4) the opinions of other
countries in the Anglo-Saxon tradition “not less civilized than our own” as
reflected in their statutes, decisions and practices.349

Looking to each of these sources arguably was consistent with Hurtado, but in
some instances, their use was somewhat different than what would have been
suggested by Hurtado.
Looking to the “opinions of the progenitors and architects of American
institutions” was consistent with Hurtado’s examination of the views of Coke,
Kent and others.350 Also included in this category was the settled usage of the
common law as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.351 Of
course, the sanction of settled usage no longer ended the due process inquiry,
as it would have under Hurtado, but that sanction remained an important factor
in sustaining a practice against a constitutional challenge.352 Indeed, in one
respect, its scope arguably was expanded, as the Court took account of the
sanction of lengthy historical traditions that did not extend so far back as to
have been part of the common law at the time of the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment.353
The position of the common law also could bear upon whether the
departure from an earlier practice violated a fundamental right, but here the
focus was not simply on whether the practice had been accepted at common
law, but on whether its settled usage had been treated as a matter of
constitutional right under the early state constitutions or simply as a practice
authorized by legislation.354 This use of history also was consistent with
Hurtado.
Looking to “the implicit opinions of the policy-making organs of state
governments” shifted the focus, in part, from history to the current status of the
law throughout the United States. The Hurtado majority opinion did not call

349. Id. at 328.
350. See supra text accompanying note 83.
351. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97 (1934); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
352. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
353. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 796-98 (1952) (state law requiring the
defendant to prove that he was insane was consistent with a widespread movement following the
liberalization of insanity defense in 1843).
354. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465-68 (1942); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 107-10 (1908).
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attention to what state law in 1884 had to say about prosecution by indictment
(perhaps because a substantial majority of the states still required prosecution
by indictment for all felonies).355 However, giving weight to a widespread
state departure from a right recognized at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution certainly was relevant to standards noted in Hurtado. Such a
consensus would suggest that the departure from the common law had not been
“arbitrary,”356 and that the common law position hardly reflected a
fundamental right which our system of jurisprudence “has always
recognized.”357 As the Court noted in Leland v. Oregon358: “The fact that a
practice is followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision
as to whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth
considering in determining whether that practice ‘offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.”359
The innovative role of a widespread state consensus in the preincorporation cases was as evidence that a contrary state provision did violate
due process. This role was seen in two quite distinct settings. The first was
that in which there was a widespread continued acceptance of a traditional
practice, but a small group of states had departed from that practice. Hurtado
had recognized the need to give states the opportunity to reform the common
law in accordance with “modern ideas of self government,”360 and such a
movement would not necessarily capture the immediate attention of a
substantial number of states. This would suggest that the failure to be in the
mainstream should not work against an innovative state. However, preincorporation cases on at least two occasions relied on the continued
widespread acceptance of common law positions in holding that state
departures from those positions violated due process.361 While in Leland v.

355. The Hurtado dissent did look to the status of state law at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 556. See also discussion supra in text
accompanying note 176. The majority, however, cited only the Connecticut constitutional
provision, which had significance because it was adopted not too long after the Federal
Constitution and had been in force when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Hurtado, 100
U.S. at 537. See also supra text accompanying notes 85 and 173-75.
356. See supra text accompanying note 180.
357. See supra text accompanying note 186.
358. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
359. Id. at 798 (quoting in part Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934), discussed
supra note 249).
360. See supra text accompanying note 128.
361. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 528 (1927) (Ohio was one of only a small group of
states that had departed from the strict common prohibition against tying the judicial fee structure
to convictions.); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-72 (1948) (in allowing its one-person grand jury
proceeding to be converted into a contempt proceeding against a witness, Michigan stood alone in
allowing a closed contempt proceeding).
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Oregon362 the Court did sustain a state practice that stood alone in departing
from tradition, it did so on the ground that practical significance of the
particular departure was not “of such magnitude as to be significant in
determining the constitutional question.”363
A widespread consensus could also be cited as evidence of an evolving
sense of justice that rejected a common law practice and thereby rendered
constitutionally suspect the few state rulings or statutes that continued to
authorize that practice. As Professor Kadish noted, this use of a state
consensus “found favor primarily in dissenting opinions.”364 However, a broad
consensus favoring a right that was contrary to the practice at common law was
cited in occasional majority opinions as further support for an analysis which
held the particular right to be constitutionally mandated as a logical
prerequisite of fairness.365
Consideration of the views of other American courts on the character of a
particular right was entirely consistent in one sense with Hurtado, which had
taken note of the Jones v. Robbins decision.366 Hurtado, however, viewed
Jones as significant only insofar as it found the Jones reasoning to be
persuasive. The pre-incorporation cases suggested that weight was to be given
to a consensus (or lack of consensus) among the state courts as to whether a
particular right was fundamental because that consensus (or lack of consensus)
was in itself evidence of the ranking of that right in American society.367 It
provided an additional evaluative element, helpful in assessing whether a
widespread state prohibition of a particular practice was viewed simply as a
product of a policy preference or as a recognition of a “privilege [deemed] so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial.”368

362. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
363. Leland, 343 U.S. at 798. The Court noted that a strong tradition supported shifting to the
defendant the burden of establishing an insanity defense, and the practical difference in Oregon’s
somewhat heavier burden of proof (proof beyond a reasonable doubt) did not convert a
constitutionally acceptable practice into one that violated a fundamental right. Id. See also supra
text accompanying note 359.
364. Kadish, supra note 327, at 331 (citing as illustrations Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950); Justice Roberts’ dissent in Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 123 (1934); and Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent in Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S.
424, 429 (1953)). At least in the first two cases, there was some question as to whether the
overwhelming consensus rejected the specific practice at issue.
365. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932), discussed supra in text accompanying
note 288 and infra in text accompanying note 376; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956),
discussed supra in text accompanying note 316 and infra in text accompanying note 416.
366. See supra text accompanying note 63.
367. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
368. See Snyder, 291 U. S. at 120.
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Hurtado spoke of due process protecting those “general principles of
public liberty and private right, which lie at the foundation of all free
government.”369 This suggested that the status of a particular right in the law
of other democratic countries would be relevant in determining whether that
right was so basic as to be protected by due process. However, Hurtado also
used language suggesting that the proper frame of reference was the American
tradition, or at least was no broader than the tradition in other countries with
systems derived from the English common law.370 In Twining v. New
Jersey,371 the Court referred to the fact that the privilege against selfincrimination had “no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries
outside the domain of the common law.”372 In later years, the Court came to
speak only of the experience in other “English-speaking” countries.373 Yet
other cases, though not referring to specific countries, offered descriptions of
due process entirely consistent with Hurtado’s suggestion that due process
should not preclude legislative borrowing of the “best ideas of all systems,”374
including civil law systems.375
Professor Kadish also took note of another mode of analysis which allowed
the Court to find a particular practice fundamentally unfair notwithstanding the
contrary indication of the four sources discussed above. At times, the Court
relied upon deductive reasoning that started from some basic procedural
element that due process obviously demanded. Thus, in Powell v. Alabama,376
the right to the assistance of appointed counsel was deduced from the right to a
hearing. Due process obviously included a right to a hearing at which the
defendant could present his case and challenge the state’s case. However, for
many defendants, those opportunities would be meaningless without the
assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the Court reasoned, when an indigent
defendant fell in that category, due process required that he be given an
appointed counsel.377 This was so, the Court later noted in Betts v. Brady,378
even though the right to counsel recognized at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution had not included a right to appointed counsel, and there was no

369. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 521.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
371. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
372. Twining, 211 U.S. at 113.
373. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). See also Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 199 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17
(1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
374. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 531. See supra text accompanying note 130.
375. See supra text accompanying note 135.
376. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
377. See id. at 68-69. See also 3 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 11.1.
378. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

372

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:303

consensus among the states on providing counsel for indigents in non-capital
cases.379
As illustrated by Powell and Betts, a deductive analysis could lead to
mandating a particular procedure that was contrary to the common law
tradition, based upon such factors as changes in the institutional structure of
the criminal justice process and newly-developed insights into the human
experience. It thus allowed for evolution in the content of due process without
being able to point to the usual indicia of a fundamental shift in society’s sense
of fairness. The failure of more states to recognize the need for appointed
counsel could be discounted as the product of inertia or even legislative or
judicial willingness to allow expediency to override principle. Deductive
analysis could also lead to a ruling which did not challenge the general
structure of the state’s law, but found a combination of special circumstances
to have resulted in a denial of a basic element of a fair hearing in the particular
case. Thus, state law might properly be based upon the assumption that jurors
who are familiar with pre-judicial, pre-trial publicity may put aside what they
have learned and render judgment impartially based on the evidence presented,
but the particular circumstances of an inflamed community and the responses
of jurors on voir dire may lead the court to conclude that the likelihood of juror
prejudice was so great in the particular case as to have violated due process.380
Commentators suggested that the Court’s employment of deductive
analysis could lead to the Court openly balancing costs and benefits in
determining what was required by due process. It was hoped that the Court
would identify the basic values protected by due process, determine the extent
to which a particular procedure would implement those values, and then weigh
against that benefit the competing interests (frequently administrative)
advanced by the state.381 However, the Court eschewed such an approach,
noting the need to be especially cautious in utilizing deductive reasoning where
its conclusion did not find support in one or more of the four traditional criteria
previously noted. Thus, in Snyder v. Massachusetts,382 the Court was
unwilling to hold that defendant’s presence at a jury inspection of the scene of
the crime was an essential prerequisite of defendant’s due process right to
defend himself against the charge. The states were divided on the issue, and
although the defendant’s presence had its advantages, a procedure would not
be deemed contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment “because another method

379. See id. at 471-73. See also 3 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 11.1(a).
380. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
381. See Kadish, supra note 327, at 346-63 (first proposing such a process of “rational
inquiry,” but also noting the institutional limitations of the Court). See also Schaefer, supra note
328, at 5-6; Nowak, supra note 14, at 401-03 (urging the adoption of such a methodology in the
post-incorporation era).
382. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
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may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of
protection to the prisoner at the bar.”383
Although deductive analysis could lead to finding unconstitutional a longstanding, common state practice (as in Powell/Betts384), such rulings were
exceptional in the pre-incorporation era.385 Most of the pre-incorporation cases
finding a due process violation based upon a deductive analysis involved state
practices so clearly contrary to traditional standards, e.g., the use of perjured
testimony,386 that they obviously lacked support in the common law or the
consensus of state law.387 Where tradition clearly supported a particular
practice, the Court often based its analysis entirely on that history,388 but when
it also went on to consider a contention based on a deductive analysis, that did
not necessarily produce a conflict with tradition. Indeed, the institutional
changes taken into consideration under a deductive analysis could lend further
support to the conclusion that the practice in question did not interfere with a
fundamental right.389
E.

The “independent content” cases

Although all due process cases of the pre-incorporation decades rested on
the “independent potency”390 of due process, the vast majority involved claims
383. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 304-09.
385. Another such example might be Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1954), described infra in
text accompanying note 416. Although the Court majority there stated that only a few states
failed to facilitate appeals by indigents, Justice Harlan’s dissent argued that at least nineteen states
failed to require the free transcripts demanded by the Court’s ruling (although at least five
expressly recognized a discretionary authority to provide such transcripts).
386. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), discussed infra in text accompanying
note 396.
387. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), discussed infra in text accompanying
note 406. See also Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1956). In Reece, the defendant in a state
prosecution was indicted by a grand jury impaneled and sworn eight days before his arrest and
reconvened under an order that did not list the defendant as a person whose case was being
considered. Id. at 89. The defendant had been arrested two days earlier and did not have counsel.
The Court found the application of a state rule requiring challenges to the grand jury’s
composition be made before indictment deprived him of the opportunity to challenge racial
discrimination in the composition of the grand jury and therefore denied due process. Id. at 8990.
388. This was particularly true of its earlier pre-incorporation rulings. See, e.g., Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). It was also the case, however, for some of its later rulings. See,
e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
389. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949) (stating that
inapplicability of evidentiary rules in sentencing proceeding found support not only in history, but
in “modern concepts [of] individualizing punishment,” which “made it all the more necessary that
a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement
of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial”).
390. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 44, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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that would have been considered under specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
had they been advanced in federal cases. There was, however, a comparatively
small group of rulings dealing with claims that presumably would not have
found a home in the specific guarantees, and therefore would have been
presented as Fifth Amendment due process claims in federal cases. In general,
the Court did not treat these cases as presenting a separate breed of due process
claim and rarely even mentioned that the right claimed did not have a parallel
in a specific guarantee.391
The successful claims among this group of rulings tended to involve the
trial phase of the process, with the Court finding a departure from the basics
mentioned in Hurtado. In the first such ruling, Moore v. Dempsey,392 the trial
was alleged to have been mob dominated, with an “adverse crowd that
threatened the most dangerous consequences to anyone interfering with the
desired result [i.e., a conviction].”393 In such a situation, the Court reasoned,
the trial was a “mask” and due process was denied when “the State Courts
failed to correct the wrong . . . .”394 Although the Court did not refer to
Hurtado’s discussion of the law of the land, Moore was a case in which a
defendant had been denied a true application of the “standing law.”395 In
Mooney v. Holohan,396 the Court found that much the same principle applied
where the state deliberately deceived the trial court and jury by “the
presentation of testimony known to be perjured.”397 Here, as in Moore, the
Court found no need to examine the common law tradition or the consensus of
the states, although the practice obviously had no support. “Such a contrivance
by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant” was
simply “inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the
obtaining of a like result by intimidation.”398 Arguably similar were two cases
in which the Court found due process violations because the defendant was

391. For an exception, see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952) (noting that it was not
being asked “to enforce against the states a right which we have held to be secured to defendants
in federal courts by the Bill of Rights”).
392. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
393. Moore, 261 U.S. at 89.
394. Id. at 91.
395. But see Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 105. Easterbrook argued:
In Moore v. Dempsey the Court held that kangaroo courts are unconstitutional.
There could have been no serious dispute about this outcome: the defendant received
neither the (statutory) law of the land nor Coke’s minima. The case is significant because
of the way it reached the result: the opinion is reasoned wholly as a matter of natural law,
with no reference to statutes, historically recognized procedures, or any of the earlier due
process decisions.
396. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
397. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112.
398. Id.
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convicted without any evidence that the defendant committed the crime
charged.399
The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial mandates an “impartial jury,” but
there is no similar express provision as to the neutrality of the judge.
However, Tumey v. Ohio400 reasoned that an unbiased decisionmaker was a
basic element of a fair hearing, a conclusion that was in accord with Hurtado’s
description of such a hearing. In determining whether that element was denied
when a judge had a “direct, personal, [and] substantial, pecuniary interest”401
in a conviction, here arising from the magistrate receiving a major part of his
fee in the form of court costs imposed upon a convicted defendant, the Court
looked to those “settled usages” in the “law of England” that had been
followed in this country.402 Finding in the common law “the greatest
sensitiveness over the existence of any pecuniary interest however small or
infinitesimal, in the justices of the peace,”403 and finding further that this “strict
principle”404 had been adopted in this country in all but a small group of states,
the Court concluded that “a system by which an inferior judge is paid for his
service only when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by
custom in the general practice either at common law or in this country that it
can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so
399. In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 464 (1943), a federal statute made it a crime for
certain classes of persons to receive any firearm shipped in interstate commerce after a certain
date. The statute further provided that the possession of a firearm by such a person was
presumptive evidence (i.e., sufficient to convict) of the firearm having been shipped in interstate
commerce in violation of the Act. The Court concluded that there was no rational relationship
between the fact proved (possession) and the ultimate fact presumed (the interstate
transportation), resulting in a violation of due process. Id. at 466. The Court characterized the
presumption as arbitrary and therefore contrary to the due process “limits upon the power of
Congress or that of a state legislature to make the proof of one fact or group of facts evidence of
the existence of the ultimate fact on which guilt is predicted.” Id. at 467. It did not explain what
it was in due process that provided the source for that limit. It did suggest that due process
required the state to prove its case, noting that it surely would not be permissible for a legislature
to command “that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the accused,
should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt.” Id. at 469. See
also Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929).
In Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), the defendant was convicted of
disorderly conduct, an offense that required one of three distinct types of conduct. Id. at 204.
The only evidence offered against the defendant was that he was doing a dance by himself in a
local cafe while waiting for a bus. Id. at 205. Such behavior clearly did not fit any of the three
categories specified in the statute. The Court noted that “[j]ust as [c]onviction upon a charge not
made would be [a] sheer denial of due process [citing notice cases], so is it a violation of due
process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt.” Id. at 206.
400. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
401. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 526.
404. Id. at 528.
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small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis non
curat lex.”405
In re Murchison406 found a similar due process violation in a unique state
procedure under which a judge sat as a one-person grand jury in a closed
inquiry, initiated a contempt charge against a recalcitrant witness, and then
proceeded in a separate, open proceeding to try the contempt charge. The
Court took care to distinguish the common law practice which allowed a trial
judge to preside in a summary contempt proceeding against a witness, noting
that the proceeding here presented unique aggravating circumstances (in
particular, the alleged contempt had occurred in a closed proceeding with the
judge a key witness). As in Tumey, the Murchison Court refused to apply a
totality of the circumstances approach that would have required a specific
showing of prejudice based on a particular ruling as to which the judge was
presumably influenced by his interest in the case.407 It noted that “fairness . . .
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases,” but in establishing the
general principle that “no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest
in the outcome,” the common law had “always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.”408 Here, due process recognized that, “to perform
its high function in the best way, ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.’”409
Hurtado had suggested that due process was limited to the basic elements
of a trial-type adjudication. However, as previously noted,410 the Court’s
movement to a flexible, open-ended conception of due process in the preincorporation era led it to gradually absorb within due process aspects of
specific Bill of Rights guarantees that went beyond the adjudication of guilt.
Initially, the Court illustrated some reluctance to move in the same direction as
to procedural rights that had no parallel in the specific guarantees, but it
eventually did so. In the 1913 ruling of Lem Woon v. Oregon,411 the Court
held that due process was not violated where a felony prosecution was initiated
by a prosecutor’s information without the prerequisite of a magistrate’s finding
of probable cause at a preliminary hearing (which had been present in
Hurtado). Citing Hurtado, the Lem Woon Court noted that if due process did
not require the screening of a charge by the grand jury, neither did it require

405. Id. at 531.
406. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
407. The Court did point to the judge having relied upon his own recollection of the witness’
attitude in the grand jury proceeding (which was closed), but it cited that as an illustration of the
invariable potential for prejudice when the judge later presided at the contempt trial, not as a
prerequisite for finding a due process violation. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 138.
408. Id. at 136.
409. Id. (quoting Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
410. See supra text accompanying notes 270-300.
411. 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
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magistrate screening at a preliminary hearing. The key apparently was that the
defendant would receive a fair hearing in the adjudication of his guilt. In
another early case, McKane v. Durston,412 the Court held that due process did
not require New York to follow the path of the states that stayed the execution
of sentence pending disposition of defendant’s appeal.413 The Court noted:
“[A] review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case,
however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at
common law, and is not now, a necessary element of due process.”414 The
focus apparently was strictly on the adjudication of guilt.Starting in the 1930s,
as the Court expanded the absorption of rights found in the specific guarantees,
it gradually also expanded the stages governed by other due process
restrictions. Two groups of cases went beyond trial-type adjudication in
establishing fundamental rights that were distinct from the specific guarantees.
In addition, other cases, though not finding a due process violation, strongly
suggested that that content of due process, which lacked a parallel in specific
guarantees could readily extend to all stages of the criminal justice process.415
In Griffin v. Illinois416 and its progeny,417 the Court extended due process
to the appellate process and did so through an analysis that accepted the
evolving character of due process. Griffin relied in part on due process to hold
unconstitutional state prerequisites for appellate review that restricted the
availability of such review for those convicted defendants who were indigent.
The Court acknowledged that due process did not require a state to provide any
appellate review.418 However, once a state had done so as a general matter,
making appellate review “an integral part of the [state] trial system for finally
adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,” the state could not draw a
distinction based on “poverty,” for “an ability to pay costs in advance bears no

412. 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
413. McKane, 153 U.S. at 688. See also Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903).
414. McKane, 153 U.S. at 687.
415. Thus, in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949), the Court held that due
process did not preclude a judge’s reliance upon out-of-court information in imposing a
discretionary sentence. Justice Black’s opinion for the Court pointed to the sanction of historical
usage (which traditionally gave sentencing judges wide discretion in the sources and types of
evidence relied upon) but also justified the grant of such discretion within the context of modern
concepts of sentencing, which focused upon individualizing punishment. The latter argument
suggested that a contrary position could have been reached, notwithstanding the historical
sanction, if changes in the sentencing context had required a new standard of fairness. See also
Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 587 (1959); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12-13
(1950).
416. 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1954).
417. See Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 216
(1958); Barnes v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959).
418. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894), discussed supra in text
accompanying note 412.
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rational relationship to the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”419 While such a
distinction obviously had the sanction of historical usage, it was a “misfit in a
country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to
none in the administration of its criminal law.”420 Griffin thus was a more
dramatic rejection of settled usage than Powell v. Alabama and Betts v. Brady.
Those cases had dealt with settled usage at trial and had overridden that usage
by reference to the function of the right to counsel, which was held to have no
rational relationship to an indigency distinction.421 Griffin dealt with a later
and less significant stage of the process and announced that a state-imposed
indigency distinction was contrary to the values underlying the administration
of the criminal justice process as a whole. It recognized a general state
obligation to assist the indigent in the criminal justice process that arguably
found support in the current national sense of justice,422 but clearly was
contrary to accepted tradition until well into the twentieth century, that
tradition having treated such state assistance merely as a matter of grace.423
In a series of rulings on coerced confessions,424 the Court similarly
extended due process to the investigative process and incorporated new values.
Those rulings clearly went beyond the concern of the common law that
confessions admitted in evidence not have been obtained by means that render
suspect their reliability.425 Later cases suggest that the Court may simply have
been applying an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination,426 but the
extension of the privilege beyond the compulsion of a court order to testify had
not yet been established,427 and the coerced confession opinions generally did
not refer to the self-incrimination privilege.428 The Court clearly recognized in

419. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17-18.
420. Id. at 19.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 376-79.
422. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), discussed supra notes 288, 365 and 376-79;
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), discussed supra at notes 365, 385 and 419. As to the other
aspects of that obligation, see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387
(1985), Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
423. See generally REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919); Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), discussed supra note 309; 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 1.5(e), at 277.
424. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
425. See supra note 313.
426. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Although the Fifth Amendment foundation
for the exclusion of coerced confession is now commonly cited by the Court, it also continues to
refer to due process as a separate grounding for that requirement. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 (2000); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993); Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
427. See 2 TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 6.2(a)-(b), 6.5(a).
428. But see Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in Lyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 & n.3
(1954); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 585 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion)
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its coerced confession rulings the potential for evolutionary change in society’s
sense of justice, citing a new perspective on those burdens that would not be
tolerated in obtaining a confession from a suspect.429 Confessions could be
deemed coerced “not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but
because the methods used to extract them offend [the] underlying principle . . .
that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.”430
F.

The subjectivity challenge

In Adamson v. California,431 Justice Black launched a vigorous attack
against the fundamental fairness doctrine, stressing inter alia its potential for
subjectivity.432 Justice Black contended that the fundamental fairness doctrine
permitted the Court to “substitut[e] its own concepts of decency and
fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights.” Application of the
fundamental fairness concept, he noted, “depended entirely on the particular
judge’s idea of ethics and morals” rather than upon “boundaries fixed by the
written words of the Constitution.” Although Justice Black thought that many
fundamental fairness rulings reflected this basically idiosyncratic approach to
adjudication, perhaps his prime examples, as noted in later opinions, were the

(“[C]onceptions underlying the rule excluding coerced confessions and the privilege against selfincrimination have become, to some extent, assimilated.”).
429. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-20 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
430. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961). See also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (“[I]t is inconceivable that any court of justice in the land, conducted as our
courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to keep a defendant
witness under continuous cross-examination for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep in an effort
to extract a ‘voluntary’ confession. Nor can we, consistently with Constitutional due process of
law, hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the same thing away from the restraining
influences of a public trial in an open court room.”).
431. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
432. Similar objections have been advanced over the years as to the ordered liberty standard
as applied to substantive due process. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting the comments of Justice Roberts,
the cases will fall “on one side of the line or the other as a majority of nine Justices appraise
conduct as either implicit in the confines of ordered liberty or as lying without the confines of that
vague concept”); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (White, J. dissenting) (reading
of cruel and unusual punishment clause as a substantive limit on legislative authority to
criminalize contrasted to Court’s “allergy to substantive due process” in economic regulation,
which “prevent[s] the Court from imposing its own philosophical predilections upon state
legislatures or Congress”). Those objections obviously influenced Justice Black. See Comment,
The Adamson Case: A Study in Constitutional Technique, 58 YALE L.J. 268, 275 (1949)
(“Pervading the pages of his [Adamson] dissent is Justice Black’s distrust of the vagueness and
uncertainty of the due process formula. He is haunted by the specter of due process as a clog on
state economic legislation. His concern is to prevent a return to that charismatic jurisprudence
which enabled the Court to substitute its views on economic policy for those of the legislature.”).
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totality of the circumstances rulings of Rochin v. California433 and Irvine v.
California,434 which applied a “shock the conscience” standard.
Justice Frankfurter, in particular, took sharp exception to Justice Black’s
characterization of the Court’s fundamental fairness analysis as basically
subjective. Admittedly, the case-by-case application of the fundamental
fairness standard required the exercise of judicial judgment in an “empiric
process” for which there was no “mechanical yardstick.”435 That did not mean,
however, that judges were “at large” to draw upon their “merely personal and
private notions” of justice.436 In each application of due process, the Court was
required to undertake a “disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of
science.”437 Justice Frankfurter emphasized that, in conducting that inquiry,
the Court was subject to the very important limits of reasoned results, the
limited role of judicial review,438 “deference to the judgment of the state court
433. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, the police, having “some information” that defendant
was selling narcotics, entered his home without a warrant and forced open the door to his
bedroom. Id. at 166. When the surprised defendant immediately shoved into his mouth two
capsules believed to be narcotics, the police grabbed him and attempted to extract the capsules,
which defendant then swallowed. The police then took the protesting defendant to a doctor, who
forced an emetic solution into defendant’s stomach, causing him to vomit up the capsules. Id.
Describing the total course of police action as “conduct that shocks the conscience,” the Court
held that due process no more permitted the use of the capsules in evidence than it would a
coerced confession. “Due process,” the Court added, was a principle that “precludes defining . . .
more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that “offend a
sense of justice.” Id. at 173.
434. 347 U.S. 128 (1954). In Irvine, the plurality described the police action as flagrant and
deliberate misconduct, but held that it was not so offensive as to violate due process. Id. at 131.
The police in Irvine had made repeated illegal entries into defendant’s home for the purpose of
installing secret microphones, including one in his bedroom, from which they listened to his
conversations for over a month. Id. The plurality distinguished Rochin as a case involving
“coercion, violence . . . [and] brutality to the person” rather than, as here, a “trespass to property,
plus eavesdropping.” Id. at 133. However, Justice Frankfurter, who had written for the Court in
Rochin, concluded that the two cases were not distinguishable. Id. at 145-46. Though “there was
lacking [in Irvine] physical violence, even to the restricted extent employed in Rochin,” the police
had engaged in “a more powerful and offensive control over Irvine’s life than a single limited
physical trespass.” Id. The division of the Court in Irvine, Justice Black later noted, revealed that
the “ad hoc approach” of the Court in Rochin and Irvine consisted of no more than determining
whether “five justices are sufficiently revolted by local police action” to “shock [the victim of that
action] into the protective arms of the Constitution.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 665 (1961)
(Black, J., concurring).
435. Irvine, 347 U.S. at 147 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
436. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170.
437. Id. at 172.
438. Id. at 170.
Even though the concept of due process of law is not final and fixed, these limits are
derived from considerations that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process . . . .
These are considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the
legal profession. The Due Process Clause places upon this Court the duty of exercising a
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under review,”439 and the very character of due process (a “large untechnical
concept” which directed the Court to enforce “those permanent and pervasive
feelings of our society as to which there is compelling evidence of the kind
relevant on social institutions”440). Due process “thus conceived . . . [was] not
to be derided as a revival of ‘natural law.’”441
Justice Frankfurter also argued out that due process, under the fundamental
fairness conception, presented an interpretative task not that much different
from other provisions in the Constitution. He noted:
In dealing not with the machinery of government but with human rights, the
absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or
even regrettable attribute of constitutional provisions. Words being symbols
do not speak without a gloss. On the one hand the gloss may be the deposit of
history, whereby a term gains technical content. Thus the requirements of the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments for trial by jury in the federal courts have a
rigid meaning . . . . When the gloss has thus not been fixed but is a function of
the process of judgment, the judgment is bound to fall differently at different
times and differently at the same time through different judges. Even more
specific provisions, such as the guaranty of freedom of speech and the detailed
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, have inevitably evoked
as sharp divisions in this Court as the least specific and most comprehensive
protection of liberties, the Due Process Clause.442

Justice Black, on the other hand, argued that the difference was not one of
degree, but of assuming an unauthorized authority. He acknowledged that
provisions like the “reasonableness” clause of the Fourth Amendment did
“require courts to chose between competing policies.” However, there was “no
express constitutional language granting judicial power to invalidate every
state law of every kind deemed ‘unreasonable’ or contrary to the Court’s
notion of civilized decencies.”443

judgment, within the narrow confines of judicial power in reviewing State convictions,
upon interests of society pushing in opposite directions.
Id. at 170-71 (citations omitted).
439. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
440. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
441. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171.
442. Id. at 169.
443. Id. at 175-77 (Black, J., concurring). In this respect, Justice Black’s objection went
beyond simply criticizing the majority standard as subjective; it also contended that the due
process clause was not intended to have the character attributed to it by the majority. Id.
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Justice Black offered a two-pronged reading of due process as an
alternative to the traditional fundamental fairness position. First, due process
would be read as incorporating all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.444
For Justice Black, that would have included some interpretations that extended
substantially beyond the traditional reading of those guarantees and
encompassed protections the majority had arrived at through the content of due
process that it believed to extend beyond any Bill of Rights provision.445
While total incorporation eliminated the alleged subjectivity in determining
which specific guarantees or which aspects of specific guarantees stated
fundamental principles that were included within Fourteenth Amendment due
process, it did not respond to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
including an additional evolving content defined by reference to the
fundamental fairness standard. The second prong of Justice Black’s alternative
responded to this avenue of subjectivity. Apart from incorporation, he noted,
due process did no more than grant “a right to be tried by independent and
unprejudiced judges using established procedures and applying valid preexisting law.”446 Here, Justice Black offered a combination of (1) a broad view
of the standing law concept that encompassed prosecutorial or judicial efforts
to undermine the defendant’s exercise of rights,447 (2) a decision based on
some evidence of guilt,448 and (3) a requirement of judicial neutrality.449 Thus,
the Black alternative probably came close to the position that had been
advanced in Hurtado. It did not include, however, such requirements as proof
beyond a reasonable doubt,450 although here (as elsewhere451) Justice Black’s
position had not been consistent through his long tenure on the Court.452

444. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
445. Thus, in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), Justice Black found a violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination because he did not limit that safeguard to the compulsion
of testimony. See discussion supra note 433. Similarly, in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,
473 (1943), Justice Black concluded that the presumption violated the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. See discussion supra note 399. He also saw the coerced
confession prohibition as resting on the self-incrimination clause. See supra note 320.
446. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (Black, J., concurring).
447. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), discussed supra in text
accompanying note 396; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 743-44 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring) (stating due process prohibits judicial vindictiveness based on defendant’s exercise of
rights).
448. See Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (Black, J., majority), discussed supra
note 399.
449. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (Black, J., majority), discussed supra note
406.
450. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 62 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 382 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). See also HUGO BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 30-34
(1968); Roger W. Haigh, Defining Due Process of Law: The Case of Mr. Justice Hugo Black, 17
S.D. L. REV. 1, 18-25 (1972).
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Justice Black’s alternative did not gain majority support. However, his
criticism of the subjectivity potential of traditional fundamental fairness
analysis did contribute to the subsequent development and adoption of the
selective incorporation doctrine,453 which produced all but a small part of what
Justice Black had sought through total incorporation. His criticism arguably
also helped shape the later resistance to a continued application of an evolving
fundamental fairness analysis in determining the content of due process that
stands apart from the incorporated guarantees.
III. THE POST-INCORPORATION ERA
During the 1960s, the prevailing due process position was restructured
with the adoption of the selective incorporation doctrine.454 That doctrine
rested on two major modifications of the previously established fundamental
fairness analysis. The first related strictly to the overlap of due process and the
specific guarantees. Where a due process claim rested on a right protected by a
specific guarantee, the traditional approach had been to assess the possibly
fundamental character of only that aspect of the guarantee denied by the state
in the particular case. Moreover, the Court often assessed the significance of
that element of the guarantee in light of the special circumstances of the
individual case. The selective incorporation doctrine, on the other hand,
focused on the total guarantee rather than on the particular aspect presented in
an individual case. It assesses the fundamental nature of the guarantee as a
whole, rather than the fundamental nature of any one requirement of the
guarantee. Consider, for example, the situation presented in Palko v.
Connecticut.455 Applying the fundamental fairness doctrine, the Court there
asked whether the ordered liberty standard required protection against “that
kind of double jeopardy”456—a retrial following an appellate reversal of an
initial acquittal for legal error—that had been imposed upon the defendant
before it. Applying the selective incorporation doctrine, the Court instead

451. See John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretation: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.
REV. 399, 423-24 (1978) (arguing that Justice Black had not been consistent in his views on due
process, as evidenced by a comparison of his opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and
his other opinions which had concluded that “convictions by biased tribunals, under vague
statutes, or based upon ‘no evidence’ or perjured testimony or other evidence known to be false
violate due process, even though none of these defects is specifically mentioned anywhere in the
Constitution”).
452. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-07 (1952) (Frankfurter & Black, JJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that state could not shift to defendant the burden of establishing insanity that
would relieve him of liability).
453. See infra text accompanying note 469.
454. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.5(b).
455. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
456. Palko, 302 U.S. at 328.
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would ask whether the ordered liberty standard encompasses the basic concept
underlying the Fifth Amendment’s overall prohibition against double
jeopardy.457
The difference in the scope of the right assessed necessarily carried over to
the scope of the ruling under the selective incorporation doctrine. A
fundamental fairness ruling theoretically should go no farther than to establish
due process protection parallel to the one aspect of the Bill of Rights guarantee
presented in the particular case. Selective incorporation, however, judging the
guarantee as a whole, produces a ruling that encompasses the full scope of the
guarantee. When a guarantee is found to be fundamental, due process, in
effect, “incorporates” that guarantee, and carries over to the states precisely the
same prohibitions as apply to the federal government under that guarantee.
Under selective incorporation, a ruling that a particular guarantee is within the
“ordered liberty” concept makes applicable to the states “the entire
accompanying doctrine” previously developed in applying that guarantee to
federal criminal prosecutions.458 This led some commentators to describe the
incorporation element of selective incorporation as having a “wholesale
character.”459
The second modification of the selective incorporation doctrine related to
the frame of reference utilized in determining whether a claimed right was
indeed “fundamental.”460 While the traditional analysis often asked whether a
“fair and enlightened system of justice” would be “impossible” without a
particular safeguard,461 selective incorporation “proceed[s] upon the . . .
assumption that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical
schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the
common law system that has been developing contemporaneously in England
and in this country.”462 Accordingly, it directs a court to test the fundamental
nature of a right within the context of that common law system of justice,
rather than against some hypothesized “civilized system” or some foreign
system growing out of different traditions. The question to be asked, the Court
has noted, is whether “a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime
of ordered liberty.”463 Consistent with this approach, considerable weight is
given to the very presence of a right within the Bill of Rights, since that

457. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.5(a), at 540-41.
458. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
459. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 794-95 (1970); Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited,
71 GEO. L.J. 253, 291 (1982).
460. 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.5(a), at 541-42.
461. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
462. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
463. Id.
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presence in itself establishes that historically a substantial body of opinion
viewed that right as essential to the fairness of the common law system.
Applying the two modifications of the selective incorporation, the
Supreme Court during the 1960s concluded that due process fully
incorporated: the Fourth Amendment provisions on search and seizure; the
Fifth Amendment prohibitions against double jeopardy and compelled selfincrimination; the Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial, to a public trial, to
an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to
confrontation of adverse witnesses, to compulsory process for favorable
witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel; and the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.464 The Court has left unresolved
the possible incorporation of the Sixth Amendment’s “vicinage” provision
(requiring that the jury be “of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed”), and the Eighth Amendment prohibitions against
excessive bail and excessive fines, although it has strongly indicated that at
least the Eighth Amendment prohibitions will be deemed fundamental (and
incorporated) when that issue is squarely presented in an appropriate case.465
Of all the specific guarantees aimed at the criminal justice process, only the
Fifth Amendment requirement of prosecution by indictment or presentment
quite clearly will not be incorporated. That aspect of Hurtado repeatedly has
been affirmed.466
There are those who argue that the selective incorporation doctrine has no
coherent constitutional rationale.467 They contend that selective incorporation
constitutes no more than a result-oriented modification of the previously
rejected total incorporation theory—a doctrine devised to achieve total
incorporation, minus the pragmatically troubling civil jury trial and grand jury
guarantees. The Court wanted to expand Fourteenth Amendment protection to
encompass all but those few guarantees that would cause the greatest
disruption if applied to the states, and selective incorporation was created and
accepted because it could eventually lead to exactly that result. Selective
incorporation, these critics argue, is a doctrine that lacks the textual and
historical support of either total incorporation or fundamental fairness, a
doctrine justified only by its end product.

464. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.6(a) (collecting cases).
465. See 1 id., § 2.6(b) (discussing the relevant rulings).
466. See 4 id., § 15.1(c), at 220 n.141.
467. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 171 (Harlan J., dissenting); Charles Rice, The Bill of
Rights and the Doctrine of Incorporation, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND
CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 11, 14 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1981); Henry J. Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 937 (1965); RAOUL
BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 11-18 (1989). See also
Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1964).
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While the Supreme Court majority never responded to such criticism,
individual justices did so in separate opinions.468 One point frequently made in
those opinions was that selective incorporation would reduce the potential for
impermissible subjective judgments in defining due process.469 Taking a page
from Justice Black’s argument favoring total incorporation, justices supporting
selective incorporation maintained that utilizing selective incorporation would
avoid much of the subjectivity inherent in the application of the fundamental
fairness doctrine. They noted initially that the selective incorporation doctrine,
in contrast to the fundamental fairness doctrine, would not look to the “totality
of the circumstances” in a particular case in determining whether a right is
necessary to “ordered liberty.” To permit evaluation of a right in light of “the
factual circumstances surrounding each individual case” led, in their view, to
judgments that were “extremely subjective and excessively discretionary.”470
Selective incorporation was also said to reduce subjectivity by focusing on the
fundamental nature of the Bill of Rights guarantee as a whole, rather than on a
particular aspect of the guarantee.
“[O]nly impermissible subjective
judgments,” it was argued, “can explain stopping short of the incorporation of
the full sweep of the specific [guarantee] being absorbed.”471 Finally, under
selective incorporation, once a guarantee was held fundamental, discretion was
reduced because the Court’s analysis thereafter would rest on the language and
history of the guarantee. There was no need for reference, in case after case, to
an “evolving standard” of due process. This was deemed significant even if
one assumed, as Justice Frankfurter had argued, that the determination of
fundamental fairness is guided by objective evidence of pervasive notions of
justice. Selective incorporation, once applied, would still offer the advantage
of “avoid[ing] the impression of personal, ad hoc adjudication by every court
which attempts to apply the vague contents and contours of ‘ordered liberty’ to
every different case that comes before it.”472
The concerns expressed as to the role of subjectivity in the application of
the traditional fundamental fairness standard also bore upon the application of
that standard to claims that did not rest upon an incorporated guarantee.
Admittedly, the two modifications of fundamental fairness that provided the

468. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1960) (4-4 decision)
(Brennan, J.); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
410 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). The lack of any full-fledged exposition of the rationale of
selective incorporation in a majority opinion may be explained in part by the composition of the
majority in the earlier selective incorporation cases. See also 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.6(a),
at 560 n.5.
469. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.5(d).
470. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 413 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
471. Cohen, 366 U.S. at 154 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
472. Henkin, supra note 467, at 77.
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foundation for selective incorporation did not necessitate a reexamination of
the analysis utilized in determining the “independent content” of due
process.473 Yet, if subjectivity concerns had indeed been a driving force in
producing such a basic change as selective incorporation, that certainly would
suggest at least a reconsideration of the “looseness” of the due process
guidelines applied in determining the content of free-standing due process.
Pragmatic considerations also suggested a likely reconsideration of those
guidelines. Selective incorporation had dramatically altered the constitutional
landscape in which the fundamental fairness standard was now being applied.
The state criminal justice systems were subject to far more extensive
constitutional regulation through the application of the Bill of Rights. The due
process standard that governed the application of free-standing due process—
the fundamental fairness standard—had been developed largely in the context
of determining the overlap between due process and the specific guarantees.
When the Court had focused on the “evolving” character of due process, that
enabled it not only to recognize rights that had not been recognized at common
law, but also to conclude that certain rights recognized in the common law
tradition were no longer deemed basic to fairness.474 With selective
incorporation, the flexible, open-ended due process could grow in only one
direction—adding to the rights protected under the Bill of Rights.475
The Court’s decisions in the post-incorporation era have, indeed,
considered several major reformulations of due process doctrine as applied to
criminal procedure, with some accepted and some rejected. The most
important of these involved: (1) characterizing free-standing due process as a
disfavored concept to be construed narrowly; (2) granting a preemptive impact
to the specific guarantees; (3) returning to Hurtado’s shield for practices in
accord with settled usage; and (4) adopting a utilitarian balancing test which
has been applied in other fields of procedural due process.
The Court’s treatment of each of these proposed formulations is discussed
below. All were advanced within the framework of basically the same type of
general descriptions of the character of fundamental rights as were offered first
in Hurtado and then in the pre-incorporation era rulings. The favored standard

473. As to those modifications, see supra text accompanying notes 454-63. The second
modification did bear upon free-standing due process insofar as past decisions had failed to focus
on fundamental character within the Anglo-American system, see supra note 463, but that had not
been a concern in the rulings pre-incorporation rulings on claims not having a parallel in the
specific guarantees. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 392, 396, 400 and 406.
474. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
475. Similarly, Justice Black’s view of a very limited independent due process had been
presented as part of a reading of due process that dramatically extended its reach by incorporating
the Bill of Rights. See supra text accompanying notes 444-52. However, Justice Black’s reading
stood only to add a narrow coverage to the incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees.
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of the post-incorporation cases has been that set forth in Patterson v. New
York:476 A state practice violates due process only if it “offends some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked
as fundamental.”477 As in Hurtado and the pre-incorporation cases,478 the
statement of this standard often has been accompanied by language noting the
need to give deference to the states in their shaping of their criminal justice
processes.479
A.

Making free-standing due process a disfavored concept

In reviewing substantive due process claims, the Court has stated that,
“[a]s a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking . . . are scarce and open-ended.”480 In the post-incorporation
era, the Court sometimes has offered a similar view of its role in determining
the content of free-standing due process. In Dowling v. United States,481

476. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
477. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02. Patterson cited this formulation as derived from a line of
cases going back to Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934). The Patterson formulation was cited by the Court in refusing to apply to criminal justice
cases the utilitarian balancing analysis applied to due process claims in other fields. See Medina
v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992), discussed infra in text accompanying note 675. The
Patterson formulation had been fairly popular prior to Medina. See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501
U.S. 624, 641 (1991). It has almost always been cited in post-Medina rulings. See, e.g., Montana
v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355 (1996); Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407 (1993).
478. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89 and 261.
479. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407 (1993) (“‘[B]ecause the States have
considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in
centuries of common-law tradition,’ we have ‘exercis[ed] substantial deference to legislative
judgments in this area.’”); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992); Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
480. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). Cases repeating this position
include Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997), County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998), and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)
(plurality opinion). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986), stating:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully demonstrated by the face-off
between the Executive and the Court in the 1930’s, which resulted in the repudiation of
much of the substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand
the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental.
481. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
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Justice White’s opinion for the Court noted:482 “Beyond the specific
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has
limited operation. We, therefore, have defined the category of infractions that
violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.”483
That perspective was repeated and further explained in Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court in Medina v. California:484
In the field of criminal law, we “have defined the category of infractions that
violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly” based on the recognition that,
“[b]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due
Process Clause has limited operation.” Dowling v. United States [citation
omitted]. The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of
criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional guarantees under
the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites undue interference
with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance that the
Constitution strikes between liberty and order.485

The Court’s description of free-standing due process as having “limited
operation,” with fundamental fairness defined “very narrowly,” might suggest
that constitutional regulation through free-standing due process would be
confined to a narrow slice of the criminal justice process. However,
constitutional regulation through free-standing due process actually extends
today to every phase of the process.486 While a full review of the free-standing
due process rulings is impracticable in this format, the brief survey that follows
illustrates this extraordinary range.
At the investigatory stage, free-standing due process restricts the state’s
utilization of lineups, showups, and other identification procedures insofar as
they present a “substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,”487
prohibits police practices that are so “outrageous” as to “shock the
conscience,”488 imposes restrictions on the obtaining of confessions that

482. Justice White was one of the members of the Court most frequently noting the need for
caution in expanding substantive due process. See, for example, his opinion for the Court in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), quoted in supra note 480, and his dissenting opinion
in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977).
483. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352.
484. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
485. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443.
486. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (the
“stream of law on procedural due process” has continuously “grown larger with the passing
years.”).
487. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) and its progeny, discussed in 2
TREATISE, supra note 1, § 7.4.
488. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 264 and 433; Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433-34 (1986) (“misbehavior that so shocks
the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal processes of
the States”); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (considering possibility of
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arguably are separate from the self-incrimination prohibition,489 and mandates
against the intentional destruction or failure to preserve evidence recognized to
be exculpatory,490 and actions directed at making it more difficult for the
defendant to locate potentially favorable witnesses.491 At the charging stage,
due process prohibits unjustified extensive delay in charging that results in
prejudice to the defense in preparing its case,492 and bars charging decisions
that are the product of prosecutorial vindictiveness.493
At the pretrial stage, free-standing due process governs procedural
elements of the motion to suppress,494 ensures that the defense receives
reciprocal discovery when it is required to provide discovery to the
prosecution,495 provides the indigent defendant with access to experts as
needed to evaluate and present a contention resting on scientific expertise (e.g.,
insanity),496 recognizes a defense right to obtain pretrial governmental records
determined by the trial court to contain material exculpatory information,497
imposes on the prosecution a duty to disclose to the defense or court material

police involvement in a crime that is “so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely
bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction”). Though related to
procedure, these prohibitions are today described as resting on substantive rather than procedural
due process. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), discussed infra in text
accompanying note 572 .
489. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2330 (2000) (“Over time, our cases
recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be
admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . We have never abandoned this due process
jurisprudence . . . .”); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) (“[t]he Court has retained
this due process focus, even after holding . . . that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination applies to the States.”); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10
(1985). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (holding use of involuntary
statement to impeach defendant violates due process).
490. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
491. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (judicial discouragement of witness from
testifying); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-74 (1982) (holding
government action denying defendant access to witnesses, here by deportation, subject to
regulation by due process and compulsory process clauses).
492. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971); United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
493. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S.
368, 384 (1982).
494. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (burden of proof); Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 395 (1964) (decision-maker).
495. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 479 (1973).
496. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985).
497. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987).
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exculpatory evidence that is within its possession or control,498 and prohibits
state timing requirements for motions that are so stringent as to deny the
defendant a reasonable opportunity to raise a constitutional objection.499
Notwithstanding the number of specific guarantees in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments applicable to the trial, a wide variety of due process limitations
add considerably to the constitutional regulation of the trial. Initially, due
process governs many of the structural components of the trial. Due process
imposes the requirement of an unbiased judge500 and contributes to the
constitutionally mandated procedures designed to ensure that the jury is not
tainted by prejudicial pretrial publicity.501 Due process also contributes in part
to the defendant’s right to be present at various stages of the trial,502 prohibits
forcing upon the defendant an unnecessary physical setting that conveys a
prejudicial message to the jury,503 and limits the trial court’s authority to
exclude the defendant from the courtroom because of his misbehavior504 and to
try him in absentia when he has failed to appear for trial.505 The constitutional
right of the defendant to testify on his own behalf is also grounded in part on
Constitutional standards governing the defendant’s
due process.506
498. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
675 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995). As to the application of this
responsibility to pretrial discovery, see 4 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 20.3(m).
499. See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1955), discussed supra note 387.
500. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927), discussed supra note 400; Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971).
501. In its first ruling after the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, which
dealt with the impact of prejudicial pretrial publicity on prospective jurors, the Court relied on the
due process clause. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975). The Court also relied on
due process in striking down a statute that precluded use of the remedy of a venue change. See
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1971). This followed reliance on due process in preincorporation cases dealing with pretrial publicity issues. See Irvine v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728
(1961); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963) (neither suggesting that the standards
being applied were borrowed from the Sixth Amendment). However, later post-incorporation
decisions dealing with pretrial publicity issues relied on the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an
impartial jury. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1026 (1984); Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.
415, 417 (1991).
502. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 529 (1985) (noting that the right therefore is not
limited to situations in which the defendant is “actually confronting witnesses or evidence against
him,” but also includes other trial related proceedings at which the defendant’s presence will
contribute to his opportunity to defend himself).
503. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572
(1986).
504. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970).
505. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973).
506. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987), recognized a constitutional right of a
defendant to testify at his or her trial based upon the confluence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process clause, the Sixth Amendment’s compulsory process clause and the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination.
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competence to stand trial, including the test for competency, the necessity for a
competency hearing, and applicable standard of proof on that issue, also are a
product of due process.507 The state’s authority to televise trials over the
objection of the defendant is also subject to the constitutional regulation of due
process.508
The state’s obligation to establish guilt by proof “beyond a reasonable
doubt” is still another due process requirement.509 This leads, in turn, to due
process regulation of the use of presumptions,510 the shifting of the burden of
proof to the defense on particular issues,511 the designation of alternatives in
the proof of the means or mental state of the crime,512 and the explanation
given to the jury of the reasonable doubt standard.513
Due process also contributes to the constitutional regulation of trial
presentations. Due process is violated, for example, where the prosecution
introduces material testimony known to be false,514 fails to bring to the
attention of the court or defendant evidence within its possession or control
that contradicts its key evidence or undercuts the credibility of its key
witnesses,515 seeks to draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s exercise
of his Miranda rights,516 or presents a closing argument “so infected with
unfairness” as to undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict.517 The trial judge
may violate due process by excluding evidence critical to the defendant’s

507. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1975); Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 453 (1992); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369 (1996).
508. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981).
509. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
510. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307,
326 (1985).
511. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 215 (1977); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987).
512. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 627 (1991).
513. See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1990); Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22
(1994). But see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993) (speaking of a Sixth Amendment
right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that is denied by a constitutionally
defective reasonable doubt instruction). Sullivan was written by Justice Scalia, who takes a
narrower view of free-standing due process than the Court majority. See infra text accompanying
notes 597-607.
514. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935), discussed supra in text
accompanying note 396; Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 153 (1972).
515. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963).
516. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976).
517. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 639 (1974); Darden v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986).
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presentation of a defense,518 taking unnecessary actions that “effectively
dr[ive] a [defense] witness off the stand,”519 or tolerating courtroom behavior
that produces a “carnival atmosphere” prejudicial to the defense.520
Of course, far more prosecutions are resolved by guilty plea than by
trial.521 Here, the due process clause is the dominant source of constitutional
regulation. Due process establishes the minimum amount of information that
must be given to the defendant prior to accepting his plea,522 requires that the
record provide a factual basis for the plea under certain circumstances,523
determines what pressures can be imposed upon a defendant without rendering
his plea involuntary,524 determines at what point there exists a plea agreement
which can be “broken,”525 and requires relief for a plea bargain that has been
breached by the prosecutor or court.526
When the process moves to the sentencing stage, most trial-type rights
(e.g., confrontation) do not apply and due process becomes the primary source
of constitutional regulation. Due process governs the range of conduct and
type of information that may be considered by the sentencing judge,527 the
need for notifying the defendant of the information that the judge will consider
in making the sentencing decision,528 the need to ensure that information relied
upon is accurate,529 and the need to provide the defendant with an opportunity
to be heard and to offer his own evidence.530 Due process also sets the
minimum burden of proof the government must bear where the sentencing
statute calls for a sentence enhancement based on a judge or jury finding of a
particular aggravating circumstance,531 as well as the minimum procedural
rights that must be granted to the defense where the sentencing statute imposes
an extended or alternative term upon a finding of dangerousness or
518. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), discussed infra in text
accompanying note 584; Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986), discussed infra note 591.
519. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972).
520. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
521. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 1.3(o).
522. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 n.5, 244 (1969).
523. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970).
524. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 363 (1978).
525. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1984).
526. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971).
527. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245-52 (1949). See also North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 49 (1978).
528. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358-62 (1977).
529. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736, 740-41 (1948).
530. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 217-20 (1971).
531. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1986); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605, 609-10 (1967); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000).
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recidivism.532 Many of the special procedural guarantees attaching to capital
sentencing also are prescribed by due process.533
Once the process moves beyond the trial court, free-standing due process
constitutes the almost exclusive source of constitutionally mandated procedural
rights. The right of a defendant to representation by appointed counsel (if
indigent) or retained counsel on a first appeal of right is established by due
process,534 which also demands certain minimum standards in allowing
withdrawal by counsel who believes the appeal is frivolous.535 The due
process clause also establishes the prohibition against the vindictive exercise of
judicial or prosecutorial discretion directed at defendants who exercise their
right to appeal.536
Due process also regulates the structure of subsequent proceedings that
involve modification of the sentence. It requires the appointment of counsel
under some circumstances in probation revocation proceedings.537 It also
requires that the state procedure for probation or parole revocation include a
prompt preliminary hearing, a final revocation hearing within a reasonable
time, a neutral and detached hearing body, advanced written notice of the
charges, disclosure of the evidence on which the decisionmaker relies, a

532. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610
(1967).
533. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a statute
that prohibited lesser included offense instructions in capital cases); Simmons v. South Carolina,
512 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1994) (holding that where the state had raised the spectre of defendant’s
future dangerousness, due process was violated by refusing to instruct jury that, as an alternative
to death sentence, a sentence of life imprisonment carried with it no possibility of parole);
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727-28 (1992) (holding that due process required the trial court,
on defendant’s request, to inquire into prospective jurors’ views on capital punishment as an
aspect of the due process clause’s “independent” requirement of decisionmaker impartiality,
which is demanded “regardless of whether the Sixth Amendment requires it,” and which clearly
extends to the capital sentencing jury); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 127 (1991) (holding that
due process was violated where at the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant did not have
adequate notice that the judge might sentence the defendant to death). See also Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362-64 (1977) (White, J. concurring) (relying partly on due process and
partly on the Eighth Amendment in holding unconstitutional the trial court’s consideration of a
confidential presentence report, not disclosed to the defense, in deciding to impose a death
sentence).
534. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1985); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
355-56 (1963); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 607 (1974).
535. See Smith v. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2000); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744 (1967).
536. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21, 27 (1974).
537. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-90 (1973).
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limited right of confrontation and cross-examination, and a right of the
probationer or parolee to appear and present evidence in his own behalf.538
Does this survey describe a free-standing due process that has “limited
operation” and is defined “very narrowly”? Of course, the terms “limited” and
“narrow” may be used in a comparative sense, and in many of the freestanding due process rulings, the Court certainly imposed restraints that were
much narrower than the restraints the dissenters would have imposed.539 It is
also true that many of the due process rulings (although certainly not all540)
make a defense showing of likely prejudice an element of the constitutional
violation,541 in contrast to rulings under most (but not all542) specific

538. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-89 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 786-87 (1973). The decision on parole release can, under some circumstances, be subject to
due process requirements as to procedure. See 5 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 26.10(b)-(d).
539. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 249-50 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 128 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 714 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 65556 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). It goes almost without saying that the rulings tend to be
narrower than what the majority of academic commentators would require. But that is true of
rulings under the specific guarantees as well. In recent years, the academic commentary may be
somewhat more balanced, but the dominant thrust (at least as I read that commentary) is to seek a
revival of the philosophy of the Warren Court.
540. Consider for example, the following cases finding per se violations of due process
without any form of “prejudice” or “harmless error” inquiry and without insisting upon an
element that would indicate likely prejudice in the particular case: Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,
85-89 (1988) (denying the appointment of counsel on appeal); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
702-04 (1975) (improperly shifting of burden of proof); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 47576 (1973) (lacking reciprocity in discovery); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (judge
having a financial interest in a criminal conviction); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 (1964)
(no judicial determination of voluntariness of confession).
541. See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795-96 (1977) (establishing a due
process violation through delay in bringing charges generally requires a showing of actual
prejudice); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985) (due process right to assistance of
psychiatric experts requires preliminary showing that defendant’s mental condition is “seriously
in question”); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (due process violation based on
prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence requires showing of a reasonable probability
of different outcome if evidence had been disclosed); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
U.S. 858, 873 (1982) (due process violation based on interference with possible witness must
meet reasonable probability standard); United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1985)
(due process right to appointed counsel at probation revocation requires showing of
circumstances suggesting need for counsel’s assistance); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02
(1967) (due process violation in a lineup requires “substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification”); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-47 (1976) (due process violation in
failure to inform defendant of element of crime to which he pleaded guilty where element is
critical as to possible defense or reduction in level of crime); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 38 (1970) (due process requires showing of factual basis for plea where defendant seeks to
enter plea while claiming innocence); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976) (due
process is violated where defendant is forced to appear in court in a setting likely to be
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guarantees, which typically describe constitutional violations without regard to
prejudicial impact (although those violations may then be subject to a harmless
error analysis on appellate review).543
Another feature that “narrows” many free-standing due process rulings is
the use of a “totality of the circumstances” analysis that takes account of
various factors beyond the element of likely prejudice (e.g., administrative
justifications and the overall “character” of the actions of the responsible
officials) and therefore largely limits rulings to the particular facts of the
particular case.544 However, many other free-standing due process rulings are
not tied to the totality of the circumstances, but announce a general prohibition
of a particular type of governmental action (though often combined with the
additional prerequisite of a likely showing of prejudice).545 Moreover, a
totality of the circumstances analysis is not unique to due process cases;
basically the same approach is applied in certain settings under specific

prejudicial, such as in prison uniform); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 636-37 (1980) (due
process violated by failing to instruct a jury on finding a lesser offense where evidence placed in
dispute is a factor that separated capital and non-capital murder); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 180-81 (1986) (due process violated by closing argument that “so infected the trial with
unfairness” as is likely to influence the outcome).
In some instances, prejudice is inherent because the prohibited adverse impact by
definition otherwise would not have occurred. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
725 (1969) (prohibiting vindictive sentencing); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)
(prohibiting vindictive charging). In others, the due process violation requires an intent to subvert
the process and therefore cause prejudice. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112
(1935) (knowingly using perjured testimony); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-59 (1988)
(purposely destroying exculpatory evidence).
542. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-87 (1984) (ineffective assistance
of counsel requires prejudice showing); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-34 (1988) (including
prejudice as one component in speedy trial balancing test). See also 1 TREATISE, supra note 1,
§ 2.6(e) (discussing use of “due process” methodology, including a prejudice showing, in
applying specific guarantees).
543. See 5 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 27.6(c)-(e).
544. See, for example, the standards applied in determining whether (1) confessions were
coerced, see cases cited supra note 300; (2) judicial failure to control actions of the press,
spectators and others resulted in a trial setting that denied due process, see supra note 520; (3) the
conditions of defendant’s appearance at trial resulted in a violation of due process, see Holbrook
v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986); (4) the circumstances surrounding pretrial publicity and the
seating of jury were such as to have required the trial court to have sustained challenges to seated
jurors or to have granted a change of venue, see cases cited supra note 501; and (5) police
conduct was so outrageous as to preclude prosecution or exclude the evidentiary fruits of that
conduct, see cases cited supra note 488.
545. As for due process violations stated as a general prohibition and not requiring any
showing of prejudice, see, for example, cases cited supra note 540. As for due process violations
stated as general prohibitions but requiring an element indicative of prejudice, see the following
cases (all discussed supra note 541): Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S 68 (1985); Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625 (1980); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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guarantees, most notably the Fourth Amendment.546 Much the same holds true
for the “narrowing” impact of the requirement of a bad purpose on the part of
the governmental actor. That requirement is found in only a small group of
due process standards,547 and also is not unique to due process rulings.548
Finally, free-standing due process rulings might be characterized as
“narrow” in that they tend to focus on the value of adjudicatory fairness
(looking primarily to protect against the conviction of the innocent),549 rather
than on the broader range of values reflected in the whole of the specific
546. See, e.g., 2 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 3.3(a)-(c) (character of probable cause); 2 id.
§ 3.10 (voluntariness standard as applied to consent searches). See also 2 id. § 18.2 (balancing
test in speedy trial cases); 2 id. § 25.2(c) (double jeopardy’s manifest necessity standard for
mistrials, as applied to traditional areas of trial court discretion).
547. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988), discussed supra in text
accompanying note 490; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974), discussed supra in text
accompanying note 493; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), discussed supra in
text accompanying note 536.
548. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982). See generally 5 TREATISE,
supra note 1, § 25.2(e).
549. Free-standing due process requirements implementing this value would include: (1)
providing the defendant with notice of the case against him (including an open presentation of the
case), see, e.g., Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 127 (1991), discussed supra note 533; Gardner
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358-62 (1977), discussed supra note 528; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 486-89 (1972), discussed supra note 538; (2) providing the defendant with a
“meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,” see, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683, 690 (1986), discussed infra note 591; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987),
discussed supra note 497; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), discussed in text
accompanying infra note 584; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987), discussed supra note
506; Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985), discussed supra note 496; United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-74 (1982), discussed supra note 491; Wardius v. Oregon,
412 U.S. 470, 479 (1973), discussed supra note 495; Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20
(1973), discussed supra note 505; (3) providing an unbiased decisionmaker, see, e.g., Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927), discussed supra note 500; Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S.
455, 466 (1971), discussed supra note 500; Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975),
discussed supra note 501; Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976), discussed supra note
503; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966), discussed supra note 520; (4) protecting
against evidentiary gaps or proof deficiencies that could lead to the conviction of the innocent,
see, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), discussed supra note 515; Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), discussed supra note 487; Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58
(1988), discussed supra note 490; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971), discussed
supra note 492; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975), discussed supra note 511;
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979), discussed supra note 510; Cage v. Louisiana,
498 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1990), discussed supra note 513; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348,
2362-63 (2000), discussed supra note 531; Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1985),
discussed supra note 534; and (5) prohibiting state actions that restrict the defendant’s ability to
utilize the standing law, see, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974); North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969), discussed supra note 536; Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85,
89-90 (1955), discussed supra note 499; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964),
discussed supra in text accompanying note 314.
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guarantees. But here again, the description is not complete, as there are strands
of free-standing due process doctrine, such as the prohibition of coerced
confessions,550 that do look to “dignitary” values.551 Also, various specific
guarantees, such as the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, might as
readily be described as focusing primarily on the value of adjudicatory
fairness.552
While the above perspectives must be strained to justify describing freestanding due process as “defined narrowly” and having “limited operation,”
other perspectives readily undermine such a characterization. As compared to
the due process regulation of criminal procedure originally envisaged in
Hurtado, or even that established in the pre-incorporation era under a more
flexible conception of due process, the terms “limited” and “narrow” are
hardly applicable to today’s precedent. Free-standing due process extends far
beyond the regulation of the trial. Moreover, as to the trial, it has moved
beyond the basics of adjudicative fairness and adherence to the standing law,
even as those elements were liberally interpreted in the pre-incorporation
decades. The coverage of due process has moved from prohibiting
prosecutorial lawlessness in the knowing use of perjured testimony to
prohibiting prosecutorial negligence in failing to disclose exculpatory
evidence.553 It has moved from requiring that a judgment of conviction be
based on some evidence554 to requiring that it be based on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as to all elements of the crime.555
In light of such developments, it is not surprising that the Court appears to
have “retired” its description of free-standing due process as having only
“limited operation” with infractions defined “very narrowly.” It continues to
speak to the need for restraint, but prefers to do so without reference to the
vague contours of due process. Instead, it stresses the primary responsibility of
the states in shaping their own criminal justice systems. It notes, for example,
that due process rulings should be careful to “evaluate state procedures one at a

550. See supra notes 300 and 489. Consider also the cases discussed supra note 488.
551. As to the distinction between adjudicatory and dignitary values, see Kadish, supra note
327, at 346-47. Of course, certain adjudicatory values (e.g., allowing the defendant to present his
defense) have obvious dignitary elements. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 1.4(c)-(d), discussing
the values underlying adversarial adjudication in an accusatorial structure.
552. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
730, 736 (1987); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1986). Of course, confrontation is an
element of an adversary system, which also serves other values, including respect for individual
autonomy. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 1.4(c), at 184.
553. As to the application of this due process requirement to prosecutorial negligence, see the
discussion in 5 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 24.3(b).
554. See supra text accompanying note 399.
555. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) (federal constitutional review of the
sufficiency of the evidence standard). See also cases cited supra note 511.
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time, as they come before us,” and not “cavalierly ‘impede the States ability to
serve as laboratories for testing solutions to novel legal problems.’”556
B.

Giving preemptive effect to the specific guarantees

The range of regulation imposed under free-standing due process could
also be restricted by giving a preemptive impact to the incorporated specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The broadest preemption doctrine would hold
that due process cannot be used to carry the values of a specific guarantee
beyond the limits imposed by that guarantee. This position has never been
suggested by any member of the Court,557 and it is contrary to various Court
rulings, such as the extension of right to counsel to later stages of the process
at which the defendant is no longer an “accused” in a “criminal
prosecution.”558 A narrower position would hold that where a specific
guarantee regulates a particular procedure, it preempts the regulation of that
procedure and due process has no role to play. That position has found support
in Graham v. Connor559 and its progeny.
Graham involved a § 1983 action560 to recover damages for injuries
sustained when officers allegedly used excessive force during the course of an
investigatory stop. The Supreme Court held that in determining whether the
officer’s use of force violated the Constitution, the lower court should look to

556. Smith v. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. 746, 758-59 (2000) (citing other opinions expressing
similar sentiments). See also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407 (1993) (“‘[B]ecause the
States have considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is
grounded in centuries of common-law tradition,’ we have ‘exercised substantial deference to
legislative judgments in this area.’”).
557. Such a position could be drawn, however, from Justice Scalia’s comments on substantive
due process in a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 471 (1993):
It is particularly difficult to imagine that “due process” contains the substantive right
not to be subjected to excessive punitive damages, since if it contains that it would surely
also contain the substantive right not to be subjected to excessive fines, which would
make the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment superfluous in light of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Although Justice Scalia distinguished the incorporation of specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights, as well as procedural due process, it could be similarly said that if Fifth Amendment
due process provides a right to counsel on first appeal of right, see supra note 534, it would
certainly also contain the right to counsel at trial and thus render superfluous the Sixth
Amendment guarantee.
558. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 534 and 537. Similarly, some of the values underlying
the speedy trial requirement are extended by the due process limitation on delay in the bringing of
charges. See cases cited supra note 492. See also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 11
(1982).
559. 490 U.S. 386 (1980). See Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for
Jot” Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1090-91 (1998).
560. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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the “objective standard of reasonableness” imposed by the Fourth Amendment
rather than the substantive due process standard that had been applied in the
pre-incorporation Rochin decision (the “shock the conscience” standard).561
The Court reasoned: “Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically
intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these
claims.”
The reach of Graham was clarified in Albright v. Oliver562 and County of
Sacramento v. Lewis.563 Albright presented a § 1983 action in which the
plaintiff alleged that he had been denied “substantive due process” (through a
denial of his “liberty interest”) when a detective relied upon statements of a
notoriously unreliable informant to file felony charges against him, to obtain
an arrest warrant based on those charges, and to testify against him at a
preliminary hearing. A splintered Supreme Court required dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint, with varying positions taken on the application and
character of the Graham doctrine. A plurality opinion for four justices
concluded that plaintiff’s claim, in essence, was one of improper arrest, and
therefore Graham required that it be resolved only under the Fourth
Amendment (which the plaintiff had failed to raise). The plurality opinion
reasoned that: the Fourth Amendment addresses “pretrial deprivations of
liberty”;564 those “deprivations go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions”;565
an accused is not “entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to
prosecute”;566 and the plaintiff therefore was presenting, in actuality, a claim
centering on the issuance of the arrest warrant and the resulting restraint on his
liberty. The plurality mentioned initially that the plaintiff had not raised a
procedural due process claim, but did not comment on whether that claim
would stand apart from the Fourth Amendment claim.567
Four other justices found the Graham doctrine inapplicable in Albright,
reasoning that the defendant had a separate liberty interest in avoiding an
unfounded prosecution (although two concurred in the dismissal because there

561. For a description of Rochin and that standard, see supra notes 264 and 433.
562. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
563. 523 U.S. 833, discussed infra text accompanying note 572.
564. Albright, 510 U.S. at 274.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Justice Scalia, who joined the plurality opinion, stated in a separate concurring opinion
that he thought it “unlikely that the procedures constitutionally ‘due’ with regard to an arrest
consist of anything more than what the Fourth Amendment specifies, but petitioner has in any
case not invoked ‘procedural’ due process.” Id. at 275.
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had been no possible violation of due process with respect to that interest).568
Justice Souter, the remaining member of the Court, concluded that this case did
not present a due process claim which could be separated from a Fourth
Amendment claim, but that substantive due process could apply under different
circumstances.569 Justice Souter therefore concluded that Graham supported
dismissal, but he provided a majority for the position that Graham’s
preemption rule does not apply to an alleged invasion of liberty, even though it
follows from an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, if it involves a burden
distinct from that imposed by the allegedly illegal search or seizure.570 Justice
Souter also characterized Graham as a rule of “judicial self-restraint” rather
than a rule of mandatory preemption, and that also may have reflected a
majority position.571
568. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment. Albright, 510
U.S. at 281. He reasoned that due process does not “include a standard for the initiation of
prosecution.” Id. at 282. This was evidenced by the common law, which while it provided for
“grand jury indictment and speedy trial . . . did not provide a specific evidentiary standard
applicable to a pretrial hearing on the merits of the charges or subject to later review by the
courts.” Id. Moreover, insofar as the common law of torts might reflect some notion of due
process protection against malicious prosecution, prior precedent established that a state actor’s
“random and unauthorized” deprivation of such an interest could not be challenged under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 so long as the state provides “an adequate post-deprivation remedy” (here found in
the state’s tort remedy). Id. at 283-86.
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, argued that freedom from
prosecution except upon probable cause is a deeply-rooted substantive liberty interest protected
by Fourteenth Amendment due process. Id. at 291. While Hurtado held that due process does
not require states to proceed by grand jury indictment, it had allowed the states to do so “only if
the substance of the probable cause requirement remains adequately protected.” Hurtado, 510
U.S. at 292. Here the state had established procedures to ensure that probable cause was present,
but, as evidenced by cases such as Mooney v. Holohan, discussed supra note 396, which involved
the prosecution’s knowing use of perjured testimony, “state[] compliance with facially valid
procedures” should not invariably “meet the demands of due process, without regard to the
substance of the resulting probable cause determination.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 298.
Justice Ginsberg, who joined the plurality opinion, countered in a separate concurring
opinion with a description of the various elements of the case that supported “viewing this case
through a Fourth Amendment lens.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 276.
569. Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion, stressed that all injuries claimed by Albright
flowed solely from his wrongful arrest and were not compounded by the use of false or
misleading testimony at any other stage in his prosecution. He cautioned that in other cases,
where the assertion of baseless charges against an arrestee produced damage that did not flow
from the arrest, a substantive due process claim might be available. Albright, 510 U.S. at 289.
570. This was the position of at least Justices Souter, Stevens, Blackmun, Kennedy and
Thomas. Albright, 510 U.S. at 281-316.
571. Justice Souter pointed to earlier rulings in which the Court had “rejected the view that
applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the guarantees of another . . . .” (quoting
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49 (1993) and Soldal v. Cook
County, 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992)). He agreed, however, that as a matter of “judicial self-restraint,”
the Court should follow a “rule of reserving due process for otherwise homeless substantive
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In County of Sacramento v. Lewis,572 the Court was unanimous in agreeing
that Graham did not apply (although it was divided as to the proper content of
substantive due process analysis).573 At issue there was a § 1983 claim
alleging deprivation of an automobile passenger’s “substantive due process
right to life” due to police recklessness in a high-speed chase. Graham only
requires looking to the specific guarantee, the Court noted, when the claim in
question is “covered” by that guarantee. The Fourth Amendment covers only
“searches and seizures,” and here there had been neither. A Fourth
Amendment seizure does not occur with a chase by pursuing police, as a
seizure requires a “termination of an individual’s freedom of movement.”574
Therefore, the Court concluded, “Graham’s more-specific-provision rule” was
no bar to looking to the applicable substantive due process standard (the
“shock the conscience” standard of Rochin).575
The combination of Lewis and Albright clearly leave huge portions of the
criminal justice process subject to potential regulation by free-standing due

claims.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 287. The plurality opinion may have implicitly accepted the same
view of Graham. It acknowledged the Court’s consideration of a substantive due process claim
in another criminal case, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). In considering the
constitutionality of the preventive detention provisions of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984,
the Salerno Court rejected on the merits contentions raised under both the Eighth Amendment’s
bail clause and substantive due process. Id. at 747-54. It did not suggest that the applicability of
the Eighth Amendment to pretrial detention meant that substantive due process could play no role
in regulating preventative detention. Id.
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993), as Justice Souter
noted, the Court had rejected the contention that due process could impose no procedural
prerequisites for a civil forfeiture beyond the prerequisites of the Fourth Amendment relating to
the seizure of property. The Court there noted that certain wrongs can affect more than one
Amendment and that it had previously rejected the view that “the applicability of one
constitutional amendment pre-empts the guarantee[] of another.” Id. at 49. Distinguishing
Graham and Gerstein v. Pugh, discussed infra at note 578, the Court stated:
Gerstein and Graham concerned not the seizure of property but the arrest or
detention of criminal suspects, subjects we have considered to be governed by the
provisions of the Fourth Amendment without reference to other constitutional guarantees.
In addition, also unlike the seizure presented by this case, the arrest or detention of a
suspect occurs as part of the regular criminal process, where other safeguards ordinarily
ensure compliance with due process.
Id. at 50.
572. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
573. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 833. Justices Stevens, Scalia and Thomas did not
join Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court, which distinguished Graham. Id. at 859-60.
However, Justice Stevens’ separate opinion focused on the issue of immunity, and Justices Scalia
and Thomas objected to the Court’s substantive due process analysis. Id. at 859-60. Neither of
the separate opinions expressed disagreement with the Court’s treatment of the Graham issue. Id.
574. Id. See also Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
575. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 842-45. See supra text accompanying notes 264-71,
as to the Rochin standard.
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process without concern as to Graham. Stages such as sentencing and appeal,
for example, generally are not “covered” by specific guarantees and therefore
would be exempt from the Graham doctrine on the same reasoning that
exempted the high-speed chase in Lewis. Where the specific guarantees do
“cover” the particular process at issue, Albright holds open the possibility of
free-standing due process still contributing to the regulation because it looks to
a different interest of the individual. Moreover, when neither of these
distinctions applies, there remains the distinction between substantive due
process and procedural due process. The Graham doctrine is tied to
substantive due process. Where the constitutional violation is presented not as
a claim for compensation by the injured victim, but as a grounding for a
procedural remedy administered within the criminal justice process (e.g.,
exclusion of evidence or dismissal of the prosecution), due process claims tend
to be characterized as “procedural” even though they challenge governmental
activity similar to that involved in Graham (misuse of police authority in
making an arrest) and Albright (misuse of prosecutorial authority in bringing
charges).576 The Court has characterized relatively few restrictions relating to
the administration of the criminal justice process as resting on substantive due
process.577
576. Thus, challenges to vindictive prosecution, raised in the context of seeking a dismissal of
charges, have not been characterized as presenting a substantive due process issue. See cases
cited supra note 493. So too, the coerced confession prohibition is viewed as an aspect of
procedural due process, accepted by justices who generally reject substantive due process.
Compare, for example, the position taken by Justice Scalia in the cases of County of Sacramento
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), discussed supra note 573, and Arizona v. Fulimante, 499 U.S. 279
(1991). See also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 n.6 (1993) (stating that although the
execution of an innocent person may be a substantive due process claim, whether the state must
consider an allegation of innocence based on newly discovered evidence raises a procedural due
process claim); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (involving state prohibition against jury
considering evidence of involuntary intoxication in determining whether defendant had required
mental element; majority proceeds on due process analysis, applying Patterson standard, see
supra note 476, with reference to various procedural due process rulings; Justice Ginsberg,
concurring, views the state rule as the equivalent of redefining the mental element to treat
intoxication as the counterpart of the required mental element in a sober person, presenting what
would generally be viewed as a substantive due process claim, although she does not refer to the
issue as presenting a substantive due process claim).
577. The Rochin limit is the primary example of a free-standing substantive due process
restriction in the area of police enforcement practices. See supra text accompanying note 270. A
few other procedures that impose restraints on individuals in connection with the administration
of the criminal justice process also have been described as involving free-standing substantive
due process issues. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-38 (1992) (finding that
substantive due process prohibits forcing a defendant to continue taking antipsychotic drugs
during trial absent a showing of medical appropriateness and consideration of other alternatives).
The Riggins majority relied on the defendant’s liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication.
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, noting that the violation of any such interest does not
warrant a remedy of reversal of a conviction, as the defendant had shown no interference with his
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In Gerstein v. Pugh,578 a case decided long before Graham, the Court
suggested the possible general application of a Graham-like preemption
principle within the context of procedural due process. Gerstein involved a
Florida procedure that permitted the prosecutor to charge a non-capital offense
by information, without a prior preliminary hearing. Under this procedure, a
person arrested without a warrant would not obtain a judicial determination of
probable cause until he was arraigned on the information, which might be
delayed a month or more after his arrest. A lower federal court had held that
the prolonged detention of the arrested person solely on the basis of the
prosecutor’s information violated the Fourth Amendment. It directed the
Florida courts to provide the arrested person with a prompt preliminary
hearing. The Supreme Court agreed that a prompt judicial determination of
probable cause was a Fourth Amendment prerequisite for “extended restraint
of liberty following an arrest.”579 However, the adversary preliminary hearing
was not necessary, as illustrated by the acceptability of ex parte issuance of
arrest warrants. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, questioned the latter
conclusion. The magistrate’s determination did not relate simply to the initial
arrest (as in the issuance of an arrest warrant), but also “the continuing
incarceration of a presumptively innocent person.”580 Justice Stewart further
noted that a series of civil due process rulings had required more substantial
hearings prior to the seizure of property or the termination of benefits. He was
not prepared to say “that the Constitution extends less procedural protection to
an imprisoned human being than is required to test the property of garnishing a
commercial bank account . . . [or suspending] a driver’s license.”581
The majority’s response to Justice Stewart, though placed in a footnote,
was telling. The Court noted:
Mr. Justice Stewart objects to the Court’s choice of the Fourth Amendment as
the rationale for decision and suggests that the Court offers less procedural
protection to a person in jail than it requires in certain civil cases. Here we
deal with the complex procedures of a criminal case and a threshold right
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The historical basis of the probable
cause requirement is quite different from the relatively recent application of
variable procedural due process in debtor-creditor disputes and termination of
government-created benefits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly

ability to consult with counsel or other trial unfairness. Id. at 149-50. See also United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (finding that denial of bail pending trial raised issue of
substantive due process limits on continued custodial control).
578. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
579. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
580. Id. at 127 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall).
581. Id. at 126-27. Justice Stewart argued that it was sufficient to hold the Florida procedure
unconstitutional and there was no reason at this point to decide whether an ex parte determination
would be satisfactory.
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for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public
interests always has been thought to define the “process that is due” for
seizures of person or property in criminal cases, including the detention of
suspects pending trial.582

This passage could have constituted the foundation for building a procedural
due process counterpart to Graham. At the least, it would suggest that before
ruling on a free-standing due process claim, the Court would ask whether a
specific guarantee spoke to the practice in question, and if so, whether that
guarantee’s more specific focus on the criminal justice process made its
command the “process that is due” in criminal cases.
The response of the Gerstein majority, however, largely has been
forgotten. The Court not only has failed in some areas to consider the possible
application of a specific guarantee,583 it has occasionally noted its preference
for resting its finding of unconstitutionality on due process grounds and
thereby avoiding the need to determine whether the state’s procedure also
violates a specific guarantee. Thus, in Chambers v. Mississippi,584 the Court
relied on the “totality of the circumstances” analysis of due process to find
unconstitutional the combined impact of restricting defendant’s
cross-examination of a hostile defense witness and precluding testimony of
other defense witnesses, noting that it therefore had no need to consider
whether the state evidentiary rules which had produced those limitations
violated the Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and compulsory process.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,585 involving the extent of the state’s obligation to
provide the defense with subpoena access to possibly favorable agency
records, the Court noted that “[b]ecause the applicability of the Sixth
582. Id. at 125 n.26. The majority went on to distinguish the civil cases, noting:
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact only the
first stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the
rights of those accused of criminal conduct. The relatively simple civil procedures (e.g.,
prior interview with school principal before suspension) presented in the cases cited in the
concurring opinion are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly different context of the
criminal justice system.
Id. at 125.
583. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (in requiring access to experts, Court
does not consider whether Sixth Amendment right to counsel would include such a requirement);
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (failure to consider possible application of Sixth
Amendment notice requirement in determining what information regarding the offense must be
given to a defendant pleading guilty). See also cases cited supra note 510 (addressing the limits
on use of presumptions without considering possible application of Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial as Justice Black earlier suggested, see discussion supra note 445). See also discussion
supra in text accompanying note 512 (discussing placing limits on allowing a finding of guilt
based on alternatives means of commission without considering possible application of Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial).
584. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
585. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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Amendment [compulsory process clause] to this type of case is unsettled,” it
preferred to turn to a “due process analysis,” where “precedents addressing the
fundamental fairness of trials established a clear framework for review.”586
Similarly, a series of procedural rulings relating to capital punishment have
been grounded on due process in preference to determining whether those
procedures are required by the Eighth Amendment limitation upon the
imposition of capital punishment.587
In still other areas, the Court’s post-incorporation rulings initially relied on
due process and subsequently turned to a specific guarantee as an alternative
grounding for imposing basically the same constitutional limitations. In
developing constitutional standards governing the seating of prospective jurors
exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity, the Court relied on due process in its
first post-incorporation ruling,588 but then relied on the Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury in applying and expanding upon those standards in later
decisions.589 Judicial action discouraging a defense witness from testifying
was held to violate due process in an early post-incorporation ruling,590 but a
later case looked to both due process and the compulsory process clause of the
Sixth Amendment in reviewing government action that denied the defendant
access to a potential witness.591 Due process also has been combined with
specific guarantees in explaining the scope of a particular defense right. Thus,
586. It added, however, that compulsory process would certainly provide “no greater
protections in this area than those afforded by due process.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56 (emphasis
added).
587. See cases cited supra note 533. See also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). In
Herrera, the plurality opinion “assume[s] for the sake of argument . . . that in a capital case a
truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution
of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to
process the claim,” id. at 417, but does not state whether the unconstitutionality would be based
on due process or the Eighth Amendment, though previously characterizing the right to a newtrial hearing as a procedural due process issue. See supra note 576. Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion notes that executing a person known to be innocent would violate both the
Rochin standard of due process, discussed supra notes 264-71, and Patterson standard of due
process, discussed supra text accompanying note 476, as well as the Eighth Amendment’s
standard of “contemporary standards of decency.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419. Justice Blackmun,
in dissent, relies on both the Rochin standard and Eighth Amendment standard. Id. at 430.
588. See supra note 501.
589. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1026 (1984); Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.
415, 417 (1991).
590. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
591. See United States v. Valenzuela–Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982). See also Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), where the Court held unconstitutional the exclusion from trial of
evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession. The Court noted
in this regard that “whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment . . . the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense,’” which the state had violated. Id. at 690.
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Rock v. Arkansas592 announced that a defendant has a constitutional right to
testify at his or her trial produced by the confluence of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause, the Sixth Amendment’s compulsory process
clause and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compulsory
self-incrimination. The defendant’s right to be present at every stage of the
trial similarly has been described as the combined product of the right of
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and due process, with the latter
adding to the scope of the right.593 The prohibition against admission of
coerced confessions is said to retain a due process grounding, notwithstanding
the extension of the self-incrimination privilege to custodial interrogation,
although it is not clear what due process today adds to the prohibition.594
While many of the cases described above were decided before Graham,
almost all came after Gerstein. Moreover, apart from distinguishing Gerstein
and Graham in a civil forfeiture case,595 the Court has made no effort to tie the
two cases together.
C. A proposed return to the shield of “settled usage”
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,596 a 1991 civil case
presenting a due process challenge to a state’s common law method of
assessing punitive damages, Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion,597 urged
that free-standing due process analysis return to the lesson of Murray’s Lessee,
as explained in Hurtado: If a procedure has a strong common law pedigree,
that necessarily makes it the law of the land and consistent with due process.598
Hurtado, Justice Scalia noted, had introduced the flexible due process analysis
of “fundamental justice,” but only for judging what due process requires
Justice Scalia
“when traditional procedures are dispensed with.”599
acknowledged that “[i]n the ensuing decades . . . the concept of ‘fundamental
fairness’ under the Fourteenth Amendment became increasingly decoupled
from the traditional historical approach.”600 He attributed that development to
the Court carrying over to the states through selective incorporation prior
592. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
593. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (noting that the right therefore is not
limited to situations in which the defendant is “actually confronting witnesses or evidence against
him,” but also includes other trial related proceedings at which the defendant’s presence will
contribute to his opportunity to defend himself).
594. See supra note 489.
595. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993), discussed supra
note 571.
596. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
597. The quotations that follow come from Justice Scalia’s discussion of the development of
due process jurisprudence in Part II of his opinion. Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 28-39.
598. See supra text accompanying note 229.
599. Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 32.
600. Id. at 34.
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interpretations of incorporated guarantees that “had departed from their strict
common law meaning.”601 That application, he argued, was distinguishable
from determining the independent content of due process.602 In the latter
context, he argued, “no procedure firmly rooted in the practices of our people
can be so ‘fundamentally unfair’ as to deny due process of law.”603
Justice Scalia appeared to add one significant modification to Hurtado’s
announced shield for settled usage. Justice Scalia spoke of “unbroken
historical usage,”604 suggesting that the shield would not extend to a practice
601. Id. at 35. See also supra note 305. Contrary to Justice Scalia’s suggestion, that
development was not limited to due process cases looking to specific guarantees. See supra text
accompanying notes 313-17.
602. Justice Scalia reasoned on this score:
To say that unbroken historical usage cannot save a procedure that violates one of the
explicit procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights (applicable through the Fourteenth
Amendment) is not necessarily to say that such usage cannot demonstrate the procedure’s
compliance with the more general guarantee of “due process.” In principle, what is
important enough to have been included within the Bill of Rights has good claim to being
an element of “fundamental fairness,” whatever history might say; and as a practical
matter, the invalidation of traditional state practices achieved through the Bill of Rights is
at least limited to enumerated subjects.
Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 35. Justice Scalia also argued that carrying over a “disregard for
the procedure of the ages” from the interpretation of specific guarantees to the interpretation of
the independent content of due process was an ironic development “since some of those who
most ardently supported the incorporation doctrine did so in belief that it was a means of
avoiding, rather than producing, a subjective due process jurisprudence.” Id. at 34. He cited, in
particular Justice Black’s criticism of a “natural law” formula of due process. Id.
603. Id. at 38. Justice Scalia did not thereby reject the fundamental fairness standard. That
standard remained applicable in determining whether a departure from historical practice violates
due process and whether a practice with no historical analogue violates due process. See Steven
R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia’s Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territorial Jurisdiction:
The Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REV. 981, 995 (1992) (Justice Scalia’s
challenge was to the Court’s rejection of the “first axiom of Hurtado by elevating fundamental
fairness from its limited role as a test for weighing the constitutionality of government procedures
which depart from tradition, to the universal benchmark of due process”). Of course, where
departures do occur, Justice Scalia will give great weight to tradition in determining what is
fundamental. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that unconstitutionality of a state denying a defendant the right to
proceed pro se might more appropriately have been based on due process, rather than the Sixth
Amendment; framers, “who were suspicious enough of governmental power—including judicial
power—that they insisted upon a citizen’s right to be judged by an independent jury of private
citizens, would not have found acceptable the compulsory assignment of counsel by the
Government to plead a criminal defendant’s case”).
604. Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 35. See also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
Submitting killing in the course of a robbery and premeditated killing to the jury
under a single charge is not some novel composite that can be subjected to the indignity of
“fundamental fairness” review. It was the norm when this country was founded, was the
norm when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, and remains the norm today.
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that had basically been abandoned.605 In Rock v. Arkansas,606 the Court,
relying in part on due process, had recognized a constitutional right of a
defendant to testify in his own behalf. That right directly contradicted a
common law prohibition of testimony by the defendant, a position that had
long since been abandoned throughout the United States. The Court was
divided as to whether a prohibition of hypnotically refreshed defendant
testimony infringed impermissibly on that right (with Justice Scalia joining the
dissenters, who argued that it did not). There was no division, however, as to
recognizing the basic right and finding support for it in due process.
Justice Scalia stood alone in Pacific Mutual.607 For the majority, Justice
Blackmun concluded that even though the common procedure for assessing
punitive damages was “well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was
enacted”608 and continued to be widely used, that did not preclude an inquiry to
determine whether the method as applied violated due process. In light of the
longstanding acceptance of the common law method, it would be inappropriate
to declare that method “so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per
se unconstitutional,” but “[i]t would be just as inappropriate to say that,
because punitive damages have been recognized for so long, their imposition is
never unconstitutional.”609 Justice Blackmun quoted in this connection
Williams v. Illinois,610 a criminal case, where the Court had noted: “‘[N]either
the antiquity of a practice nor the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial

Unless we are here to invent a Constitution rather than enforce one, it is impossible that a
practice as old as the common law and still in existence in the vast majority of States does
not provide that process which is “due.” If I did not believe that, I might well be with the
dissenters in this case.
Id. at 651.
605. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 622 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (“perpetuation of
ancient forms” could conceivably be unconstitutional when that perpetuation “is engaged in by
only a very small minority of the States”). See also David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His
Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J.
1377 (1999). Justice Scalia, in his non-judicial writings, has described himself as a “faint
hearted” originalist, using public flogging as an example of a historical practice permissible at
ratification, but unlikely to be sustained if reenacted by a legislature today. Id. at 1396-97. He
suggested, however, a rejection of an historical practice must be based on “the hard proof in
‘extant legislation’” that social perception has so evolved that the practice now is viewed as
unconscionable. Id. at 1397. This basically limits any departures to situations in which “societal
mores have changed so significantly that a historical practice now is either basically forbidden by
statutes or no longer imposed by state action . . . .” Id.
606. 483 U.S. 44 (1987), discussed supra note 506.
607. 499 U.S. at 43. He has, however, persisted in his position. See Weiss v. United States,
510 U.S. 163 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S.
624 (1991) (Scalia, J., writing separately).
608. Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 17. See discussion infra note 619 as to the use of this timeframe.
609. Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 18.
610. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
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adherence to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack.’”611
Justice O’Connor also relied upon Williams v. Illinois in her more extensive
rebuttal of Justice Scalia’s position.612 Justice Kennedy, in another separate
opinion, noted that he agreed with Justice Scalia that “the judgment of history
should govern the outcome in the . . . current case,” but could not “say with the
confidence maintained by Justice Scalia . . . that widespread adherence to a
historical practice always forecloses further inquiry when a party challenges an
ancient institution or procedure as violative of due process.”613
Although refusing to go as far as Justice Scalia urged, the Supreme Court
in its post-incorporation rulings, particularly over roughly the last decade, has
given substantial weight to the approval of history in applying free-standing
due process to state criminal procedure. The Court has described historical
acceptance as providing a “strong indication” that the practice in question does
not offend a fundamental principle of justice.614 Indeed, Justice O’Connor,
who strongly criticized Justice Scalia’s position in Pacific Mutual,615 has stated
that “history creates a strong presumption of continued validity.”616 In one
instance, where a procedure had deep common law roots, that helped to sustain
it even though all but a few states had departed from that common law
tradition.617 Moreover, when the Court over the last decade has spoken of
611. Williams, 399 U.S. at 239, quoted in Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 17. Justice Scalia responded
that Williams had indeed “held unconstitutional the centuries-old practice of permitting convicted
criminals to reduce their prison sentences by paying fine,” but that ruling had been grounded in an
equal protection analysis and the “Equal Protection Clause and other provisions of the
Constitution, unlike the Due Process Clause, are not an explicit invocation of the ‘law of the land’
and might be thought to have some counter-historical content.” Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 38.
612. Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 60. Justice O’Connor dissented on the merits, arguing that the
state’s common law scheme for assessing punitive damages failed to provide the jury with
sufficient guidance to meet due process standards. Id. She praised the majority for correctly
rejecting Justice Scalia’s argument “that a practice with a long historical pedigree is immune to
reexamination” and stressed the “flexible” character of due process, which allowed it to adjust to
“time, place, and circumstances.” Id. She acknowledged that “history creates a strong
presumption of continued validity,” but viewed that presumption as overcome in this case. Id.
613. Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 40. Justice Kennedy noted that Justice Scalia’s historical
approach “has much to commend it,” but that was not because an historical sanction was itself
due process. Id. “Historical acceptance of legal institutions,” he noted, “serves to validate them
not because history provides the most convenient rule of decision but because we have
confidence that a long accepted legal institution would not have survived if it rested upon
procedures found to be irrational or unfair.” Id.
614. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991). See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,
43-48 (1996) (acceptance at common law at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would present “what might be called an a
fortiori argument in favor of the State”); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 (1993).
615. See supra text accompanying note 612. See also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
453 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
616. See Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 41 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
617. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
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history supporting a particular procedure, even the dissents have not countered
by noting that due process constitutes an “evolving concept” that can overturn
history.618
In one sense, the Court in the post-incorporation era may have broadened
the potential for historical acceptance sustaining a challenged practice. In
determining whether a particular state practice has the endorsement of history,
the Court has looked to the standards of the common law as they existed at the
times of the adoption of both the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment.619 Presumably, a clearly established acceptance at either point
would be entitled to considerable weight. Since the independent content of the
two due process clauses is thought to be the same, evidence that a process was
not viewed as violating the Fifth Amendment when it was adopted should also
be relevant to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. So too, if a practice
was unknown when the Fifth Amendment was adopted, but was well

618. Frankfurterian descriptions of due process, see discussion supra in text accompanying
notes 319-23, have largely been ignored in the state criminal procedure cases of the last decade.
Writing separately in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), see infra text accompanying
note 685, Justice O’Connor did quote from Justice Frankfurter’s Griffin v. Illinois description of
due process as the guarantee “least frozen-in-history” and “most absorptive of powerful social
standards of a progressive society,” see supra note 321, but she also included Justice
Frankfurter’s additional comment that “neither the unfolding content of ‘due process’ nor the
particularized safeguards of the Bill of Rights disregard procedural ways that reflect a national
historic policy.” Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956)). See also supra note 612 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s dissent in
Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 60).
The most notable exception is Justice Souter’s dissent in Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S.
37, 74 (1996). After acknowledging that the state’s position was in accord with common law as it
stood “when the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was added to the Constitution,”
Justice Souter noted:
That is enough to show that Montana’s rule . . . contravenes no principle “so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people” as they stood in 1868, “as to be ranked as
fundamental.” But this is not the end of the due process enquiry. Justice Harlan’s
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) teaches that the “tradition”
to which we are tethered is a “living thing.” What the historical practice does not rule out
as inconsistent with “the concept of ordered liberty,” must still pass muster as rational in
today’s world.
Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted).
619. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (citing to the common law
rule “when the Fifth Amendment was adopted . . . and when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified”); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (same); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)
(English common law rule adopted in American colonies and carried forward by the states). See
also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43-48 (1996) (finding that state practice was consistent
with common law in England and this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, so
even if it was assumed that common law was “no longer generally applied” at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,” that only cut off “what might be called an a fortiori
argument in favor of the State”).
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established and widely accepted when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, that is evidence that it was not viewed as violating due process (either
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment) at that time.620
The post-incorporation decisions have also looked to the sanction of
historical usage in determining whether a particular procedural right is
“fundamental” and therefore demanded by due process. The Court has
frequently noted that “historical practice is probative of whether a procedural
rule can be characterized as fundamental.”621 A principle that has “deep roots
in our common law heritage” is more readily characterized as “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”622
Moreover, while “trial practices” may change and still remain true to the
“principles” underlying the Anglo-American criminal justice system, those
original practices often help to explain the core of such principles.623
Reliance on the lessons of historical practice has led the Court to both
establish a general principle as fundamental and to accept a particular practice
as historically sanctioned by settled usage even though that practice tends to
reduce that general principle to a matter of form in particular settings. This
willingness to let the common law control—both as to its general principles
and its acceptance of pragmatic exceptions to those principles—probably
explains the functional inconsistency in the Court holding fundamental the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and yet allowing the shifting

620. Consider, however, the dissenting opinion of Justice O’Connor in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2380 (2000). In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas relied heavily on
historical usage in arguing that due process requires treating as an element of a crime (and
therefore requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt) “every fact that is by law a basis for
imposing or increasing punishment.” Id. at 2368. He offered in support consistent rulings “from
the founding to roughly the end of the Civil War” (citing primarily cases from the 1840s onward)
and the continuation of the understanding of these cases well into the twentieth century. Id. at
2369 & n.2. In response, Justice O’Connor noted, inter alia, that “Justice Thomas divines the
common law understanding of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by consulting decisions
rendered by American courts well after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, ranging primarily
from the 1840s to the 1890s.” Id. at 2383. Such decisions “fail[ed] to demonstrate any settled
understanding . . . under the . . . preexisting common law.” Id. Apparently, the understanding at
the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was not crucial. Justice Thomas
responded that relying on post-1840 decisions to show the understanding “at the time of the
founding” was appropriate because that time frame produced the proposed modifications that first
brought this principle into dispute. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2369.
621. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992). See also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S.
348, 356 (1996); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 (1993).
622. Medina, 505 U.S. at 446.
623. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), concluding that various aspects of
the common law (rules of pleading, the character of sentencing discretion, and jury practice)
establish that factors which increase the level of punishment are elements of the crime and
therefore require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
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of burdens to the defendant if the proper form is followed.624 So too, when the
Court in its latest term concluded that due process requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as to any factor that raises the maximum sentence, but an
exception exists as to recidivist statutes (under which prior convictions raise
the maximum sentence), it looked to history both in establishing the general
principle and recognizing the pragmatic exception for recidivist statutes.625
In the pre-incorporation era, the Court appeared to give as much weight to
the contemporary consensus of state law as to common law pedigree.626 In the
post-incorporation decisions, consensus remains a relevant factor, but arguably
less significant than the sanction of historical practice. As in the preincorporation period, the key is a significant widespread acceptance of a
practice, not necessarily acceptance by a majority of the states.627 Where a
number of states accept a particular practice, that constitutes a “concrete
indicator”628 that the practice is not contrary to the “conscience of our
people.”629 Nonetheless, in general, the significance of a consensus in state
practice appears to be tied to its relationship to historical tradition (where such
tradition is available).630

624. See Mullaney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987). The functional inconsistencies in these rulings has
been widely recognized, though commentators disagree as to the appropriate handling of the issue
consistent with the general principle. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re
Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30 (1977);
Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional
Approach to Evidentiary Issues, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1980); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B.
Stephen, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burdens of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325
(1979); Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1665 (1987) (also citing the commentary).
625. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The ruling on recidivist statutes,
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), came before the Court had adopted a
definition of elements that included maximum sentence enhancers, but the Court in Apprendi
described the recidivism statutes as a “limited exception.” Justice Thomas in a concurring
opinion argued that the common law did not actually recognize such an exception, and the
majority acknowledged that the case may have been “incorrectly decided.” Thus, it could be
reopened, and if so, what exactly was the historical practice is likely to be a critical issue.
626. See supra text accompanying notes 355-65.
627. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,
556 (1967); Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1991).
628. See Shad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991) (speaking of “history” and “widely
shared practice”).
629. See supra text accompanying note 476.
630. There are, of course, situations in which the procedural steps in question have no ready
common law counterpart. Here the consensus may weigh heavily. See, e.g., Mu’Min v. Virginia,
500 U.S. 415 (1991) (noting that various jurisdictions had refused to require an individual voir
dire of jurors in cases involving pretrial publicity, and refusing to impose such a requirement as a
matter of due process); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (citing state support, as reflected
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The contemporary consensus appears to be given the greatest weight where
it reflects widespread acceptance of a practice that also has deep roots in our
common law heritage.631 This combination is not conclusive,632 but as the
Court has noted: “If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by
common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to
affect it.”633 Where a very strong contemporary consensus rejects a procedure
(i.e., where all but a few states reject it), and that rejection follows a position
well established at common law, that consensus will contribute significantly to
the case against the procedure.634 Such a consensus will be discounted,
however, if the Court concludes that practice in question, though different in
form, does not truly depart from the fundamental principle that shaped the
different approach followed at common law and in the vast majority of the
states.635
Where the common law and the contemporary consensus point in different
directions, the historical sanction has tended to trump the contemporary
consensus.636 In Medina v. California,637 speaking to such a situation, the

in amici briefs of state officials, in allowing continuing experimentation in televising trials, and
rejecting claim that televising constitutes a per se violation of due process).
631. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 (1993) (noting that common law and
current rules in many states sharply limit time for “a new trial motion based on newly discovered
evidence”); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 639-41 (1991) (noting the continued acceptance of
the common law definition of murder that treated the intent to kill and the intent to commit a
felony as alternative aspects of mens rea and allowed for verdict without requiring a jury to select
between them).
632. See, e.g., Schad, 501 U.S. at 62 (“This is not to say that either history or current practice
is dispositive.”).
633. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991) (quoting Sun Oil v. Wortman,
486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988)). See also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 203 (1971) (stating
that “it requires a strong showing to upset this settled practice of the Nation”).
634. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 360-61 (1996) (noting that the Oklahoma
requirement that defendant prove his competency to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence
was contrary to “late 18th century” precedents, which suggested use of a standard more favorable
to the defendant, and was contrary to “contemporary practice,” with only four of fifty states
imposing such a heavy burden); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635 (1980) (stating that
Alabama’s practice was unconstitutional and was “unique in American criminal law” and
contrary to the common law).
635. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), discussed supra note 363. The Court
has frequently noted that the states are free to take new approaches, provided they do not violate
principles of justice deemed fundamental, and as to that determination, “history and current
practice” may be strong indicators, but “this is not to say that either history or current practice is
dispositive.” Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 642 (1991). So too, the Court has stated that the
fact “that [a state’s] approach has been adopted in few other States does not render [the state’s]
choice unconstitutional.” McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 90 (1986).
636. The Rochin “shock the conscience” standard would appear to look solely to
contemporary sense of justice and thus give great weight to a contemporary consensus, but it was
not presented as an alternative to a Patterson type standard, but as an application of such a
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Court characterized “contemporary practice” as being “of limited relevance to
the due process inquiry” and cited in support Martin v. Ohio638 and Patterson
v. New York.639 In both cases, the challenged state procedure (involving the
allocation of the burden of proof) was consistent with the traditional common
law position, which prevailed when both the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment were adopted, but that position subsequently had been rejected by
the vast majority of states (all but two in Martin). In both cases, the Court
sustained the state practice, noting that the abandonment of the common law
view by a majority of states did not render that position inconsistent with due
process, which “require[s] that only the most basic procedural safeguards be
observed . . . .”640 The question of constitutionality, the Court noted, “is not
answered by cataloging the practices of . . . [the] States.”641
On the other side, where a state practice is widely accepted, but contrary to
a common law standard, that acceptance arguably should have far more than
“limited relevance” in light of the recognition, starting with Hurtado, that due
process does not lock the states into common law forms, which may well have
been the product of the conditions and the times in which they were developed
rather than a fundamental principle of justice.642 The Court has sometimes
been wary, however, of a newly adopted innovation, lacking a significant
tradition, which departs from a structural feature of the common law. Thus, in
Apprendi v. New Jersey,643 the Court concluded that such an innovation lost
sight of the basic premise of requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
would not be sustained. This was so notwithstanding various changes in

standard. See discussion supra note 271; Donald A. Dripps, Does Police Pursuit Shock the
Conscience?, TRIAL, Aug. 1998, at 66. (“Shocking the conscience of contemporary justices,
however, might not be enough to prevail, because history and tradition might indicate that current
consciences are overly squeamish about coercive state actions.”).
637. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
638. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
639. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
640. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
641. Martin, 480 U.S. at 236 (1987). See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 48 (1996).
642. See supra text accompanying notes 130 and 326. See also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44, 51 (1987) (relying in part on due process to establish a defendant’s right to testify under oath
at his own trial). Although the Court in Rock relied on various factors besides the unanimous
rejection of the common law rule that disqualified the defendant from being a witness, it did cite
to that rejection and did note that it was now the “considered consensus of the English-speaking
world . . . that there [is] no rational justification” for the common law rule. Id. at 50 (quoting
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961)). Of course Rock was not based solely on due
process. See supra note 506.
643. 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), discussed supra note 625. Apprendi relies heavily upon Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), which contained an extensive discussion of the relevant
common law history.
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sentencing philosophy and structure that supported the innovation,644 and
arguably would have lead a Court adhering to the Hurtado philosophy to
sustain the innovation as a rational attempt at “wise adaptation to new
circumstances . . . .”645 Indeed, the Apprendi majority appeared not to give any
weight to the fact that the New Jersey sentencing structure there held
unconstitutional had counterparts in many states.646 It may well be that a
critical element here is whether the widespread departure from the common
law tradition is presented as some recent innovation seeking to accommodate
administratively some pressing political concern of the day, or as a well
established, gradually developed new perspective on fairness with a tradition
of its own.647
Prior to incorporation, the Court would apply a mode of deductive
reasoning to impose due process requirements that did not have support in the
common law or the current consensus.648 That analytical device has continued
to be used in the post-incorporation era in much the same manner. The Court
has started with a structural prerequisite clearly established as part of due
process (e.g., notice) and asked whether a particular practice is required or
prohibited as a logical extension of that structural prerequisite.649 The same
question has also been asked in cases that have relied upon historical practice
and contemporary consensus,650 but deductive reasoning is more significant as

644. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2397-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Jacqueline E.
Ross, Unanticipated Consequences of Turning Sentencing Factors into Offense Elements: The
Apprendi Debate, 12 FED. SENT. R. 197 (Jan./Feb. 2000).
645. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530.
646. A forthcoming article by Nancy King and Susan Klein notes that Apprendi threatens
dozens of existing federal and state statutes. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Après
Apprendi, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 331 (2000). In Carless v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2739 (2000),
certiorari was granted, judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further
consideration in light of Apprendi, evidencing the Court’s apparent awareness of Apprendi’s
application beyond the “hate crime” provision presented in Apprendi.
647. Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), discussed supra note 643,
with Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), discussed supra note 642.
648. See supra text accompanying notes 376-80.
649. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355 (1996) (considering practice’s
relationship to the prohibition against trying incompetent person); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 786-87 (1973) (considering practice’s relationship to the right to a hearing); Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (considering practice’s relationship to basic goals of adversary
system).
650. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448-52 (1992). Another mode of this
analysis starts with a structure that is clearly not required by due process and asks whether it
follows that that particular procedure also is not required. See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal,
120 S. Ct. 684, 693 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that because there is no due process
right to appeal, leaving the states free even to adopt a review “which consists of a nonadversarial
reexamination of convictions by a panel of experts,” states certainly can insist on adversarial
review with each side represented by counsel, denying the defendant’s right to proceed pro se).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

FREE-STANDING DUE PROCESS AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

417

the primary grounding for rulings that ignore those factors. In the postincorporation era, decisions departing from historical practice have been far
more likely to be based on deductive reasoning than characterization of due
process as an evolving concept.
In some instances the Court has turned to the logical extension of due
process basics where looking to historical practice would not have been
fruitful. Apart from those practices so commonplace as to be widely
recognized in the literature,651 a practice is not appropriately characterized as
part of our common law heritage simply because there is little or no common
law precedent specifically prohibiting the practice. Thus, when the Court has
before it such practices as a judge failing to inform a murder defendant that the
judge was considering a death sentence even though the prosecutor had
recommended life imprisonment,652 or the police intentionally destroyed
evidence known to be exculpatory,653 one would not expect the Court to
discuss the relevance of historical practice or even contemporary consensus.
Arguably, the same would be true of other actions viewed as unusual, if not
unique, such as the failure of the judge to control the disruptive conduct of
newsmen within the courtroom.654 However, no reference was made to
common law traditions or a possible contemporary consensus in various other
rulings where deductive reasoning was employed to “requir[e] States to
institute procedures that were neither required at common law nor explicitly
commanded by the text of the Constitution.”655 Thus, post-incorporation due
process rulings have: extended the concept that the state had a duty to offset
indigency barriers to the exercise of rights;656 prohibited unjustified and
prejudicial delay in the bringing of charges, notwithstanding compliance with
the statute of limitations;657 required a prosecutor who increase charges on a

651. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (noting that courts in this
country had traditionally “practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a
wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence” considered in sentencing, and citing in this
connection law review literature as well as two collections of cases).
652. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 120 (1991).
653. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 54 (1988).
654. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
655. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring). At
times, dissenters would have relied upon deductive reasoning to override practices sanctioned at
the common law, but the majority relied upon history to refuse to do so. See, e.g., Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), including Justice Souter’s dissent, Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 74, quoted
in supra note 618.
656. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), discussed supra text accompanying note 496;
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), discussed supra text accompanying note 534;
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-87 (1973), discussed supra text accompanying note 537.
As for the pre-incorporation recognition of this principle, see supra text accompanying note 365.
657. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1971); United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 795 (1977).
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trial de novo to explain that increase,658 and a judge to explain a sentence
which is higher than the sentence that the judge previously imposed on a prior
conviction for the same offense that had subsequently been reversed on
appeal;659 required the prosecution to disclose evidence within the
government’s possession that is material and exculpatory;660 mandated that a
state under special circumstances allow testimony and questioning concerning
another person’s confession to the crime charged against the defendant,
notwithstanding preclusion under traditional evidentiary standards;661
prohibited admission of lineup identification evidence where it presents a
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification (thereby rejecting a state
position that simply puts the reliability issue to the jury);662 and mandated a
broad range of hearing requirements for the revocation of probation and
parole.663 While historical practice would not have been available as to all of
these issues, it was most likely available as to several. The widespread state
acceptance of a contrary position certainly was a distinct possibility as to all.
Neither factor was viewed as needing to be discussed, apparently because each
would be trumped by the logical imperative of a structural feature of due
process.664
The Court has noted, however, that it is limited in its imposition of new
requirements based upon a deductive analysis. An acknowledged structural
requirement hardly provides a “yardstick” which can be used in a

658. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974).
659. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), as modified by Texas v.
McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986).
660. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985). This arguably is an area in which the historical practice was uncertain, as judicial
decisions were not likely to deal directly with the issue on a widespread basis. See 1 TREATISE,
supra note 1, § 2.7, at 600 n.151. However, the Court did not look to possible indicators of a
tradition that allowed the prosecutor to keep its discoveries to itself provided that it did not
introduce false evidence, such as the absence of any such disclosure requirement in defense
discovery authority (none existed at common law), or the failure to distinguish evidence that had
been in the prosecutor’s possession on new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence.
See 4 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 20.1(a) (discovery); 5 id. § 24.6(d) (new trial motions).
661. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
662. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
663. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), discussed supra text accompanying note
537; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), discussed supra text accompanying note 538. In
Morrissey, the Court did take note of state practice in a footnote, noting that a “number of States
are affected by no legal requirement to grant any kind of hearing” and others simply required
“some type of hearing,” presumably indicating that these jurisdictions would not meet the
requirements of the Court. Id. at 489 n.15.
664. But see Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA.
L. REV. 859, 894-95 (1979) (“If a societal consensus has not developed on a concrete issue, it
seems likely either that the particular application does not follow inexorably from the general
principle, or that the general principle is not exactly what the court supposes.”).
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“mechanical” fashion to test the validity of a challenged procedure.665 Rather,
determining the imperatives of such a requirement requires “‘a delicate process
of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom
the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.’”666 Decisions
must take account of the “past course of decisions” that have construed that
prerequisite. 667 They also must recognize that reasonable minds may differ on
what process is needed to implement the structural basics of a fair adjudicatory
process, and the Court therefore cannot “engage in a finely tuned review of the
wisdom” of the challenged state practice.668 Thus, the Court has noted that “a
state procedure ‘does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because
another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a
surer promise of protection’” to the defendant,669 and that “[d]ue process does
not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate
the possibility of convicting an innocent person.”670 The Court also has
stressed in various contexts that the focus must be on the operation of the
practice in the individual case, and a state practice therefore should not be
deemed to violate due process unless it conflicts with a structural prerequisite
of fairness in a manner that actually causes substantial prejudice to the
particular defendant.671
In sum, while the Court has refused to return to the Hurtado shield of
“settled usage,” its post-incorporation rulings do reflect a general pattern of
increased reliance upon historical acceptance, both in rejecting and sustaining
constitutional challenges. The sanction of history has served to sustain
practices that had been abandoned as outmoded by all but a small group of
states. It has sustained as well practices that were recognized at common law
though apparently inconsistent with general principles elsewhere reflected in
the common law. On the other side, although the Court has continued to speak
of the need to give the states leeway to search for novel solutions to practical
problems, the sanction of history has proven a more formidable obstacle to
state innovations at odds with historical practice, at least where such
innovations have only limited support among the states and are characterized
as substantive rather than formalistic. As in the pre-incorporation era,

665. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 121 (1991).
666. Id. at 121 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
667. Id.
668. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991).
669. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 451 (1992) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967) (same).
670. Medina, 505 U.S. at 451 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)).
671. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985); Ake v. Oklahoma, 47 U.S.
68, 82-83 (1985); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795-96 (1977); Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 112-16 (1977).
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however, the treatment of historical sanction has not been consistent.
Although the Court has been less willing to discount that sanction by
characterizing due process as an open-ended, evolving concept, it has
continued to discount (or simply ignore) historical sanction in utilizing
deductive reasoning to impose new constitutional mandates (including some
that are contrary to the contemporary consensus as well as to historical
practice).
D. Utilitarian balancing
In Mathews v. Eldridge,672 a case involving an administrative proceeding,
the Court announced a three-factor balancing standard, which it later
characterized as “a general approach for testing challenged state procedures
under a due process claim.”673 Under Mathews, once a court determines that a
litigant has at stake an interest protected by due process, its task is then to
analyze and balance three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.674

Mathews did not prescribe precisely where the balance should be struck, but
the greater the defendant’s interest, the greater the risk of error under the
challenged procedure, and the greater the potential for substantially reducing
that risk through a modification that imposes minimal costs for the state, the
greater the likelihood that the modification will be required under due process.
Although the Supreme Court considered numerous due process challenges
to state criminal procedures in the fifteen-year period between Mathews and
Medina v. California,675 it utilized the Mathews balancing test in only one of
those cases, and its use there was not debated.676 In Medina, the applicability
of the Mathews standard was viewed as a central issue in resolving a due

672. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
673. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979).
674. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71
(1970)). See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
675. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
676. That case was Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), discussed supra text accompanying
note 496. As noted in Medina, the Court also referred to Mathews in a federal criminal case. See
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). In rejecting Mathews, the Medina Court noted
that it was not “disturbing the holding in Raddatz and Ake, [as] it is not at all clear that Mathews
was essential to the results reached in those cases.” Medina, 505 U.S. at 444.
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process challenge to a state law that allocated to the defense the burden of
establishing that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial.677 The Medina
majority rejected the contention that such a law should be judged under the
Mathews balancing test. Mathews, the Court concluded, was inappropriate for
this case and criminal cases in general. The “Bill of Rights,” it noted, “speaks
in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and the expansion of
those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the due process
clause invites undue interference with both considered legislative judgments
and the careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and
order.”678 Accordingly, free-standing due process should be construed “‘very
narrowly’ based on the recognition that, ‘[b]eyond the specific guarantees
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited
operation.’”679
The Medina majority concluded that the appropriate standard for judging
the independent content of due process in criminal cases was the “narrower
inquiry” of the traditional fundamental fairness standard, as set forth in
Patterson v. New York,680 a case which also involved a due process challenge
on a burden-of-proof issue. Patterson suggested that “because the States have
considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal
process is grounded in centuries of common-law tradition, it is appropriate to
exercise substantial deference to legislative judgments in this area.”681 It
therefore had endorsed an approach “far less intrusive than that approved in
Mathews.”682 Under that approach a state procedure is “‘not subject to
proscription under the Due Process Clause unless ‘it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.’”683 Applying the Patterson standard, the Medina majority
looked to both the historical treatment of the burden of proof as to
incompetency and the logical implications of the prohibition against the trial of
an incompetent defendant (a “recognized principle of ‘fundamental fairness’”),
677. Although the majority viewed this as an issue that should be resolved, two concurring
justices and two dissenting justices disagreed. The concurring justices (O’Connor, J., joined by
Souter, J.) argued that the state law was constitutional under the Mathews test, just as the majority
found it constitutional under a traditional fundamental fairness standard. Id. at 454-56. The
dissenters (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens, J.) argued that the parties had improperly framed the
issue as involving a choice between the two standards, as the state law was unconstitutional under
the rationale of earlier precedent dealing with the incompetency issue. Id. at 459.
678. Id. at 443.
679. Id. at 443 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)). See also supra
notes 483-85.
680. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). As the Medina Court noted, Patterson was decided after Ake,
discussed supra note 676, but did not refer to the Mathews standard. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445.
681. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-46.
682. Id. at 446.
683. Id. at 445 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02).
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and concluded that neither provided a basis for holding that the state’s
allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant violated due process.684
Justice O’Connor wrote separately in Medina in support of applying
Mathews to criminal cases. She acknowledged that the Mathews balancing test
did not refer to historical practice, and that history commonly played an
important role in criminal cases.685 However, historical endorsement was not
conclusive, as the majority appeared to acknowledge. “Against the historical
status quo,” the Court seemingly would “allow some weight to be given
countervailing consideration of fairness in operation,” but these were
“considerations much like those . . . evaluated in Mathews.”686 The troubling
aspect of the Court’s rejection of Mathews, Justice O’Connor suggested, was
not its preference for a standard that first looked to the “traditions of our
people,” but to its “intimation that the balancing of equities is inappropriate in
evaluating whether state criminal procedures amount to due process.”687
Justice Blackmun in dissent also expressed concern that the rejection of
Mathews might be seen as a rejection of balancing. He argued that “the
Court’s reliance on Patterson” should not be viewed as condemning “the basic
balancing of the government’s interests against the individual’s interest that is
germane to any due process inquiry.”688 He noted that Patterson, “[w]hile
unwilling to discount the force of tradition and history,” had not adopted “an
exclusively tradition-based approach to due process analysis.”689 The “Court
in Patterson [also] looked to the ‘convenience’ to the government and
‘hardship or oppression’ to the defendant,” aspects of the governmental and
individual interests that had to be weighed against each other in “determ[ining]
what process is due.”690
The Medina majority’s decision not to apply the Mathews standard to
criminal justice cases obviously rested, in part, on the failure of that standard to
acknowledge the role of history and tradition in the definition of due process in
the criminal justice field. However, the Mathews analysis could play a role
684. Id. at 446-53.
685. See supra text accompanying note 616.
686. Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor noted, moreover,
that criminal cases can sometimes present a “new administrative regime” as to which there is “no
historical practice,” such as guideline sentencing. Id. at 453-54. Mathews, she argued, would be
most helpful in analyzing due process claims in that context. Id.
687. Id. at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
688. Id. at 460.
689. Id. at 460 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
690. Id. Consider, however, Bruce J. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in
Determining Competency to Stand Trial: An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme
Court’s New Due Process Methodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817, 826 (1993)
(viewing Medina as having rejected Mathews in favor of an “exclusively historical approach” and
reading Justice O’Connor’s opinion as challenging the Court’s failure to take account of the
growth potential in due process).
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alongside history and tradition, as evidenced by the Court’s application of the
Mathews analysis to aspects of civil process that also have deep roots in our
common law heritage.691 The more critical concern for the Medina Court, as
suggested by Justices O’Connor and Blackmun, was the use of balancing in the
Mathews analysis. In applying the fundamental fairness standard, the Medina
majority looked not only to historical practice, but also to the logical
implications of a basic principle of fairness, the prohibition against forcing to
trial an incompetent defendant. This required it to explore the extent to which
allocating the burden to the defendant posed a risk to the implementation of
that principle. Such an assessment would also be required under the Mathews
standard, but there the Court would also evaluate the potential for reducing that
risk by shifting the burden to the prosecution and the cost to the state of doing
so. The Medina majority, in contrast, stressed that the question before it was
not whether the state could do more to implement the prohibition against trying
the incompetent, but simply whether the state’s procedure substantially
undercut that prohibition. If it did not, deference to the state’s legislative
judgment required its constitutional acceptance no matter how much more
might have been achieved at little or no cost to the state.
In the course of applying the traditional fundamental fairness standard as
prescribed by Medina, a court, in its analysis of the impact of the challenged
state procedure upon the structural prerequisites of fairness, is likely to
consider many of the same factors as it would in applying Mathews.692

691. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993),
applying the Mathews inquiry to a challenge to the procedures used in a civil forfeiture
proceeding. Although the forfeiture there was connected to the use of the subject property in a
criminal transaction, the civil nature of the proceeding served to distinguish Medina. Id. at 66.
Indeed, the Court also looked to the civil character of the proceeding in determining the
appropriate role of due process regulation. Id. at 52. It rejected the government’s argument that
since the seizure of forfeitable property was subject to the Fourth Amendment, due process
should not add additional requirements. Id. at 49. The Court distinguished Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975), discussed supra note 571, where the Court had viewed the Fourth Amendment
as the exclusive source of constitutional regulation of the custody that followed a warrantless
arrest. Id. at 50.
692. Consideration of the initial Mathews’ factor—the private interest at stake—is inherent in
a deductive analysis of the structural prerequisites of fundamental fairness as applied to the
criminal process, i.e., to proceedings that involve the private interest of avoiding a criminal
conviction and its accompanying sanctions. At least one aspect of the second factor—the risk of
erroneous deprivation under the current procedure—is an aspect of determining the extent to
which the procedure may undercut the basic structural objective of avoiding conviction of the
innocent. Consideration of alternatives is more problematic, but possible in the course of
assessing the impact of the current procedure. Thus, the Medina Court, in exploring the impact of
the burden allocation upon possibility of forcing to trial an incompetent person, compared the
placement of that burden on the defendant and on the prosecution. See also Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348, 355-56 (1996) (risks imposed by requiring defense showing by clear and
convincing evidence rather than preponderance standard). Finally, the third factor, the state’s
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However, it will do so from a perspective that prohibits only a serious
undermining of the structural prerequisite rather than one that considers
whether the state has struck a reasonable balance in failing to produce a
procedure that would better implement that structural prerequisite. It will do
so from a perspective which states that “a state procedure ‘does not run foul of
the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking
to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection’” to the
defendant,693 and that the states are entitled to substantial deference in their
judgments as to what is an appropriate balance between liberty and order in
light of their “considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure” and
usual grounding of the “criminal process . . . in centuries of common-law
tradition.”694 In this sense, the Medina Court does appear to eschew balancing
and to utilize an inquiry that is “narrower.”695
IV. THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
Over the roughly twelve decades since Hurtado, the Court has considered
a wide range of guidelines for determining the independent content of due
process. Of course, those guidelines were considered in quite different
contexts. Hurtado considered guidelines for a due process content that could
not overlap with the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights; the preincorporation cases following Hurtado considered guidelines for a due process
content that would both encompass some aspects of the restrictions imposed by
certain specific guarantees and add restrictions that had no parallel in those
guarantees; and the post-incorporation decisions considered guidelines for a
due process content that went beyond the specific guarantees, but operated
alongside an additional content that applied to the states in their full scope
almost every one of those specific guarantees. Even though the first two stages
dealt with a regime of constitutional regulation quite different than the postincorporation stage, no feature of the guidelines considered during those earlier
stages precluded their adoption or continued application during the postincorporation stage. Indeed, most of the guidelines accepted during those first
two stages remain open to consideration, if not actively supported, by the
current Court.
Taking account of the guidelines considered in all three stages, a wide
range of positions have been open to the Court, with most remaining viable
interest, may be considered in determining whether the state has made a rational decision, insofar
as rationality is an aspect of due process. See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
693. Medina, 505 U.S. at 451 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105). See also Spencer v. Texas,
385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967).
694. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-46, discussed supra text accompanying note 681.
695. See supra text accompanying note 680. The inquiry prescribed by Medina may be
“narrower” in that it makes it less likely that the Court will consider all of the factors noted in
Mathews, although it conceivably might. See supra note 692.
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today. Putting aside minor variations in approach, and looking only to major
lines of division, that range includes at least the following four possibilities for
setting the overall role of free-standing due process in the constitutional
regulation of criminal procedure: (1) a due process standard that insists only
upon a few basic elements of trial-type adjudication (along with adherence to
the standing law concept), and otherwise allows adoption of a wide variety of
rational procedures, including those borrowed from the civil system; (2) a
standard that gives free-standing due process a limited range of operation and
encourages narrow rulings in those areas, possibly reaching at points beyond
concern for adjudicatory fairness, but focusing primarily on ensuring that the
adjudicatory process does not convict the innocent and doing so primarily by
adding those core elements of the common law not contained in the Bill of
Rights specifics (e.g., proof beyond a reasonable doubt) and precluding
practices that clearly threaten the reliability of the process (e.g., the failure to
disclose material exculpatory evidence); (3) a due process standard, operating
alone or in conjunction with the second standard noted above, that gives a
preemptive influence to the specific guarantees, taking the form of either (i)
precluding additional regulation by free-standing due process (or perhaps only
free-standing substantive due process) where the subject matter is regulated by
a specific guarantee or (ii) simply preferring to ground constitutional restraints
on the specific guarantees rather than on free-standing due process in areas of
possible overlap; and (4) a due process standard that defines the content of
free-standing due process as encompassing both the basic procedural
protections of the common law and such additional protections as are
suggested by a more refined contemporary conception of justice (perhaps
applying a cost/benefit analysis to determine what new procedures are needed
to implement both the values of the common law and the added values of
contemporary conceptions of justice).
A similar range is suggested when one looks to specific factors that might
be weighed in determining the content of free-standing due process. Consider,
for example, the significance of historical sanction of the particular procedure
being challenged. The sanction of settled usage (which may be limited to
acceptance at common law at the time of the founding, may also include
acceptance at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, or may
even extend to encompass all long-standing traditions) may operate: (1) as a
shield against a due process challenge; (2) as a highly influential factor
favoring constitutionality, which may be overridden only where changes in the
structure of the process have eliminated the justification for the procedure or
the procedure is a historical idiosyncrasy, inconsistent with traditional values
of the common law process; and (3) as a highly influential factor, but also
subject to being overridden by the emergence of a contemporary sense of
justice reflecting different values (with that emergence evidenced by such
factors as a shift of the states away from the traditional practice). Similarly,
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where a state practice substantially departs from a core feature of the common
law, the Court has considered guidelines that would: (1) treat that departure as
suspect unless the Court determines that the value underlying that feature of
the common law is otherwise being accommodated; (2) treat that feature as
suspect absent widespread support for the departure among the states; and (3)
treat the departure as acceptable provided it has a rational grounding and does
not deny the basics of an adjudication (notice, right to present evidence, etc.).
Some of the positions set forth above clearly have been rejected, and
arguably none reflects perfectly the current state of Supreme Court precedent.
Yet that hardly forecloses considering the question of which of these positions
(or some other) most appropriately frames the content of free-standing due
process in a post-incorporation world. I believe that something can be said for
and against each of the above positions, and how they are finally evaluated
depends, in large part, on how one resolves several general issues of
constitutional interpretation (e.g., the appropriate character of judicial review,
including the proper role of originalism) and several issues of constitutional
interpretation especially relevant to the subject of criminal procedure (e.g., the
special significance of the criminal process to the preservation of individual
liberty, and the extent to which the Court has less or more expertise in this area
than in others).696 Others (including several of the commentators responding
to this article697) have given such issues far more attention than I, and I
therefore leave evaluating the wisdom of these different positions in their
capable hands. I will concentrate on a less controversial aspect of the history
set forth above—what it says about the judicial “craft” of the Supreme Court.
Over a period of almost 120 years, one would expect the style of opinion
writing to change, as it has.698 However, certain basics in appellate judicial

696. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2.9.
697. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits
of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149 (1998);
Ronald J. Allen, Constitutional Adjudication: The Demands of Knowledge and Epistemological
Modesty, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 436 (1993); Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 14; Donald
A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court, supra note 14; Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and
Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1003-22 (1989). Nowak, supra note
14; 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 228; ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS,
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997); Margaret L. Paris, Trusts, Lies, and
Interrogation, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 3 (1996); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466
(1996); Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771
(1998).
698. See Victoria F. Nourse, Making Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 1401 (1997); Schauer, supra note 23.
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opinions, such as the focus on clarity and explanation, remain constant.699
Therefore, where particular features reappear in opinions spread over many
decades and those features, at least on the surface, seem to be contrary to such
basics, that arguably suggests something substantive about the subject matter.
Two such features found in rulings on the independent content of due process
have been: (1) unacknowledged departures from guidelines established or
suggested in earlier rulings; and (2) a generality in the statement of guidelines
that has produced unresolved ambiguities.
A.

Unacknowledged departures

It is hardly surprising that guidelines for interpreting due process as
applied to criminal procedure should change over a period of 120 years.
Substantial change might be expected simply as a result of changes in
personnel, major shifts in the Court’s approach to judicial review, and changes
in the application of substantive and procedural due process outside of the
criminal justice field. In addition, as previously noted,700 the adoption of
selective incorporation so altered the role of free-standing due process in the
regulation of criminal procedure as to make almost certain the reconsideration
of previously established guidelines, if not their complete revision.
What is surprising is a dominant feature of the opinions adopting new and
different guidelines. Those opinions rejected prior guidelines simply by taking
a new approach; they did not acknowledge that the Court was departing from
reasoning of the earlier opinions. The acknowledgment that the Court had
shifted course came, if at all, long after the change was initially adopted. The
rejections of the positions taken in Hurtado provide three examples of such
unacknowledged departures.
Hurtado established that (1) procedures that had the sanction of historical
usage were per se consistent with due process,701 and (2) due process did not
mandate procedural rights that were to be found in the specific guarantees;702 it
also strongly suggested that (3) the procedural content of due process was
limited to such basics as notice and opportunity to be heard.703 During the preincorporation decades, each of these propositions was rejected. The second
proposition was rejected only thirteen years after Hurtado, with no reference to
Hurtado’s contrary reasoning.704 Eventually, in the Powell ruling, decided
almost fifty years after Hurtado, the Court recalled what had been said in
699. See Shauer, supra note 23. See generally ROBERT A. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL
OPINIONS (1974); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960).
700. See supra text accompanying notes 473-75.
701. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20 and 211.
702. See supra text accompanying notes 136-40 and 238.
703. See supra text accompanying notes 202-23 and 235.
704. See supra text accompanying note 283.
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Hurtado about due process overlapping with specific guarantees, noted that
post-Hurtado rulings had departed from that proposition, and politely put it to
rest.705
Hurtado’s first proposition was treated similarly. Over the years, the
historical practice came to either be ignored or to be described as a relevant
factor (but not as a shield for procedures that had the sanction of settled usage).
Indeed, this rejection of Hurtado’s settled-usage guideline was achieved with
so little discussion of the applicable standard that commentators have
disagreed as to exactly when that rejection occurred.706 Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip707 was the
first to note that what Hurtado had said on this issue had long since been
rejected by the Court. The Court has yet to acknowledge that Hurtado initially
suggested a narrow procedural due process, much more closely tied to
procedural basics than the broad ranging due process of today.
The practice of disregarding the analysis of earlier rulings is also seen in
other major shifts in the Court’s approach to determining the independent
content of due process. Over the decades of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the
Court moved to characterizing due process as an evolving concept.708 In doing
so, it did not acknowledge that the earlier cases which similarly had spoken of
due process and legal change had done so only with reference to providing the
flexibility needed to accommodate legislative change. When referring to the
character of the restraints imposed by due process, those opinions had not
spoken of recognizing new fundamental concepts of justice, but simply of
preserving those most basic principles recognized in the common law.709
Similarly, when the Court in Gerstein710 suggested that the process which
was due on a criminal procedure issue was that prescribed in an incorporated
guarantee speaking specifically to that issue (there the Fourth Amendment), it
did not acknowledge the seemingly contrary approach of earlier postincorporation rulings that had chosen to rely on due process rather than look to
what the specific guarantees required.711 So too, when later cases continued to
follow that pre-Gerstein approach,712 they did not acknowledge either Gerstein

705. See supra text accompanying notes 288-94.
706. See supra note 305.
707. See supra note 600.
708. See supra text accompanying notes 318-23.
709. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 130; supra notes 235 and 241.
710. See supra text accompanying note 582.
711. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), discussed supra text
accompanying note 584; Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971), discussed supra note 501;
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972), discussed supra text accompanying note 590.
712. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), discussed supra text
accompanying note 585; Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), discussed supra note 583.
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or those post-incorporation cases that had reached the due process issue only
after first finding the specific guarantees inapplicable.713
When the Court in the post-incorporation era decided that free-standing
due process should have a limited operation in light of the extensive regulation
of the criminal justice process by the incorporated guarantees, it described that
position as one the Court had been following—at least in the postincorporation era. No mention was made of Warren Court and Burger Court
decisions of that era that apparently viewed the role of free-standing due
process much more broadly. These were decisions that found in free-standing
due process a grounding for extending the policies of specific guarantees
beyond the stated limits of those guarantees,714 apparently ignoring the “careful
balance” those guarantees had struck between “liberty and order” in the
language that limited their scope.715 Giving free-standing due process a
limited role also suggests that rulings should be grounded on the specific
guarantees, rather than due process, where possible; yet no mention was made
of earlier rulings in the post-incorporation era that had ignored that
possibility.716
There is every reason to believe the Court was fully aware of what it was
doing when it failed to mention the contrary guidelines suggested in earlier
cases.717 Although there were dissents in some of those cases, the dissents also
did not point to the inconsistent guidelines offered in earlier cases. The
implication of such silence is that the Court simply did not attach any
precedential weight to its general descriptions of the character of due process.
The rulings in the earlier cases, including what was said there about the
particular procedural rights at issue, was not contrary to what the Court was
now saying about different procedural rights. Further commentary in earlier
opinions on the general character of due process was to be cited or disregarded
depending upon its persuasiveness, but it did not have to be distinguished, or
713. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 492.
714. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 492, 534, 537 and supra text accompanying notes 55758.
715. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992), quoted in supra note 485.
716. See, e.g., cases discussed supra notes 584-88.
717. Very often some of the very same Justices had been members of the Court that rendered
the earlier rulings. Also, some of the critical opinions, such as Justice Matthews opinion in
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1984), were among the Court’s most prominent. See, e.g.,
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 467 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(noting “the classic language of Mr. Justice Matthews in Hurtado”). While the first introduction
of law clerks, and then the substantial increase in their numbers, would have had an impact on
opinion writing, those developments should have given the Justices a broader rather than a
narrower recall of the subtleties of past decisions (assuming they wanted that information). See
generally WILLIAM DOMARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT, chs. 2 & 3 (1996) (discussing
role of law clerks in shaping the content of opinions, and noting law clerk influence in expanding
the range of citations).
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criticized and rejected.718 Insofar as stare decisis had any role to play in this
area of constitutional law,719 it certainly did not encompass such expressions of
judicial philosophy. There was no need to speak to the general philosophy or
rationale of past opinions where the specific rulings in those opinions were not
being challenged. It was sufficient that today’s opinion set forth the guidelines
accepted by the current majority, recognizing those guidelines would have no
power over future majorities beyond their power of persuasion.
B.

Unresolved ambiguities

From the very outset, as reflected in Hurtado, the Court has relied on
guidelines that are open to alternative interpretations.
In describing
fundamental rights, Hurtado used phrases that appeared to offer alternative
points of reference for determining whether a particular procedural right was
so clearly fundamental as to be protected by due process. At one point, the
Court suggested that the proper frame of reference was the Anglo-American
common law tradition and at another, it was the universality of the right to all
civilized systems.720 That ambiguity was carried forward in later descriptions
of the character of fundamental rights.721 It was not even acknowledged by the
Court until Duncan v. Louisiana,722 decided eight decades after Hurtado,
where the majority concluded (in a footnote) that the proper reference point
was the “Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.”723
The interpretive guidelines for free-standing due process have been filled
with similar inconsistencies or ambiguities, which the Court has found no need
to resolve. Consider, for example, the following: (1) in looking to historical
practice, is the key time frame the common law at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution (that which would have been known to those who ratified the
Fifth Amendment) or is the common law at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment equally significant, at least where the practice in
question was not known at the time of the founding, but was well established

718. The Court here arguably has been drawing a distinction between its general guidelines
and the “reasons” offered for the particular ruling (i.e., why it was that a particular procedural
right was or was not fundamental). Under this view, the “reasons” given for a ruling are narrower
than the Court’s complete “explanation” of how it arrived at the ruling. Relying on that
distinction arguably is inconsistent, however, with the purposes underlying the basic requirement
that an appellate court offer reasons for its ruling. See generally Frederick Schauer, Giving
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995); Schauer, supra note 23; Charles Fried, Constitutional
Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140 (1994); Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions
Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979).
719. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 2.9(a).
720. See supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
721. See supra text accompanying notes 255-56.
722. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
723. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14. See also discussion of Duncan supra note 463.
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prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment;724 (2) insofar as its suspect
character requires greater caution in relying upon substantive due process, as
suggested by Graham v. Connor,725 what distinguishes substantive due process
limits (e.g., Rochin726) from procedural due process limits when the particular
limit is being applied in the context of a criminal prosecution (why is it, for
example, that the Court has not viewed Graham as having a bearing upon the
due process grounding for excluding coerced confessions);727 and (3) what is
needed to establish that a general concept is so clearly at the core of due
process and a particular procedural right is so essential to implementing that
concept as to basically override the historical rejection of that procedural right
(indeed, in some instances, to render that historical practice not even worth
discussing)?728
Similar unanswered questions are posed in the Court’s shaping of its
rulings. For example, what considerations lead to the formulation of some due
process standards as per se prohibitions and others as prohibitions resulting in
a due process violation only where the circumstances suggest a likely
prejudicial impact.729 Why, in this connection, is the due process right to
appointed counsel on a probation revocation proceeding tied to a showing of
likely need and a due process right to appointed counsel automatic on a first
appeal of right?730 Why is the knowing introduction of perjured testimony at
trial a per se violation, requiring a reversal of a conviction (absent a showing of
harmless error), and the knowing failure to introduce exculpatory evidence a
due process violation requiring a new trial only upon a defense showing of a
reasonable probability that a different verdict would have been reached except
for the prosecutor’s failure to disclose?731
The failure to answer such questions may be the product of an inability to
muster a majority for a single position. More likely, however, that failure
reflects the view that the guidelines better serve the institutional needs of the
Court by not answering such questions. Over the years, some Justices have
been far less comfortable in applying the due process clause than others. But
even those Justices who have shown the strongest interest in restricting the

724. See supra note 99 and text accompanying notes 167-68 and 619-20.
725. See supra text accompanying note 559.
726. See supra note 270.
727. See supra notes 576 and 577.
728. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 656-64.
729. See supra text accompanying notes 540-41 and 671.
730. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), discussed supra text accompanying note
537, and Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), discussed supra text accompanying note 534. See
also 3 TREATISE, supra note 1, § 11.1(b) (noting use of “flat lines” in determining scope of due
process right to counsel in postconviction proceedings except for Gagnon).
731. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (noting this distinction); Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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scope of judicial review under free-standing due process, such as Justices
Black and Scalia, have recognized that some leeway in the exercise of
judgment is inevitable.732 The task of formulating guidelines for applying due
process to the criminal justice process appears to be viewed as directed more at
setting a tone than giving detailed directions. Scholars may desire to draw
significant meaning from every different shading of language, but that has not
been the history of the Court’s own reading of its language. It has utilized
standards stated with sufficient breadth and with sufficient shading of outlook
as to accommodate major shifts in approach as changes in the Court’s
composition produces major shifts in the perspective of the Court majority.
This has allowed the Court to adhere, for example, to Hurtado’s initial
definition of fundamental rights for almost 120 years while modifying from
one generation to the next the role of the independent content of due process.
The Court’s traditional approach to formulating due process guidelines
apparently has its benefits,733 but it would be refreshing (and perhaps even
helpful to the courts and legislatures engaged in shaping the state criminal
justice systems) if a Court majority some day would surprise us with an
opinion along the following lines:
We, of course, continue to apply the fundamental fairness doctrine in
determining the content of due process not dictated by incorporated provisions
of the Bill of Rights. Over the years, we have hardly been consistent in our
interpretation of that standard and we cannot promise consistency for a future
Court with a different composition. But a majority today has settled on an
interpretation of fundamental fairness that we will apply in our future
decisions. What follows are the guidelines we will utilize in determining what
constitutes a denial of fundamental fairness. These guidelines, as we will point
out, are not consistent with certain guidelines noted in past opinions. We do
not reject the results reached in those cases, but do reject those guidelines
inconsistent with ours. At the same time, we should note that we are not
attempting to bind our successors. Whatever weight is given to stare decisis in
constitutional law obviously does not apply to due process guidelines (as
opposed to due process rulings), but clarity and consistency for the tenure of a
particular group of judges is preferable to vagueness, a constant shifting, and a
mere facade of continuity.

732. See supra notes 446-50 and 603.
733. For example, the development of standards for determining the content of free-standing
due process arguably has been no less result oriented than the development of the selective
incorporation doctrine, yet the Court here certainly has not faced the same type of criticism. See
supra text accompanying note 467 as to the character of criticism produced by the selective
incorporation doctrine.

